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ABSTRACT 
The wetlands, floodplains, inland waterway, and soil erosion 
and sedimentation control provisions of Michigan’s Natural 
Resources Environmental Protection Act (NREPA) and implementing 
regulations, and the NREPA enforcement and monitoring practices of 
the Michigan Department of Environmental Quality, and the 
Michigan Department of Natural Resources have effectively been 
“Europeanized” at the expense of the constitutionally protected 
private property rights of Michigan’s hydroelectric dam 
owner/operators, farmers, and other landowners. Their 
Europeanization was the natural consequence of international 
agreements and initiatives covering the Great Lakes that incorporate 
international legal and scientific norms and standards such as 
Europe’s precautionary principle, ecosystem-based management, 
marine spatial planning, and weight-of-the-evidence standards.  
One such international agreement is the Canada–U.S. Great 
Lakes Water Quality Agreement (GLWQA). Little is publicly known 
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about the GLWQA, its most recent 2012 amendment, and the other 
transborder agreements reached and initiatives pursued by the 
national governments of Canada and the United States and by the 
governments of the Canadian provinces and the eight U.S. states 
bordering the Great Lakes. These initiatives include inter alia the 
Great Lakes Regional Collaboration (GLRC) and the Great Lakes 
Restoration Initiative (GLRI). Even less is known about how these 
agreements and initiatives incorporate the legal and scientific norms 
noted above which are championed by the European and global 
environmental movements now anchored in the United Nations (U.N.) 
Commission on Sustainable Development (CSD) and the United 
Nations Environment Programme (UNEP). These programs spawned 
the design, implementation, and enforcement of strict liability 
environmental legal regimes currently applicable in the eight Great 
Lakes States that are anathema to the exercise of constitutionally 
protected private property rights. 
This Article will identify the relationship between these 
agreements and initiatives and the strict liability environmental 
(NREPA) legal regime they have spawned in the Great Lakes State of 
Michigan. It also will explain how that regime is anathema to the 
exercise by Michigan’s hydroelectric dam owner/operators, farmers, 
and other landowners of their constitutionally protected private 
property rights. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
It is readily apparent that the unique constitutional republic that 
was formed on September 17, 1787,1 at the Constitutional Convention 
in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, grounded in a decentralized 
constitution-based framework with a federal government established 
to serve We the People has since devolved into an unaccountable 
runaway administrative state quickly approaching those of continental 
Europe.2 The runaway administrative state is rooted in the New Deal 
policies of the 1930s, which arguably arose as a compromise between 
the Socialist, Communist, Progressive, Populist, and Labor Parties 
that had then threatened to destabilize the nation in the wake of the 
Great Depression.3 The ‘statist’ conception of legal rights that 
thereafter evolved has since effectively been touted through 
revisionist rebranding as the ‘silver bullet’ that saved capitalism.4 The 
administrative state has been further enabled by unthoughtful (or 
thoughtful) judicial deference on both sides of the political aisle to 
federal agency determinations presumed to be anchored in 
dispassionate technical expertise rather than political agenda, such that 
 
 1. See The Constitution: How Did it Happen?, U.S. NAT’L ARCHIVES, 
https://www.archives.gov/founding-docs/constitution/how-did-it-happen 
[https://perma.cc/H9V7-2BKD] (last visited Oct. 30, 2019).  
 2. See id. (supplementing this framework on December 15, 1791, by ten 
amendments affirmatively guaranteeing natural rights-based individual liberty, 
known as the Bill of Rights); see also Roger Pilon, Declaration of Independence, U.S., 
in INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES, 254–55 (William A. 
Darity ed., 2d ed. 2008); see, e.g., Adam Candeub, Transparency in the Administrative 
State, 51 HOUS. L. REV. 385, 386 (2013); Richard Epstein, The Perilous Position of 
the Rule of Law and the Administrative State, 36 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 5, 18 
(2013); Richard Epstein, Why the Modern Administrative State Is Inconsistent with 
the Rule of Law, 1 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 491, 508 (2008); Jessica Mantel, 
Procedural Safeguards for Agency Guidance: A Source of Legitimacy for the 
Administrative State, 61 ADMIN. L. REV. 343, 347 (2009). See generally THE 
DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE (U.S. 1776). 
 3. See generally Seymour Martin Lipset & Gary Marks, How FDR Saved 
Capitalism, HOOVER INSTITUTION (Jan. 30, 2001), https://www.hoover.org/research/ 
how-fdr-saved-capitalism [https://perma.cc/57TP-8GW5]. 
 4. See Jerry Mashaw, “Rights” in the Federal Administrative State, 92 
YALE L.J. 1129, 1129–73 (1983); see also John Hardman, The Great Depression and 
the New Deal, EDGE, https://web.stanford.edu/class/e297c/ 
poverty_prejudice/soc_sec/hgreat.htm [https://perma.cc/5L7C-JNRE] (last updated 
July 26, 1999); Louis Menand, How the Deal Went Down, THE NEW YORKER (Mar. 
4, 2013), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2013/03/04/how-the-deal-went-
down [https://perma.cc/Y66Z-YA8Z].  
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the rule of law and the fiber of the United States Constitution and the 
Bill of Rights are now seriously threatened.5 
Indeed, U.S. Supreme Court Chief Justice John Roberts, joined 
in his dissenting opinion by Justices Kennedy and Alito in City of 
Arlington v. Federal Communications Commission, a case involving 
review of the Chevron doctrine, observed how administrative agencies 
today  
as a practical matter . . . exercise legislative power, . . . executive 
power[,] . . . and judicial power, [and how the] accumulation of these 
powers in the same hands is not an occasional or isolated exception to the 
constitutional plan[, but rather,] a central feature of modern American 
government. The administrative state “wields vast power and touches 
almost every aspect of daily life.” The Framers could hardly have 
envisioned today’s “vast and varied bureaucracy” and the authority 
administrative agencies now hold over our economic, social, and political 
activities. “[T]he administrative state with its reams of regulations would 
leave them rubbing their eyes.” And the federal bureaucracy continues to 
grow . . . .6  
In their dissenting opinion, these Justices could not help but to cite to 
Founding Father James Madison, who correctly stated in Federalist 
No. 47 that the “accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive, and 
judiciary, in the same hands . . . may justly be pronounced the very 
definition of tyranny.”7  
These same Justices in Perez v. Mortgage Bankers Association, 
in three separate concurring opinions, first expressed their desire to 
revisit the U.S. Supreme Court’s prior precedents resulting in federal 
courts’ near-reflexive deference to what they believed was U.S. 
agency expertise.8 Justices Alito, Scalia, and Thomas authored rather 
strongly worded concurring opinions expressing their admonition and 
disdain for federal courts’ frequent deference and consequent transfer 
 
 5. See Richard Faulk, America’s Administrative State: Tracking the Origins 
and Consequences of Judicial Deference to Federal Agencies (Wash. Legal Found. 
Critical Legal Issues Working Paper Series, Working Paper No. 196, 2016); Gregory 
Jacob & Lynsey Ramos, Judicial Review of Informal Agency Pronouncements: Any 
Clearer After Young v. UPS and Perez v. MBA? (Wash. Legal Found. Vol. 30, Legal 
Backgrounder No. 16, 2015); Jeffrey Wall & Owen Wolfe, Why ‘Chevron’ Deference 
for Hybrid Statutes Might Be a No-No (Wash. Legal Found. Vol. 25, Legal Opinion 
Letter No. 16, 2016).  
 6. City of Arlington v. FCC, 569 U.S. 290, 312–13 (2013) (Roberts, C.J., 
dissenting) (citations omitted). 
 7. Id. at 312. 
 8. See Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass’n, 135 S. Ct. 1199, 1210 (2015) (Alito, 
J., concurring); id. at 1211 (Scalia, J., concurring); id. at 1213 (Thomas, J., 
concurring). 
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of judicial power to executive agencies’ interpretations of their own 
regulations.9 These Justices also expressed alarm concerning 
Congress’s ongoing delegation of lawmaking authority to executive 
agencies.10 In their opinion, the judicial and legislative branches’ 
deference to Article II institutions had largely contributed to the rapid 
expansion of the administrative state and the aggrandizement of 
administrative agency power.11  
Arguably, the U.S. Supreme Court’s recent grants of certiorari 
(cert) give credence to those opinions.12 In PDR Network, LLC v. 
Carlton & Harris Chiropractic, Inc., cert was granted based on the 
following legal question: “[W]hether the Hobbs Act required the 
 
 9. See id. at 1210 (Alito, J., concurring); id. at 1211 (Scalia, J., concurring); 
id. at 1213 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 10. See, e.g., id. at 1210 (Alito, J., concurring). 
 11. See id. at 1210 (Alito, J., concurring) (referring to how the Paralyzed 
Veterans of America doctrine “may have been prompted by an understandable concern 
about the aggrandizement of the power of administrative agencies as a result of the 
combined effect of (1) the effective delegation to agencies by Congress of huge swaths 
of lawmaking authority, (2) the exploitation by agencies of the uncertain boundary 
between legislative and interpretive rules, and (3) this Court’s cases holding that 
courts must ordinarily defer to an agency’s interpretation of its own ambiguous 
regulations”); see also id. at 1211 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“‘The [APA] was framed 
against a background of rapid expansion of the administrative process as a check upon 
administrators whose zeal might otherwise have carried them to excesses not 
contemplated in legislation creating their offices.’ The Act guards against excesses in 
rulemaking by requiring notice and comment. Before an agency makes a rule, it 
normally must notify the public of the proposal, invite them to comment on its 
shortcomings, consider and respond to their arguments, and explain its final decision 
in a statement of the rule’s basis and purpose. The APA exempts interpretive rules 
from these requirements. But this concession to agencies was meant to be more 
modest in its effects than it is today. For despite exempting interpretive rules from 
notice and comment, the Act provides that ‘the reviewing court shall . . . interpret 
constitutional and statutory provisions, and determine the meaning or applicability of 
the terms of an agency action.’ The Act thus contemplates that courts, not agencies, 
will authoritatively resolve ambiguities in statutes and regulations.”) (citations 
omitted); id. at 1213 (Thomas, J., concurring) (“I write separately because these cases 
call into question the legitimacy of our precedents requiring deference to 
administrative interpretations of regulations. That line of precedents, beginning with 
Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410 (1945), requires judges to defer 
to agency interpretations of regulations, thus, as happened in these cases, giving legal 
effect to the interpretations rather than the regulations themselves. Because this 
doctrine effects a transfer of the judicial power to an executive agency, it raises 
constitutional concerns. This line of precedents undermines our obligation to provide 
a judicial check on the other branches, and it subjects regulated parties to precisely 
the abuses that the Framers sought to prevent.”). 
 12. See, e.g., PDR Network, LLC v. Carlton & Harris Chiropractic, Inc., 139 
S. Ct. 2051, 2053 (2019); Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400, 2408 (2019). 
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District Court [in this case] to accept [the] FCC’s legal interpretation 
of the [Telephone Consumer Protection Act].”13 At least one legal 
commentator believes this case will have significant implications 
beyond the FCC because the Hobbs Act, also known as the 
Administrative Procedure Act, “provides a mechanism for judicial 
review of certain administrative orders.”14 This Act predates and is at 
tension with the Chevron doctrine, which requires lower courts to 
defer to an agency’s ruling on an issue on which a statute is silent or 
ambiguous.15  
The Supreme Court issued its ruling in PDR Network, LLC on 
June 20, 2019, holding that the extent to which a final agency action 
warrants deference from lower federal courts will depend on the 
resolution of two sets of preliminary questions.16 First, it must be 
determined whether the final agency action (e.g., the 2006 FCC Order) 
was “the equivalent of a ‘legislative rule’” or “an ‘interpretative rule,’” 
the former but not the latter of which has the force and effect of law.17 
Thus, an interpretative rule “may not be binding on a district court, 
and a district court therefore may not be required to adhere to it.”18 
Second, it must be determined whether the litigant “ha[d] a ‘prior’ and 
‘adequate’ opportunity to seek judicial review of the Order” within the 
statutory scheme in question.19 The concurring opinions of Justices 
 
 13. U.S. Supreme Court Balks on Judicial Deference to FCC in TCPA Case, 
JDSUPRA (June 26, 2019), https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/u-s-supreme-court-
balks-on-judicial-82106/ [https://perma.cc/3SHF-7X79]; see also PDR Network, 139 
S. Ct. at 2053; SCOTUSBLOG, http://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/pdr-
network-llc-v-carlton-harris-chiropractic-inc [https://perma.cc/7MGB-JQMZ] (last 
visited Sept. 19, 2019).  
 14. Artin Betpera, Breaking Down the Supreme Court’s Grant of Certiorari 
to Consider Whether the Hobbs Act Requires District Courts to Follow the FCC’s 
TCPA Rulings, NAT’L L. REV. (Nov. 14, 2018), https://www.natlawreview.com/ 
article/deference-dimension-breaking-down-supreme-court-s-grant-certiorari-to-
consider [https://perma.cc/2AJV-2XPC]. 
 15. Id.  
 16. See PDR Network, 139 S. Ct. at 2053. 
 17. Id. at 2055 (citations omitted) (comparing how, because “legislative 
rule[s]” are “issued by an agency pursuant to statutory authority,” they have “the 
‘force and effect of law,’” whereas, “an ‘interpretative rule’ . . . simply ‘advis[es] the 
public of the agency’s construction of the statutes and rules which [they] administer[]’ 
and lacks ‘the force and effect of law’”).  
 18. Id. (“[W]e say ‘may’ because we do not definitively resolve these issues 
here.”).  
 19. Id. (citing 5 U.S.C. § 703 (2012)). For example, if “the Hobbs Act’s 
exclusive-review provision . . . requir[ing] certain challenges to FCC final orders to 
be brought in a court of appeals ‘within 60 days after’ the entry of the order in 
question” did not afford the litigant a “‘prior’ and ‘adequate’ opportunity for judicial 
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Thomas and Gorsuch further emphasized that an agency’s 
“interpretati[on of] a statute does not ‘determine the validity’ of an 
agency order interpreting or implementing the statute” because only 
the court has the (Article III) power to make such a determination.20  
Cert was granted in Kisor v. Wilkie based on similar grounds, 
namely “whether the [Supreme] Court should overrule Auer v. 
Robbins [] and Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., [] decisions 
holding that courts must defer to an agency’s reasonable interpretation 
of its own ambiguous regulation.”21 As one legal commentator 
emphasized, although “[t]he Kisor case is not an environmental 
case, . . . the Supreme Court’s ruling could have significant impacts 
for environmental litigation. Enforcement actions, permitting 
processes, and other agency actions are all impacted by the deference 
agencies receive as a result of the Auer deference doctrine.”22  
The Supreme Court issued its ruling in Kisor on June 26, 2019, 
setting forth a roadmap effectively cabining the scope of Auer 
deference.23 The Court held “[f]irst and foremost” that a court should 
not defer to an agency’s interpretation of its own ambiguous rules 
“unless the [agency] regulation is genuinely ambiguous.”24 According 
to the Court, an ambiguity evaluation requires the exhaustion of “all 
 
review of the Order,” then “it may be that the Administrative Procedure Act permits 
[the litigant] to challenge the validity of the Order in [an] enforcement proceeding 
even if the Order is deemed a ‘legislative’ rule.” Id. at 2056. The Court, again, went 
on to state that “[w]e again say ‘may’ because we do not definitively decide this issue 
here.” Id. 
 20. Id. at 2056 (Thomas, J., concurring) (“As I have explained elsewhere, 
‘the judicial power, as originally understood, requires a court to exercise its 
independent judgment in interpreting and expounding upon the laws.’”). 
 21. Jerry Stouck et al., Supreme Court to Decide If Courts Must Defer to an 
Agency’s Construction of Ambiguous Regulations, NAT’L L. REV. (Apr. 18, 2019), 
https://www.natlawreview.com/article/supreme-court-to-decide-if-courts-must-
defer-to-agency-s-construction-ambiguous [https://perma.cc/7S59-EF3J]; see also 
Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400, 2408 (2019); SCOTUSblog, http://www.scotusblog. 
com/case-files/cases/kisor-v-wilkie/ [https://perma.cc/2LNY-D5GP] (last visited Oct. 
30, 2019). 
 22. Brooke M. Wahlberg, U.S. Supreme Court Will Revisit Auer Deference, 
LEXOLOGY (Dec. 11, 2018), https://www.lexology.com/library/ 
detail.aspx?g=1110a677-ec87-4ab6-befc-d5ef424a449a [https://perma.cc/7PUG-
QG9]. 
 23. See Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2418 (explaining that Auer deference often does 
not apply). 
 24. Id. at 2415 (holding that, under Auer and Bowles, “[i]f uncertainty does 
not exist, there is no plausible reason for deference”).  
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the ‘traditional tools’ of construction.”25 It engenders a careful review 
of “the text, structure, history, and purpose of a regulation, in all the 
ways it would if it had no agency to fall back on.”26 Where a district 
court’s evaluation of an agency regulation leads it to conclude that 
genuine ambiguity remains, “the agency’s reading must still be 
‘reasonable.’”27 In addition, the district court “must make an 
independent inquiry into whether the character and context of the 
agency interpretation entitles it to controlling weight.”28 This will 
depend on whether the agency’s regulatory interpretation is an 
“‘authoritative’ or ‘official position,’” as opposed to an “ad hoc 
statement not reflecting the agency’s views.”29 Only an “official 
position,” one that emanates from the agency’s highest/head official 
(e.g., “the Secretary or his chief advisers”), is “published in the 
Federal Register,” is “approved by the agency head,” and/or is 
“understood to make authoritative policy in the relevant context,” will 
be entitled to controlling weight and, consequently, to judicial 
deference.30 Furthermore, the Court held that “the agency’s 
interpretation must in some way implicate its substantive [or policy] 
expertise” relative to the expertise of the court in a given issue.31 The 
Court finally held that to receive Auer deference, “an agency’s reading 
of a rule must reflect ‘fair and considered judgment,’” rather than a 
convenient agency litigation position or a defense of a past agency 
practice, and must not “create[] ‘unfair surprise’ to regulated 
 
 25. Id. (quoting Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 
837, 843 n.9 (1984)). 
 26. Id.  
 27. Id. (quoting Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 512 U.S. 504, 515 
(1994)) (explaining how “the agency’s reading must fall ‘within the bounds of 
reasonable interpretation’” taking into consideration the regulation’s text, structure, 
history, and purpose). 
 28. Id. at 2416 (citations omitted). 
 29. Id.  
 30. Id. (citations omitted). 
 31. Id. at 2417. 
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parties.”32 In the end, a “court must assess whether the interpretation 
is of the sort that Congress would want to receive deference.”33 
The Clean Water Act (CWA), and especially those of its 
provisions interpreted by federal courts to protect wetlands, is one of 
the primary vehicles through which the administrative state has 
expanded since the 1970s.34 Former Pennsylvania Congressman Tom 
Ridge put his finger on it when he explained in a 1993 Erie Times 
article what legal experts had come to realize was federal agency, 
rather than Congress, made wetlands law.35 
The gleaning by activist federal courts from unreliable snippets 
of legislative history of wetlands protection from a statute that did not 
refer to the term “wetlands” until the CWA’s 1977 amendments, and 
then only once in a single provision intended to delegate responsibility 
for CWA implementation to the States, has its roots in the 
environmental movements of the 1970s.36 These movements were the 
result of the Nixon administration’s 1970 creation of the U.S. 
Environmental Protection Agency (USEPA) via Reorganization Plan 
No. 3,37 its signing into law Congress’s 1972 revision of the Federal 
Water Pollution Control Act (the CWA 1977’s predecessor statute),38 
 
 32. Id. at 2417–18 (citations omitted) (“That means . . . that a court should 
decline to defer to a merely ‘convenient litigating position’ or ‘post hoc 
rationalizatio[n] advanced’ to ‘defend past agency action against attack.’” (quoting 
Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 567 U.S. 142, 155 (2012))); see also id. 
at 2418 (declaring “a court may not defer to a new interpretation, whether or not 
introduced in litigation, that creates ‘unfair surprise’ to regulated parties” and thus 
disrupt their reasonable expectations based on prior agency practice (quoting Long 
Island Care at Home, Ltd. v. Coke, 551 U.S. 158, 170 (2007))). 
 33. Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2424 (citation omitted). 
 34. See Lawrence A. Kogan, Harmonizing ‘Converted Wetland’ Under the 
Clean Water Act and Food Security Act Would Reaffirm Congress’ Intent to Limit 
EPA and Army Corps 404 Jurisdiction, 12 KY. J. OF EQUINE, AGRIC. & NAT. 
RESOURCE L. 2–7, 9–22, 31–51 (2019–2020).  
 35. See Bill McKinney, Case for Wetlands Reform Proven by Erie Cases, 
ERIE TIMES, Dec. 22, 1993 (“‘Over the years, through regulatory agency action and 
the courts, there developed a federal land use control policy which Congress never 
voted on and which no president ever signed into, law’ . . . . ‘Congress has a job to 
do,’ [and] ‘[w]e have to bring rationality to a situation in which bureaucracies have 
run amok.’”) (citations omitted). 
 36. See Kogan, Harmonizing ‘Converted Wetland’ Under the Clean Water 
Act and Food Security Act, supra note 34, at 18–22, 44–51. 
 37. See Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1970, 35 Fed. Reg. 15,623 (Oct. 6, 
1970) (establishing the Environmental Protection Agency); see also EPA, Initial 
Organization of the EPA, Order No. 1110.2 (Dec. 4, 1970). 
 38. See Federal Water Pollution Control Act, Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat. 
816 (1972). 
698 Michigan State Law Review  2019 
and its execution of the first iteration of the Canada–U.S. Great Lakes 
Water Quality Agreement (GLWQA).39 Former President Nixon 
clearly “recognized the huge political power of environmentalism, 
which blossomed into a popular movement just around the time of his 
election,” and “[p]oliticians, both Democratic and Republican, were 
falling over themselves to claim the mantle of environmental 
advocacy.”40  
Little is publicly known about the GLWQA and its most recent 
amendment. Likewise, little is publicly known about the other 
transborder agreements reached and the initiatives pursued by the 
national governments of Canada and the United States and by the 
governments of the Canadian provinces and the U.S. states bordering 
the Great Lakes. Two such initiatives that have arisen since the birth 
of the American environmental movement are the Great Lakes 
Regional Collaboration (GLRC) and the Great Lakes Restoration 
Initiative (GLRI).41 Even less is publicly known about how those 
North America-focused agreements and initiatives incorporate the 
legal and scientific norms now anchored in United Nations treaties and 
programs championed by the European and global environmental 
movements.42 These include the 1992 United Nations Commission on 
Sustainable Development and the United Nations Environment 
Programme,43 which have since influenced the design, 
 
 39. See Canada and U.S. Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement: Overview, 
GOV’T CANADA, https://www.canada.ca/en/environment-climate-change/services/ 
great-lakes-protection/canada-united-states-water-quality-agreement/overview.html 
[https://perma.cc/8EC8-EKZ4] (last modified July 28, 2017). 
 40. Meir Rinde, Richard Nixon and the Rise of American Environmentalism, 
SCI. HIST. INST. (June 2, 2017), https://www.sciencehistory.org/distillations/ 
magazine/richard-nixon-and-the-rise-of-american-environmentalism [https://perma. 
cc/4FSE-GELU].  
 41. See GREAT LAKES REGIONAL COLLABORATION, GREAT LAKES REGIONAL 
COLLABORATION STRATEGY TO RESTORE AND PROTECT THE GREAT LAKES 1, 4 (2005).  
 42. See Lawrence A. Kogan, Discerning the Forest from the Trees: How 
Governments Use Ostensibly Private and Voluntary Standards to Avoid WTO 
Culpability, 2 GLOBAL TRADE & CUSTOMS J. 319, 321 (2007); see also D.J. PETERSON, 
TROUBLED LANDS: THE LEGACY OF SOVIET ENVIRONMENTAL DESTRUCTION 
(Westview Press, 1993); Chris Williams, Marxism and the Environment: An Excerpt 
from the New Ecology and Socialism, 72 INT’L SOCIALIST REV. (2010), 
https://isreview.org/issue/72/marxism-and-environment [https://perma.cc/6LTJ-
AFBJ].  
 43. See U.N. SUSTAINABLE DEV. GOALS KNOWLEDGE PLATFORM, COMM’N 
ON SUSTAINABLE DEV., https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/intergovernmental/csd 
[https://perma.cc/BXD7-DCSW]; see also Pamela S. Chasek, The U.N. Comm’n on 
Sustainable Dev.: The First Five Years, Prepared for Delivery at the United Nations 
University Conference “The United Nations and the Global Environment in the 21st 
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implementation, and enforcement of strict liability environmental 
laws and regulations in the eight Great Lakes States.  
I. PRESIDENTIAL GREAT LAKES-RELATED POLICY FRAMEWORKS 
2004–2016 
A. Presidential Executive Order Creates Great Lakes Regional 
Collaboration (GRLC) 
On May 18, 2004, the White House issued Presidential 
Executive Order (E.O.) 13340: “Establishment of Great Lakes 
Interagency Task Force and Promotion of a Regional Collaboration of 
National Significance for the Great Lakes.”44 The policy objective of 
this E.O. was “to support local and regional efforts to address 
environmental challenges and to encourage citizen community 
stewardship” and “to establish a regional collaboration to address 
nationally significant environmental and natural resource issues 
involving the Great Lakes.”45 This E.O. established an Interagency 
Task Force within the USEPA which became known as the “Great 
Lakes Interagency Task Force.”46  
The Interagency Task Force was responsible for (1) helping to 
establish a collaborative process for the Task Force and Working 
Groups to develop policies, activities, and priorities for the Great 
Lakes system; (2) ensuring coordinated federal government and third 
party scientific research and actions; (3) coordinating federal policies, 
strategies, and projects for restoring and protecting the Great Lakes 
system; and (4) developing outcome-based goals and science-based 
indicators of water quality and related environmental factors.47 The 
Task Force was based in USEPA’s Great Lakes National Program 
Office,48 consisted of a number of federal agencies, reported to the 
 
Century: From Common Challenges to Shared Responsibilities” (November 14–15, 
1997); About UN Environment, U.N. ENV’T PROGRAMME, https://www. 
unenvironment.org/about-un-environment [https://perma.cc/9RME-GZVH] (last 
visited Oct. 30, 2019) (“The United Nations Environment Programme (UN 
Environment) is the leading global environmental authority that sets the global 
environmental agenda, promotes the coherent implementation of the environmental 
dimension of sustainable development within the United Nations system, and serves 
as an authoritative advocate for the global environment.”).  
 44. Exec. Order No. 13,340, 69 Fed. Reg. 29,043 (May 18, 2004).  
 45. Id.  
 46. Id.  
 47. See id.  
 48. See id.  
700 Michigan State Law Review  2019 
President via the Council on Environmental Quality,49 and established 
a Great Lakes Regional Working Group composed of representatives 
from the Task Force agencies.50  
In December 2004, a partnership comprised of federal, state, and 
local government officials and other stakeholders, known as the Great 
Lakes Regional Collaboration of National Significance (GLRC), was 
formed consistent with the Bush administration E.O.51 It was 
established for purposes of developing a strategic plan to restore and 
protect the Great Lakes ecosystems.52 This partnership consisted of 
“[e]ight Strategy Teams, each focusing on a different issue affecting 
the Great Lakes basin,” that accepted guidance from an “Executive 
Committee made up of senior elected and appointed officials.”53 In 
December 2005, the GLRC Strategy was released to the public and 
posted to the website of the Conference of Great Lakes and St. 
Lawrence Governors and Premiers.54 
The GLRC Strategy set forth a number of recommendations.55 
They included habitat conservation and species management, which 
focused in part on reestablishing and preserving native fish 
communities, as well as wetlands and riparian (streams) habitats in 
Great Lakes tributaries by means of regulation and enforcement.56 The 
GLRC objectives for these recommendations inter alia were (1) to 
ensure self-sustaining native and migratory fish and wildlife 
communities in open and nearshore waters consistent with the “Joint 
Strategic Plan for the Management of Great Lakes Fisheries”; (2) to 
“[r]estore or protect 550,000 acres of wetlands and associated uplands 
(1.1M acres)” through enhancement of federal and states wetlands 
regulations and enforcement measures; (3) to restore river and stream 
natural flow regimes to ensure connectivity between lakes, streams, 
rivers, wetlands, and connecting channels and floodplains and ensure 
“[b]arrier-free access to cold and warm water tributary spawning and 
 
 49. See id.  
 50. See id. 
 51. See GREAT LAKES REGIONAL COLLABORATION STRATEGY TO RESTORE 
AND PROTECT THE GREAT LAKES, supra note 41, at 1, 4. 
 52. See id. 
 53. See id. 
 54. See id.; see also The Great Lakes Regional Collaboration, GREAT LAKES 
ST. LAWRENCE GOVERNORS & PREMIERS, http://www.gsgp.org/projects/protection-
and-restoration/great-lakes-regional-collaboration/ [https://perma.cc/55ZV-7FCA] 
(last visited Oct. 30, 2019). 
 55. GREAT LAKES REGIONAL COLLABORATION STRATEGY TO RESTORE AND 
PROTECT THE GREAT LAKES, supra note 41, at 17–18.  
 56. See id. at 5.  
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nursery habitats . . . to sustain migratory fishes”; (4) to protect or 
restore 10,000 acres of high priority coastal and upland/inland habitats 
per year across the basin to control erosion and to ensure groundwater 
is recharged; and (5) to increase funding of habitat conservation and 
species management by $288.7 million a year via increases in 
authorized funding and creation of new appropriations and 
authorizations.57 
In addition, the GLRC set forth recommendations to restore all 
forty-three areas of concern (AOCs) previously identified as 
“impaired” in the 1987 amendments to the Great Lakes Water Quality 
Agreement (GLWQA).58 This impairment arose from contaminated 
sediments, sewage treatment plant discharges and combined sewer 
overflows, nonpoint source runoff, hazardous waste site runoff, and 
habitat degradation and destruction.59 The GLRC emphasized 
amending, reauthorizing, and increasing funding to the Great Lakes 
Legacy Act in the amount of $150 million “[o]ver the next five years” 
and expanding federal–state collaboration efforts to ensure execution 
of such recommendations.60 
Furthermore, the GLRC set forth recommendations to reduce or 
prevent nonpoint sources of pollution from nutrients, contaminants, 
pathogens, sedimentations, and altered flow regimes and to protect 
and restore Great Lakes basin wetlands.61 The GLRC’s ultimate goal 
was to “[m]easurably reduce at least hundreds of thousands of tons of 
sediment, pounds of phosphorous loading, and pounds of nitrogen 
loading [into] the Great Lakes basin,” focusing on the land 
development and agricultural sectors.62 The GLRC established for the 
Great Lakes basin the following milestones: (1) by 2010, protection, 
restoration, recovery of 550,000 acres of wetlands (consistent with 
habitat preservation goals); (2) by 2010, creation of 335,000 acres of 
new wetlands buffers; (3) by 2010, ensure residue management of two 
million new acres of cropland to ensure 40% soil loss (erosion) 
reduction; (4) by 2010, triple the number of certified nutrient 
management planning (CNMP) providers to assist farmers in the Great 
Lakes basin; (5) by 2015, protection, restoration, recovery of 450,000 
additional wetlands acres; (6) by 2015, ensure residue management of 
800,000 new acres of cropland; (7) by 2015, ensure 70% of all 
 
 57. Id. at 25–27. 
 58. See id. at 36. 
 59. See id.  
 60. Id. at 36–40. 
 61. See id. at 41–46. 
 62. Id. at 42–44. 
702 Michigan State Law Review  2019 
livestock production in the U.S. portion of the Great Lakes basin is 
covered by certified, phosphorous-based CNMPs; and (8) by 2020, 
creation of 665,000 additional acres of new wetlands buffers.63 The 
GLRC recommended $1 billion of funding until 2020 to restore 
wetlands buffers.64  
Lastly, the GLRC recommended four actions to promote 
sustainable development or sustainability.65 These include (1) 
adapting and maintaining dedicated state and federal funding (grant, 
loan, and subsidy) programs with adequate resources to promote 
sustainability across all “sectors of stakeholders”;66 (2) aligning 
governance (laws and regulations) to enhance sustainable planning 
and resource management; (3) rebranding and publicizing the Great 
Lakes as a positive destination at which to work, live, and play; and 
(4) implementing the sustainable development strategy 
recommendations.67 These recommendations were accompanied by an 
extensive sustainable development appendix.68 The appendix, in part, 
defines “sustainable agriculture” and “sustainable forestry” practices69 
and barriers to said practices.70 It also identifies principles of 
sustainable development for industrial activity and barriers to said 
practices,71 defines sustainable land use and barriers to said practices, 
identifies priority recommendations for achieving sustainable land use 
practices in the Great Lakes basin,72 assesses the status of water 
infrastructure needs, and identifies best water conservation practices 
and sources of funding to enhance water source protection.73 The 
GLRC sustainable development team recommended stricter 
regulations to promote sustainable forestry74 and to promote 
 
 63. See id. 
 64. See id. at 44 n.29. 
 65. See id. at 59–60. 
 66. Id. at 59–64. These stakeholders include federal, state, tribal, and local 
governments; private business; industry and manufacturing; and nongovernmental 
organizations (NGOs). See id. at 59; see also U.N. ENV’T PROGRAMME, HANDBOOK 
FOR STAKEHOLDER ENGAGEMENT 35 (2018).  
 67. See GREAT LAKES REGIONAL COLLABORATION STRATEGY TO RESTORE 
AND PROTECT THE GREAT LAKES, supra note 41, at 59–64.  
 68. See GREAT LAKES REGIONAL COLLABORATION, APPENDIX X: 
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY TEAM 1 (1999).  
 69. See id. at 3–4. 
 70. See id. at 2–17. 
 71. See id. at 18–23. 
 72. See id. at 24–45. 
 73. See id. at 70–80. 
 74. See id. at 16. 
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sustainable land use, development, planning, and building design.75 It 
also recommended that USEPA utilize Clean Water federal–state 
collaboration and funding mechanisms to ensure water infrastructure 
updates and water source protection, including providing significant 
funding for nonpoint source pollution control and estuary protection.76  
B. Presidential Executive Order and Memorandum (Ocean Policy 
Task Force) 
On July 19, 2010, the White House issued Presidential Executive 
Order (E.O.) 13547, “Stewardship of the Ocean, Our Coasts, and the 
Great Lakes,” the policy objective of which was the environmental 
protection, maintenance, and restoration of the nation’s ocean, coastal, 
and Great Lakes ecosystems, which “is intrinsically linked to 
environmental sustainability.”77 To achieve this policy objective, the 
E.O. expressly “adopt[ed] the recommendations of the Interagency 
Ocean Policy Task Force” (i.e., the Final Recommendations), which 
had been established pursuant to a prior presidential memorandum.78 
E.O. 13547 “direct[ed] executive agencies to implement those 
recommendations under the guidance of a National Ocean Council.”79  
C. Ocean Policy Task Force Final Recommendations 
The Final Recommendations of the former Obama 
administration Ocean Policy Task Force called for the United States 
to ensure inter alia the protection, maintenance, and restoration of the 
Great Lakes ecosystems and resources and to bolster the conservation 
and sustainable uses of land in ways that will improve the health of 
the Great Lakes ecosystems.80 “The National Policy recognizes that 
America’s stewardship of the ocean, our coasts, and the Great Lakes 
is intrinsically and intimately linked to environmental sustainability     
. . . .”81 The United States committed to promoting the objectives of 
 
 75. Id. at 27, 33, 37, 41, 43. 
 76. Id. at 76–80. 
 77. Exec. Order No. 13,547, 75 Fed. Reg. 43,023 (July 19, 2010).  
 78. OFFICE OF THE PRESS SEC’Y, MEMORANDUM FOR THE HEADS OF 
EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENTS AND AGENCIES, NATIONAL POLICY FOR THE OCEANS, OUR 
COASTS AND THE GREAT LAKES (2009).  
 79. Exec. Order No. 13,547. 
 80. See WHITE HOUSE COUNCIL ON ENVTL. QUALITY, FINAL 
RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE INTERAGENCY OCEAN POLICY TASK FORCE § III, at 14–15 
(2010) [hereinafter WHITE HOUSE COUNCIL].  
 81. Id. at 4. 
704 Michigan State Law Review  2019 
this policy through federal interagency and federal–state cooperation 
and private stakeholder engagement.82 The Final Recommendations 
also called for the United States to adopt certain key decision-making 
principles, the first of which was the Precautionary Approach 
contained within Principle 15 of the United Nations (UN) Rio 
Declaration on Environment and Development.83 Principle 15 requires 
all states to widely apply the Precautionary Approach to protect the 
environment “according to their capabilities.”84 The Precautionary 
Approach states that “[w]here there are threats of serious or 
irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used 
as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent 
environmental degradation.”85  
There is an abundance of evidence to confirm that it has been the 
common practice of prior presidential administrations to use 
“precautionary approach” language in publicly reviewable federal 
documentation. However, in reality, the U.S. Government (USG) and 
other treaty party signatories to such international agreements 
implement and enforce the legal obligations those agreements impose 
pursuant to the stronger European precautionary principle, which 
“entails a radical change in outlook,” a bias against the use of 
technology, and a reversal of the burden of proof.86 The European 
precautionary principle, “in its ‘strongest’ version,” “is triggered once 
‘there is at least prima facie scientific evidence of a hazard,’” and 
“challenges Enlightenment era regulatory science protocols, and the 
rationalist approach to risk regulation in the face of scientific 
uncertainty.”87 It also “creates an administrative presumption of risk” 
based on the presence of a hazard “which favors ex ante regulation 
and tends to reverse the administrative and adjudicatory burden of 
proof (production and persuasion) from government . . . to industry.”88 
 
 82. Id. at 15. 
 83. See U.N. Conference on Environment and Development, Rio Declaration 
on Environment and Development, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/26 (Vol. I), annex I (Aug. 
12, 1992).  
 84. Id. 
 85. Id.; see also WHITE HOUSE COUNCIL, supra note 80, at 16.  
 86. Lawrence A. Kogan, What Goes Around Comes Around: How UNCLOS 
Ratification Will Herald Europe’s Precautionary Principle as U.S. Law, 7 SANTA 
CLARA J. INT’L L. 23, 26–27 (2009), https://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/ 
scujil/vol7/iss1/2/ [https://perma.cc/K4KA-QL5Q].  
 87. Lucas Bergkamp & Lawrence Kogan, Trade, the Precautionary 
Principle and Post-Modern Regulatory Process: Regulatory Convergence in the 
Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership, EUR. J. RISK REG. 499–500 (2013). 
 88. Id. 
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In other words, rather than the government having to show an 
industry’s activities or technologies pose a potential harm to the 
environment or human health, an industry must now show that its 
activities or technologies pose no such potential harm, which is 
equivalent to the imposition of a zero-risk-threshold.89 
American and European academicians have concluded that the 
European precautionary principle offers a starkly different regulatory 
approach which calls for regulators to employ an ex ante (before-the-
fact, in anticipation of possible harm) environmental hazard 
assessment framework focused on preventing unforeseeable 
environmental harm, rather than an ex-post (after-the-fact) empirical 
environmental risk assessment framework focused on preventing 
foreseeable environmental harm. This distinction is rooted in 
fundamental underlying constitutional differences between the United 
States and the European Union. “These constitutional differences, in 
turn, reflect different notions concerning the rights of individuals 
versus those of society, of the role of government in balancing 
between those rights, and of the relative functions served by the 
different institutions of government.”90 In other words, the European 
precautionary principle dispenses with any consideration of the United 
States Constitution, the Bill of Rights, and the basic liberties identified 
in the Declaration of Independence, which recognize the inherent 
primacy of natural individual rights to “life, liberty and the pursuit of 
happiness” over collective societal rights.91 
Indeed, more radical environmentalist academics have embraced 
the European precautionary principle precisely because, under its 
influence, “the advocate of an activity has the burden of proving the 
safety of the activity.”92 They also have emphasized that the 
importance of the debate surrounding the precautionary principle 
concerns its involvement in the “fundamental dimensions of human 
life, such as the right to health and a clean environment and the 
aspiration for better standards of living.”93  
 
 89. See id. 
 90. Lawrence A. Kogan, Monograph, Exporting Precaution: How Europe’s 
Risk-Free Regulatory Agenda Threatens American Free Enterprise, WASH. LEGAL 
FOUND. 1, 97 (2005).  
 91. See id. 
 92. Marco Martuzzi & Joel Tickner, The Precautionary Principle: 
Protecting Public Health, the Environment and the Future of Our Children, WORLD 
HEALTH ORG. EUROPE 1, 78 (2004).  
 93. Id. at 8.  
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The Final Recommendations of the former Obama 
administration Ocean Policy Task Force endeavored to explain the 
Task Force’s response to public comments accusing it of incorporating 
Europe’s ‘strong’ precautionary principle rather than the ‘weak’ 
precautionary approach of Rio Declaration Principle 15.94 Despite the 
Task Force’s response that “the United States has long taken the 
position that precaution is a tool or approach rather than a ‘principle,’” 
there is much to doubt about the Ocean Policy Task Force’s sincerity 
regarding its use of “precautionary approach” terminology.95 In fact, 
there is abundant evidence to the contrary, demonstrating the Obama 
administration’s actual implementation and enforcement of more 
stringent European precautionary principle legal standards within U.S. 
policy and regulations. A prime example of this is the Obama 
administration’s deep seabed mining policy and regulations adopted 
following the environmental “crisis” the Deepwater Horizon incident 
had triggered.96  
The second principle the Final Recommendations called upon 
the USG to adopt as a “national priority objective” was Ecosystem-
Based Management (EBM), which employs European precautionary 
principle-based science protocols to account for “the interdependence 
of the land, air, water, ice, and the interconnectedness between human 
populations and these environments.”97 EBM emphasizes four 
common principles which can be achieved only “through a 
precautionary approach which errs on the side of conservation in the 
event of uncertainty, and shifts the burden of proof for showing that 
ocean use would impose no major unacceptable impacts from 
regulators to the economic actor or business.”98  
 
 94. See WHITE HOUSE COUNCIL, supra note 80, at C-IV. 
 95. Id. at app. C § II, C-III to C-IV. 
 96. See Lawrence A. Kogan, Revised U.S. Deep Seabed Mining Policy 
Reflects UNCLOS and Other International Environmental Law Obligations, 6893 
LEXISNEXIS® EMERGING ISSUES 1, 13–16 (2013), http://nebula.wsimg.com/ 
f97bfb87d31d68c9fba55f48d125fd8a?AccessKeyId=39A2DC689E4CA87C906D&
disposition=0&alloworigin=1 [https://perma.cc/96S7-88W5] (discussing the legal 
distinction between a precautionary approach contained in Rio Declaration Principle 
15 and what the European Union refers to as the precautionary principle, and how the 
deep sea mining policy adopted in 2013 actually incorporated the precautionary 
principle, despite use of precautionary approach terminology).  
 97. WHITE HOUSE COUNCIL, supra note 80, at 16. 
 98. Lawrence A. Kogan, ‘Ecosystem-Based Management’: A Stealth Vehicle 
to Inject Euro-Style Precaution into U.S. Regulation 1 (Wash. Legal Found. Vol. 24, 
Legal Backgrounder No. 23, 2009). 
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The former Obama administration Ocean Policy Task Force 
Final Recommendations contained a third principle which called upon 
the USG to adopt “comprehensive, integrated, ecosystem-based 
coastal and marine spatial planning and management” (CMSP) as a 
“national priority objective.”99 Under the recommended unified 
framework, “the United States will be subdivided into nine regional 
planning areas,” including the Great Lakes.100 “Each region will have 
a corresponding regional planning body consisting of Federal, State, 
and tribal representatives to develop regional goals, objectives, and 
ultimately regional CMS plans.”101 To implement effective CMSP and 
ensure watershed conservation, the Final Recommendations 
emphasized the need to “build knowledge of . . . Great Lakes 
ecosystems and processes” and to “[i]ncrease[] understanding of 
watershed processes and the linkages with our coasts . . . to adequately 
manage human uses, human impacts.”102 “Europeans have 
prominently relied upon EBM when pursuing ‘marine spatial 
planning,’ which is an integrated, forward-looking approach to 
protecting the marine environment.”103 
According to the Final Recommendations, closely tied to CMSP 
and watershed protection is the need to reduce nonpoint source 
pollution, such as runoff, arising from “poor land management 
practices,” including agricultural, commercial, and industrial land 
uses that can be transported hundreds of miles from inland to coastal 
waters.104 While the geographic scope of U.S. CMSP areas would 
generally not include upland areas, they could if a regional planning 
body (e.g., the Great Lakes Regional Planning Body) decides to 
include them. The Final Recommendations suggest using 
“existing . . . Federal programs including . . . the Clean Water Act” as 
part of land-based watershed planning efforts.105 
 
 99. WHITE HOUSE COUNCIL, supra note 80, at 6. 
 100. See id. at 6, 8. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. at 33.  
 103. Kogan, ‘Ecosystem-Based Management’, supra note 98, at 1. 
 104. WHITE HOUSE COUNCIL, supra note 80, at 38. 
 105. Id. at 50; see also OFFICE OF THE PRESS SEC’Y, supra note 78, at 1–2 
(calling for a new Ocean Policy Task Force to develop a comprehensive ecosystem-
based framework for the long term conservation and use of our ocean coasts and Great 
Lakes resources, and a recommended framework for effective coastal and marine 
spatial planning). 
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D. National Ocean Council Implementation Plan 
During April 2013, the former Obama administration’s National 
Ocean Council, which had evolved from the Ocean Policy Task Force, 
released its Implementation Plan setting forth “on-the-ground” actions 
that would translate policy into achievements.106 It also released an 
accompanying Appendix setting forth target dates for undertaking 
those actions in fulfillment of the goals the Final Recommendations 
had identified.107 The Implementation Plan emphasized the need for 
Federal agencies to publicly identify and communicate “the economic 
value of ecosystem services, such as healthy and productive wetlands 
that support spawning, breeding, and feeding of commercially and 
recreationally important fish species.”108 “Agencies will coordinate to 
protect, restore, and enhance wetlands. . . . Through National Ocean 
Policy actions, thousands of acres of wetlands and priority habitat will 
be protected, restored, or enhanced.”109 
For example, by 2013, the National Ocean Council was to have 
documented the status and trends of coastal wetlands using recent data 
from 2004 to 2009, with participation from the National Oceanic and 
Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) and the Department of 
Interior’s U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (USFWS).110 Furthermore, 
by 2013, the National Ocean Council was to have developed a pilot 
assessment selection strategy and identified coastal watersheds for 
pilot assessments using updated wetland inventories and geospatial 
data. USEPA, NOAA, USFWS, and the U.S. Army Corps of 
Engineers (USACE) all were listed as participating agencies.111 
Moreover, by 2014, “100,000 acres of wetlands, wetland-associated 
uplands, and high-priority coastal, upland, urban, and island habitat” 
were to be protected, restored, or enhanced.112 And by 2015, the 
National Ocean Council was to have identified actions Federal 
agencies could take, in coordination with state, tribal, regional, and 
local agencies, to improve the management of coastal wetlands and 
 
 106. NAT’L OCEAN COUNCIL, NATIONAL OCEAN POLICY IMPLEMENTATION 
PLAN 1, 3, 20 (April 2013) [hereinafter NOC].  
 107. See generally NAT’L OCEAN COUNCIL, NATIONAL OCEAN POLICY 
IMPLEMENTATION PLAN APPENDIX (2013) [hereinafter NOC APP.].  
 108. See NOC, supra note 106, at 7. 
 109. Id. at 7, 8, 14–15 (emphasis added).  
 110. See NOC APP., supra note 107, at 12. 
 111. See id. at 14. 
 112. Id. at 12. 
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reduce losses nationwide.113 The same participating agencies were to 
be involved—USEPA, NOAA, USFWS, and USACE.114 
By 2014, the National Ocean Council was to have completed its 
analyses for each coast watershed selected for a pilot assessment, 
using data and information inter alia from the 2011 USFWS study 
entitled “Status and Trends of Wetlands in the Coterminous United 
States.”115 Tellingly, the USFWS 2011 study identified freshwater 
wetland systems, including emergent marshes contiguous with and 
directly connected to the Great Lakes.116  
E. 2016 National Ocean Policy Annual Work Plan 
The 2016 National Ocean Policy Annual Work Plan, which 
brought the Implementation Plan’s target dates forward, identified 
four priority areas of pressing need for short-term advancement.117 One 
such priority area was the development of Regional Marine Plans to 
“help inform Federal activities.”118 The plans would be developed by 
the nine Regional Planning Bodies serving the nine marine regions the 
prior National Ocean Policy had established.119 And the scope of the 
marine plans would be defined by the regions themselves.120  
Congressional hearings convened on May 17, 2016, and 
questioned the impact of certain former Obama administration 
National Ocean Policy goals deemed anathema to the nation’s 
agricultural communities.121 These goals included (1) “[r]estoring 
 
 113. See id. at 5. 
 114. See id. 
 115. Id. at 14 (describing the data to be used also was to have come from 
NOAA’s Coastal Change Analysis Program, from the Clean Water Act Section 404 
program, from State regulatory programs, from USACE Civil Works programs, and 
from geospatial sources).  
 116. See U.S. FISH AND WILDLIFE SERV., STATUS AND TRENDS OF WETLANDS 
IN THE CONTERMINOUS UNITED STATES, 2004 TO 2009 1, 87 (2011); cf. Where Are 
Great Lakes Coastal Wetlands?, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, 
https://www.epa.gov/great-lakes-monitoring/where-are-great-lakes-coastal-wetlands 
[https://perma.cc/78PE-CN2J] (last visited Oct. 15, 2019) (defining “Great Lakes 
coastal wetlands” as “an area of wetland directly influenced by the waters of one of 
the Great Lakes or its connecting channels”) (citation omitted). Great Lakes coastal 
wetlands are found throughout the basin, along shorelines, in the mouths of tributaries, 
and along connecting channels. See id. 
 117. See NAT’L OCEAN COUNCIL, NATIONAL OCEAN POLICY 2016 ANNUAL 
WORK PLAN 1 (2016). 
 118. Id. at 4.  
 119. See id. 
 120. See id.  
 121. See id. 
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wetlands and upland areas”; (2) addressing “land-based sources of 
pollution”; (3) using Regional Planning Bodies which could 
“dramatically increase the role of Federal agencies on inland rivers 
and adjacent land uses . . . at a time when other hydropower dams are 
under ongoing litigation by certain environmental groups”; and (4) 
using ecosystem-based management, which “involves vague and 
undefined policies that we know from experience can be used by 
critics of irrigated agriculture as the basis for lawsuits to stop or delay 
federally permitted activities.”122 
Among the witnesses that provided testimony at the hearings, 
the Family Farm Alliance’s prepared statement emphasized how the 
use of ecosystem-based management (1) “would allow federally 
dominated Regional Planning Bodies to reach as far inland as deemed 
necessary to protect ocean ecosystem health[, which] could potentially 
impact all activities that occur on lands adjacent to rivers, tributaries 
or watersheds that drain into the ocean” and (2) 
“create[] . . . unforeseen impacts to inland sectors, like agriculture,” 
which is connected via the “ecosystem-based management” approach 
to the ocean.123 “[A]lthough the policy [was] portrayed by the [Obama] 
Administration as primarily targeting ocean-related activities, the 
draft implementation plan specifically state[d] that the policy plans to 
address ‘the major impacts of urban and suburban development and 
agriculture—including forestry and animal feedlots.’”124 
II. SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT AND ENVIRONMENTAL 
SUSTAINABILITY—WHAT IS IT REALLY? 
The concept of sustainability or sustainable development (SD) is 
an overly dramatic concept originally articulated in the Report of the 
World Commission on Environment and Development entitled “Our 
Common Future.”125 That report was transmitted to the United Nations 
General Assembly on August 4, 1987.126 On a macro global level, it 
 
 122. The Implications of President Obama’s National Ocean Policy: Hearing 
Before the Subcomm. on Water, Power and Oceans of the H. Comm. on Nat. Res., 
114th Cong. 6–7 (2016) (Statement of the Hon. Paul A. Gosar, Rep., R-AZ) (emphasis 
added); see also id. at 43 (Statement of 
Dan Keppen, Executive Director, Family Farm Alliance) (emphasis added). 
 123. Id. at 21–22, 24. 
 124. Id. 
 125.  World Comm’n on Env’t & Dev., Our Common Future (Mar. 20, 1987) 
[hereinafter World Comm’n on Env’t & Dev. Mar. Report].  
 126. See U.N. Sec’y-Gen., Development and International Co-operation: 
Environment, Report of the World Commission on Environment and Development, ¶ 
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calls simultaneously for integrating environmental and development 
policies resulting in “changes in the domestic and international 
policies of every nation” capable of “meet[ing] the needs and 
aspirations of the present without compromising the ability to meet 
those of the future” and ensuring social and economic change in 
developing nations.127 In effect, the concept of sustainability or SD 
formulates “[a] global agenda for change.”128  
According to the U.N. Report, sustainability or SD calls for each 
nation to adopt new environmental management practices that focus 
on anticipating and preventing environmental damage before it occurs, 
rather than on after-the-fact repair of environmental damage.129 “What 
is required is a new approach in which all nations aim at a type of 
development that integrates production with resource conservation 
and enhancement, and that links both to the provision for all of an 
adequate livelihood base and equitable access to resources.”130 
Furthermore, sustainability or SD calls for environmental, social, and 
economic development in all countries “developed or developing, 
market-oriented or centrally planned.”131 This requires a “progressive 
transformation of economy and society” that provides basic minimal 
living standards and “promot[es] values that encourage consumption 
standards that are within the bounds of the ecological possible and to 
which all can reasonably aspire.”132 In sum, sustainability or SD 
“embodies an ostensibly universally applicable (and, until recently, 
legally unenforceable) set of twenty-seven intergenerational 
principles integrating environmental, economic, and social 
concerns,”133 subsequently enumerated in the 1992 U.N. Rio 
 
3 U.N. Doc. A/42/427 (Aug. 4, 1987), http://www.un-documents.net/a42-427.htm 
[https://perma.cc/7T33-EYZ9]. 
 127. World Comm’n on Env’t & Dev., Our Common Future: Report of the 
World Commission on Environment and Development, ¶¶ 48–49, U.N. Doc. A/42/427 
(Aug. 4, 1987) [hereinafter World Comm’n on Env’t & Dev. Aug. Report], 
http://www.un-documents.net/ocf-01.htm#II [https://perma.cc/2NJU-GZ8U]. 
 128. World Comm’n on Env’t & Dev. Mar. Rep., supra note 125, at 
Chairman’s Foreword (emphasis added). 
 129. See id. at ch. 6. 
 130. World Comm’n on Env’t & Dev. Aug. Rep., supra note 127, at ¶ 47 
(emphasis added). 
 131. Id. at ch. 2, ¶ 2. 
 132. Id. at ¶¶ 3, 5 (emphasis added).  
 133. Lawrence A. Kogan, Local Sustainability Movement Rides Wave of 
Evolving Federalism to ‘Axe’ Private 
Property Rights, 7 KY. J. OF EQUINE, AGRIC. & NAT. RESOURCES L. 469, 469 (2014–
2015). 
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Declaration on Environment and Development.134 These principles 
include the post-modern scientifically progressive yet economically 
harmful European precautionary principle,135 which masquerades as 
the more balanced Precautionary Approach contained in Principle 15 
of the U.N. Rio Declaration.136 
On a micro-level, the concept of sustainability or SD 
incorporates a comprehensive roadmap for national and subnational 
governmental implementation of those principles, known as “Agenda 
21.”137 “Chapter 28 of Agenda 21 (‘local Agenda 21’ or ‘LA21’) 
specifically encourages the establishment of mechanisms to promote 
cooperation and coordination between local authorities 
internationally.”138 “It has effectively provided state and local 
authorities with an environmental advocacy platform at the 
international level”139 and aggressively promoted sustainability 
curricula at U.S. universities.140 Since the conclusion of the 2002 U.N. 
Johannesburg World Summit on Sustainable Development and the 
2007 signing of the European Union Lisbon Treaty, the SD concept 
has been reformulated as a legally operable and enforceable norm that 
obliges national and regional governments “to promote long-term 
economic prosperity and social justice within the limits of ecological 
sustainability.”141  
Those unfamiliar with sustainability or SD may not realize that 
it is rooted in an uneasy late twentieth century political and 
philosophical compromise between Marxism and capitalism.142 While 
 
 134. See U.N. Conference on Sustainable Development, Report of the United 
Nations Conference on Environment and Development, U.N. Doc.A/CONF.151/26 
(Vol. I), annex I, 3 (Aug. 12, 1992).  
 135. See supra Section I.C.  
 136. See U.N. Conference on Sustainable Development, supra note 134, at 3. 
 137.  U.N. Conference on Env’t & Dev., Agenda 21 (June 3–14, 1992). 
 138. Kogan, Local Sustainability Movement, supra note 133, at 470 (citing 
Leslie Hom, The Making of Local Agenda 21: An Interview with Jeb Brugmann, 7 
LOCAL ENV’T 3, 251–52 (2002). 
 139. Id. 
 140. See RACHELLE PETERSON & PETER W. WOOD, NAT’L ASS’N OF 
SCHOLARS, SUSTAINABILITY: HIGHER EDUC.’S NEW FUNDAMENTALISM (Mar. 2015).  
 141. See Kogan, Local Sustainability Movement, supra note 133, at 470.  
 142. See Joan Veon, Transcript of Radio Program Interview With Jeb 
Brugman From RIO+5 (1997), http://www.ninehundred.net/~jveon/ICELI.html and 
http://www.ninehundred.net/~jveon/2JBWCTN.html (“JB: . . . There is the socialist 
doctrine of development and the capitalist doctrine of development and we spent all 
our resources battling between these two doctrines. We had the Cold War, we had real 
wars. I mean, hundreds of billions of dollars. And, it wasn’t until the Cold War came 
to an end, 1987 the World Commission on Environment Development put forward a 
 The Europeanization of the Great Lakes States 713 
some commentators have argued that capitalism is fundamentally 
incompatible with sustainable development,143 others have spiritedly 
debated and referred to sustainability or SD as the “Third Way.”144 The 
center-left in the United States during the Clinton administration and 
the Labourites in the U.K. during the Blair administration developed 
the Third Way as a movement to respond to new challenges.145 “It is, 
effectively, an update of the 1930s New Deal and the ‘social market 
economy’ of the European continental welfare state.”146 The concept 
 
third doctrine called sustainable development which is about balancing between social 
equity, the long time socialist concern, economic vitality, the capitalist concern and 
then this new concern that neither paid any attention to which is environmental 
sustainability.”).  
 143. See George Liodakis, Material, Social and Theoretical Aspects of 
Sustainable Development, WORLD ECON. ASS’N 7, 10 (Sept. 24–Oct. 21, 2012) 
(“Marx’s fruitful insight led him to depict the relation between nature and society as 
a metabolic relation increasingly disrupted by the development of capitalism, both in 
agriculture and industry . . . . This insight has served as the basis for a considerable 
recent literature concerning this growing metabolic rift and its implications for a 
sustainable and ecologically compatible development. . . . As argued throughout this 
paper, however, due to the essential features of capitalism, it is impossible to have 
reforms of capitalism adequate to the task of creating conditions of social and 
ecological sustainability, not to speak of a truly sustainable human development.”). 
 144. Kogan, Local Sustainability Movement, supra note 133, at 470 n.9; see 
also Anne Bartlett, Greening London: Sustainability, Politics and the Third Way, in 
4 HUMAN SETTLEMENT DEV., ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LIFE SUPPORT SYS. 379, 382 (Saskia 
Sassen ed. 2009) (“[F]or many of the . . . architects of the Third Way, 
sustainability . . . demands a more flexible and in some respects syncretic approach, 
often bringing together apparently incongruous themes or groups all in the name of 
political compromise. Sustainability . . . requires an accommodation between the 
traditionally opposed factions of capitalism and environmentalism in an attempt to 
achieve a modus vivendi in which all sets of actors can pursue their agendas. It 
requires a ‘meeting of minds’—a reinvigoration of the sustainability agenda—in 
which business, environmental requisites and consumer demand can be harnessed in 
a mutually beneficial relationship.”). Compare Anthony Giddens, THE THIRD WAY: 
THE RENEWAL OF SOCIAL DEMOCRACY (1998), with The Third Way Revealed,  
ECONOMIST (Sept. 17, 1998), http://www.economist.com/node/165553 
[https://perma.cc/ST7Q-V8JP] (critiquing Anthony Giddens’ book).  
 145. See Kogan, Local Sustainability Movement, supra note 133, at 471 n.10; 
see also James Sloam, Blair, the Third Way and European Social Democracy: A New 
Political Consensus?, in “BRITAIN AFTER BLAIR” CONFERENCE (2007) (“Labour’s 
Third Way has provided a coherent political philosophy that has been enacted in 
government. Its central aims of have been to promote the primacy of the economy, 
and to concentrate spending priorities on social investment within the context of an 
active welfare state.”). 
 146. Kogan, Local Sustainability Movement, supra note 133, at 471 n.11, n.12, 
n.13; see also Margaret Weir, The Collapse of Bill Clinton’s Third Way, NEW 
LABOUR (2000) (“This transformative strategy had three components: 1.) To counter 
distrust of the federal government, policy would work through market mechanisms or 
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of sustainability or SD also is “‘closely related to “new Keynesian” 
economics’ which views ‘market failures’ ‘as arising from the 
existence of externalities, the “public good” nature of some goods and 
monopoly.’”147 
Since the 2008 global financial crisis, sustainability or SD has 
been referred to as the “Green Economy” by the United Nations 
Environment Program (UNEP).148 For example, the objective of the 
UNEP-led “Green Economy Initiative” is “to provide the analysis and 
policy support for investing in green sectors and in greening 
environmental unfriendly sectors.”149 However, if one delves deeper 
 
the states and it would ‘reinvent’ government; 2.) To counter racially charged ‘wedge’ 
issues, such as crime and welfare, policy would set clear expectations for individual 
responsibility and impose sanctions on bad behavior. It would, however, provide 
resources to assist people if they lived up to their part of this bargain. The President 
encapsulated this bargain in the aphorism, ‘If you work, you shouldn’t be poor.’ 3.) 
To counter arguments that social spending was too expensive, policy would highlight 
the long-term benefits of ‘investing’ in people so that they could be productive 
workers and citizens. This approach to policy can be distinguished from two 
Democratic alternatives. It most visibly departed from ‘old Democratic’ policy 
orientations in its forthright embrace of responsibility and expectations for individual 
behavior as conditions for beneficiaries. But it also envisioned a different relationship 
between government and the market than traditional New Deal policies.”); Christian 
Joerges & Florian Rödl, ‘Social Market Economy’ as 
Europe’s Social Model? (Eur. U. Inst. Working Paper No. 2004/8, 2004) (emphasis 
added) (describing how the term “‘social market economy’ . . . was invented by the 
German Professor of economics, Alfred Muller-Armack in 1946[] [i]n an article [in 
which] he presented the ‘social market economy’ as a third way between ‘laissez-faire 
liberalism’ and ‘planned economy’ with the inherent threat of socialization”); Jochen 
Clasen & Daniel Clegg, Does the Third Way Work? The Left and Labour Market 
Policy Reform in Britain, France, and Germany, in 
WELFARE STATE CHANGE: TOWARDS A THIRD WAY? 89, 89 
(Oxford Univ. Press 2005), http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/view/10.1093/ 
0199266727.001.0001/acprof-9780199266722-chapter-5 [https://perma.cc/E7TX-
E7B8] (“The Third Way referred originally to the self-conscious ‘rebranding’ of the 
centre-left, as advocated by Tony Blair and some of his close advisers in Britain. 
However, in more scholarly debates about welfare states and their reform, the term is 
also increasingly employed as shorthand for the policy mix perceived to be best suited 
to reconciling economic performance and social justice in a transformed international 
economy.”) (citations omitted). See generally Jurgen Jeske, The ‘Third Way’ Between 
State Intervention and the Free Market, TAIPEI TIMES 9 (Mar. 3, 2015), 
http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/editorials/archives/2015/03/03/2003612636 
[https://perma.cc/BL5M-CQ4D]. 
 147. Kogan, Local Sustainability Movement, supra note 133, at 471 n.14.  
 148. UNEP-Led Green Economy Initiative, U.N. SYS. CHIEF EXEC. BD. FOR 
COORDINATION (Feb. 23, 2017), https://www.unsystem.org/content/unep-led-green-
economy-initiative [https://perma.cc/NUN6-M6EZ]. 
 149. Id. 
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into the concept of a Green Economy, which involves a number of 
U.N. agencies, including UNEP, engaged in various international and 
domestic law, policy, and financial activities,150 one realizes that it 
engenders an anti-capitalist economic model requiring much more 
government involvement, intrusion, and control over citizens’ private 
affairs and economic lives than most Americans are willing to 
concede.151 
 
 150. See What We Do, U.N. ENV’T PROGRAMME, 
https://www.unenvironment.org/explore-topics/green-economy/what-we-do 
[https://perma.cc/CBA2-ASC4] (last visited Oct. 30, 2019). 
        151. See About Green Economy, U.N. ENV’T PROGRAMME, https:// 
www.unenvironment.org/explore-topics/green-economy/about-green-economy 
[https://perma.cc/AJF7-T974] (last visited Sept. 27, 2019); see also JOEL KOVEL, THE 
ENEMY OF NATURE: THE END OF CAPITALISM OR THE END OF THE WORLD? 122, 243  
(Zed Books ed., 2d ed. 2007) (“It is widely recognized, for example, that habits of 
consumption in the industrial societies will have to be drastically altered if a 
sustainable world is to be achieved. This means, however, that the very pattern of 
human needs will have to be changed, which means in turn that the basic way we 
inhabit nature will have to be changed. We know that capital forcibly indoctrinates 
people to resist these changes; but it is a poor and superficial analysis that would stop 
here and say nothing further about how this works and how it came about. Capital’s 
efficient causation of the ecological crisis establishes it as the enemy of nature. But 
the roots of the enmity still await exploration. . . . We call ecosocialism that society 
in which production is carried out by freely associated labor and with consciously 
ecocentric means and ends. When such production takes hold across the society as a 
whole, we are able to call it a mode of production; thus ecosocialism will be a society 
whose mode of production is ecocentric. This does not mean that no other forms of 
production coexist. Indeed, certain markets, and therefore commodities, are bound to 
continue within ecosocialist society for the foreseeable future. However, the 
coordinated agencies of society—state, civil society, culture, religion, etc.—are 
centered about ecocentric production; and this centering also hems in markets and 
keeps them functioning according to ecocentric ethics rather than profiteering. Use-
value and quality are valorized over exchange-value and quantity, and the economy 
is now embedded within society rather than, as under capitalism, standing over 
society.”); David Schweickart, Is Sustainable Capitalism Possible?, 2 PROCEDIA  
SOC. & BEHAV. SCI. 6739, 6739 (2010), https://reader.elsevier.com/reader/sd/pii/S18
77042810011547?token= [https://perma.cc/BU5E-XMXR] (evaluating the 
contrasting perspectives of Kovel’s THE ENEMY OF NATURE that “‘grow or die’ is an 
imperative of capitalism that renders sustainable capitalism impossible with the claim 
implicit in [Hawken’s and Lovins’] Natural Capitalism[: Creating the Next Industrial 
Revolution] that either capitalism is compatible with a steady-state, non-growing 
economy or an economy [that] can grow indefinitely without consuming more energy 
and natural resources than it can sustainably reproduce,” and concluding that “Kovel 
overstates his case but is closer to the truth than are advocates of ‘natural 
capitalism’”); John Ikerd, Is Sustainable Capitalism Possible (July 5, 2016) 
(unpublished paper) (filed on author’s faculty page on University of the Missouri 
College of Arts and Science website), 
http://web.missouri.edu/~ikerdj/papers/Korea%20-%20Sustainable%20Capitalism 
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It is difficult not to recognize the Green Economy as a reframing 
of the Third Way.152 In fact, several European academics have referred 
to the Green Economy as providing the means to use an “ecological 
crisis . . . for solving other problems contemporary capitalism is 
facing, such as the economic crisis and the crisis of legitimacy.”153 This 
sounds quite similar to former White House Chief of Staff Rahm 
Emanuel’s memorable statement to a journalist soon after the 
November 2008 election of Barack Obama: “You never want a serious 
crisis to go to waste.”154 Emanuel also had previously served as a 
trusted adviser to former president Bill Clinton.155 
 
[https://perma.cc/WAH6-ZXYU] (“In summary, capitalism gains its advantage over 
other economic systems by focusing on short-run, individual self-interests, and thus, 
not sacrificing current productivity for the benefit of future generations. Capitalism’s 
productivity advantage is linked directly to its lack of sustainability. Therefore, it quite 
simply is not sustainable. This is not a personal opinion, but instead a logical 
consequence of the most fundamental laws of science. Sustainability ultimately will 
require a societal commitment to rely on renewable solar energy, not just to meet the 
needs of the current generation, but also to ensure adequate energy resources for future 
generations to offset entropy. Thus, sustainability will require a new and different 
economic paradigm.”); Molly Scott Cato, 
Why Capitalism Can’t Be Sustainable, GREENECONOMIST.ORG, http://www. 
greeneconomist.org/page.php?pageid=capitalism [https://perma.cc/HMW5-4VJS] 
(last visited Sept. 27, 2019) (“[T]here is an unspoken (and largely untested) 
assumption that there need be no fundamental contradiction between sustainable 
development and capitalism. That assumption stands in stark contrast to the prevailing 
view of many radical academics and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) that 
there are profound (and possibly unmanageable) contradictions which demand a 
completely different world order.”). 
 152. See, e.g., Kogan, Local Sustainability Movement, supra note 133, at 470 
(describing sustainable development as a “political and philosophical compromise 
between Marxism and capitalism”). 
 153. Anneleen Kenis & Matthias Lievens, Greening the Economy or 
Economizing the Green Project? When Environmental Concerns Are Turned into a 
Means to Save the Market, 48 REV. RADICAL POL. ECON. 217, 231 (2016); see also 
Why Does Green Economy Matter?, U.N. ENV’T PROGRAMME, 
https://www.unenvironment.org/explore-topics/green-economy/why-does-green-
economy-matter [https://perma.cc/K4L2-ZKEV] (last visited Sept. 27, 2019) (“An 
inclusive green economy is one that improves human well-being and builds social 
equity while reducing environmental risks and scarcities. An inclusive green economy 
is an alternative to today’s dominant economic model, which exacerbates inequalities, 
encourages waste, triggers resource scarcities, and generates widespread threats to the 
environment and human health.”).  
 154. Jack Rosenthal, A Terrible Thing to Waste, N.Y. TIMES (July 31, 2009), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/02/magazine/02FOB-onlanguage-t.html [https:// 
perma.ccN7EM-RLLY]. 
 155. See Michael Ray, Rahm Emanuel: American Politician, ENCYCLOPAEDIA 
BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com/biography/Rahm-Emanuel [https:// 
perma.cc/52T9-7V37] (last visited Sept. 26, 2019). 
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Indeed, the U.S. federal government and an increasing number 
of “blue” state and local governments have embraced sustainability or 
SD over the past two decades.156 The Obama administration surfed this 
trend to two electoral victories by deftly targeting the welfare state-
minded who favored “the social safety net and an activist government” 
which would “guarantee every citizen enough to eat and a place to 
sleep.”157 In fact, the 2017 report of former President Obama’s 
Advisory Council on Faith-based and Neighborhood Partnerships 
called for the former president to lead the implementation of the U.N. 
sustainable development goals in America.158 
Some European academic proponents of sustainability or SD 
have warned, however, that the Green Economy has given life to a 
more progressive movement that seeks “climate justice” or 
“environmental justice.”159 This movement  
advocates a process of profound social change beyond capitalism, 
supported by broad alliances of forces, including workers, peasants, 
women, indigenous peoples and their myriad organizations, trade unions 
and political forces[, and] . . . centrally aims at a socially just transition to a 
sustainable future, based on principles of decommodification, 
deprivatization, social equality, communing, and radical democracy.160  
The shape and tenor of this latter movement would appear to 
encapsulate the retreaded “Green New Deal” initiative previously 
 
 156. See Kogan, Local Sustainability Movement, supra note 133, at 473–78, 
486–89. 
 157. Michelle Diggles, The New Electorate and the Future of the Democratic 
Party, THIRD WAY 18 (Sept. 19, 2013).  
 158. See PRESIDENT’S ADVISORY COUNCIL ON FAITH-BASED & NEIGHBORHOOD 
P’SHIPS, STRENGTHENING EFFORTS TO INCREASE OPPORTUNITY AND END POVERTY: 
RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE PRESIDENT’S ADVISORY COUNCIL FOR FAITH-BASED AND 
NEIGHBORHOOD PARTNERSHIPS TO ADDRESS POVERTY AND INEQUALITY 26–27 (2017) 
(“The world as a whole is making dramatic progress against hunger, poverty, and 
disease. The nations of the world recently committed themselves to the Sustainable 
Development Goals (SDGs), which begin with commitments to end poverty and 
hunger by 2030. The global goals also address the issues of inequality and 
environmental sustainability. We commend the President for affirming that the new 
global goals apply to all countries, including the United States. . . . In the history of 
the United States and other countries, we have repeatedly seen that a clear statement 
of goals can have wide influence and drive change. That is why we encourage the 
White House to continue to promote U.S. awareness of the global goals and to 
highlight the relevance of the goals in our own country. We recommend that the 
President lead the implementation of the Sustainable Development Goals in America 
in a way that reflects the new global goals but is also rooted in our nation’s own 
realities and aspirations.”). 
 159. Kenis & Lievens, supra note 153, at 231 (emphasis added). 
 160. Id.  
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proposed in 2008 by Achim Steiner, former Executive Secretary of the 
UNEP, in response to the financial crisis.161  
The Green New Deal was recently disingenuously reintroduced 
as a “new” idea both in the form of an outline and a proposed 
congressional resolution by an opportunistic new congresswoman 
from the Bronx (N.Y.)162 who had been elected to office in 2018 as a 
 
 161. James Kanter, The Green New Deal, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 22, 2008), 
https://green.blogs.nytimes.com//2008/10/22/the-green-new-deal/?pagemode=print 
[https://perma.cc/36ZN-33GY].  
 162. The author is a graduate of the Boston University (B.U.) College of Arts 
and Sciences, holds a Bachelor of Arts cum laude in Philosophy and Political Theory, 
and was inspired, in part, to pursue this course of study and the practice of law by its 
former President and Chancellor, John Silber. The author has intentionally chosen not 
to dignify junior congresswoman Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez by referring to her by 
name in the text of this Article. In full transparency, the author expresses disdain and 
embarrassment that she is a fellow graduate of B.U., especially considering her 
totalitarian mindset and failure to recognize the distinction between civilized liberal 
thought encouraging Socratic method (debate) and uncivilized illiberal thought 
silencing debate and democratic process. See, e.g., Lisa W. Foderaro, Alexandria 
Ocasio-Cortez Likens $10,000 Debate Offer by Conservative Columnist to Catcalling, 
N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 10, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/10/nyregion/ 
alexandria-ocasio-cortez-debate-catcalling-ben-shapiro.html [https://perma.cc/ 
Y95U-CAML]; Doug Most, Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez (CAS’11) Talks Democratic 
Socialism with Stephen Colbert, BOSTONIA (Jan. 22, 2019), 
http://www.bu.edu/today/2019/democratic-socialism [https://perma.cc/4759-HR2Q]; 
Rousseau, Marx and Nietzsche: The Prophets of Illiberal Progress, THE ECONOMIST 
(Sept. 6, 2018), https://www.economist.com/schools-brief/2018/09/06/the-prophets-
of-illiberal-progress [https://perma.cc/Y4XU-ZNEG]. See generally COSTICA 
BRADATAN & SERGUEI OUSHAKINE, IN MARX’S SHADOW: KNOWLEDGE, POWER AND 
INTELLECTUALS IN EASTERN EUROPE AND RUSSIA (Costica Bradatan & Serguei 
Oushakine eds., 2010). It is the author’s professional opinion that the junior 
congresswoman’s actions-to-date demonstrate both intellectual dishonesty and a lack 
of intellectual rigor and intellectualism. See, e.g., Svetlana Nikolic et al., Intellectual 
Dishonesty in Science, 52 ACTA MEDICA MEDIANAE 56, 57 https://www. 
researchgate.net/publication/271345431_INTELLECTUAL_DISHONESTY_IN_S
CIENCE [https://perma.cc/XM2R-HSX4] (“This term usually means fabrication, 
falsification and plagiarism in proposing, performing or presenting research.”); 
Intellectual Rigour Challenges All Students, VICTORIA ST. GOV’T 
DEP’T OF EDUC. & TRAINING 1, https://www.education.vic.gov.au/school/teachers/te
achingresources/practice/improve/Pages/ppn7.aspx [https://perma.cc/ZG7K-
3SSE] (last updated May 31, 2019) (defining “intellectual rigour” as “clarity in 
thinking and an ability to think carefully and deeply when faced with new content or 
concepts[, which] . . . involves engaging constructively and methodically when 
exploring ideas, theories and philosophies [and] . . . relates to analyzing and 
constructing knowledge with depth, insight and intellectual maturity”). See generally, 
Judith Curry, 10 Signs of Intellectual Honesty, CLIMATE ETC. (Apr. 20, 2013), 
https://judithcurry.com/2013/04/20/10-signs-of-intellectual-honesty [https://perma. 
cc/U6GW-UK87].  
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member of the Democratic Socialists of America Party in an upset 
victory over a Democratic Party “establishment incumbent.”163 She 
was able to defeat the incumbent because she had dishonestly 
portrayed herself as an impoverished minority progressive 
(“democratic socialist”)164 seeking environmental and economic 
justice for the peasant masses.165  
 
 163. See Jennie Neufeld, Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez is a Democratic Socialists 
of America Member. Here’s What that Means, VOX (June 27, 2018, 1:10 PM), 
https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2018/6/27/17509604/alexandria-ocasio-
cortez-democratic-socialist-of-america [https://perma.cc/CQV6-433E] (“Like most 
socialist organizations, DSA believes in the abolition of capitalism in favor of an 
economy run either by ‘the workers’ or the state—though the exact specifics of 
‘abolishing capitalism’ are fiercely debated by socialists. . . . In practice, that means 
DSA [members advocate] ending private ownership of a wide range of industries 
whose products are viewed as ‘necessities,’ which they say should not be left to those 
seeking to turn a profit. . . . DSA also believes that the government should 
‘democratize’ private businesses—i.e., force owners to give workers control of 
them—to the greatest extent possible. But DSA members also say that overthrowing 
capitalism must include the eradication of ‘hierarchical systems’ that lie beyond the 
market as well. As a result, DSA supports the missions of Black Lives Matter, gay 
and lesbian rights, and environmentalism as integral parts of this broader ‘anti-
capitalist’ program. . . . ‘Socialism is the democratization of all areas of life, 
including but not limited to the economy.’”) (alteration in original) (emphasis added). 
 164. See Eric Levitz, Is a Green New Deal Possible Without a Revolution?, 
N.Y. INTELLIGENCER (Dec. 13, 2018), http://nymag.com/intelligencer/2018/12/what-
is-the-green-new-deal-explained-revolution.html [https://perma.cc/638W-3Z2Z] 
(“Many contemporary leftists believe this history is worth repeating: Just as the fight 
against fascism facilitated a democratic transition from laissez-faire to Keynesian 
liberalism, so the fight for climate sustainability can shepard [sic] America out of 
neoliberalism, and into ecofriendly, intersectional, democratic socialism.”) (emphasis 
added); see also Jack Crowe, AOC’s Chief of Staff Admits the Green New Deal Is Not 
About Climate Change, NAT’L REV. (July 12, 2019, 
8:44 AM), https://www.nationalreview.com/news/aocs-chief-of-staff-admits-the-
green-new-deal-is-not-about-climate-change/ [https://perma.cc/QK8Q-ZQAM] 
(“Representative Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez’s chief of staff Saikat Chakrabarti 
admitted recently that the true motivation behind introducing the Green New Deal is 
to overhaul the ‘entire economy.’ . . . It would also, according to its proponents, 
advance ‘social, economic, racial, regional and gender-based justice and equality and 
cooperative and public ownership.’”). 
 165. See H.R.J. Res. 109, 116th Cong. (2019) (proposing that the federal 
government recognize a Green New Deal and outlining extensive economic needs, as 
opposed to solely environmental ones); see also Danielle Kurtzleben, Rep. Alexandria 
Ocasio-Cortez Releases Green New Deal Outline, NPR (Feb. 7, 2019, 4:30 PM), 
https://www.npr.org/2019/02/07/691997301/rep-alexandria-ocasio-cortez-releases-
green-new-deal-outline [https://perma.cc/LD6U-YJNP] (describing how the Green 
New Deal framework “combines big climate-change-related ideas with a wish list of 
progressive economic proposals that, taken together, would touch nearly every 
American and overhaul the economy”).  
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In fact, other European academic commentators have hailed the 
concept of sustainability or SD as a “progressive alternative to 
neoliberalism in the twenty-first century.”166 However, one cannot 
credibly claim that members of the U.S. Democratic Party who believe 
in “democratic socialism” or in the “Third Way” are adherents to 
neoliberalism as the progressive left has criticized them as being.167 
Much to the contrary, their concept of sustainability or SD 
“embodie[s] the post-modernist European movement’s key precepts 
that have evolved since WWII: a rejection of the Enlightenment-era 
science, economics, law, and political philosophies upon which 
America was founded.”168 This question therefore arises: To what 
extent do these movements reject America’s founding principles? At 
its best (light green), sustainability or SD sets forth a formula for 
achieving market-based socialism, and at its worst (dark green outside 
with red inside),169 sustainability or sustainable development leads to 
Marxism. 
Members of the U.S. socialist movement, for example, are not 
impressed with the recycled Green New Deal and have warned that it 
 
 166. See Kogan, Local Sustainability Movement, supra note 133, at 472. See 
generally Victor Manuel Isidro Luna, From Neoliberalism to Possible Alternatives, 
395 ECONOMIA INFORMA 35 (2015), https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/ 
article/pii/S0185084915000456 [https://perma.cc/3J9W-JV5A] (describing socialist 
policies as an alternative to neoliberalism). 
 167. See, e.g., Jonathan Chait, How ‘Neoliberalism’ Became the Left’s 
Favorite Insult of Liberals, N.Y. INTELLIGENCER (July 16, 2017), http://nymag.com/ 
intelligencer/2017/07/how-neoliberalism-became-the-lefts-favorite-insult.html 
[https://perma.cc/GD2Z-8HCN] (describing how the term “neoliberalism” has more 
recently been used by the progressive left as a pejorative against centrist members of 
the U.S. Democratic Party). See generally Dani Rodrik, The Fatal Flaw of 
Neoliberalism: It’s Bad Economics, THE GUARDIAN (Nov. 14, 2017), https://www. 
theguardian.com/news/2017/nov/14/the-fatal-flaw-of-neoliberalism-its-bad-
economics [https://perma.cc/2BKZ-LSTS]. 
 168. Kogan, Local Sustainability Movement, supra note 133, at 472; see also 
Lawrence A. Kogan & Richard D. Otis, Science for the Picking, CAN. FREE PRESS 
(July 26, 2014), https://canadafreepress.com/article/science-for-the-picking 
[https://perma.cc/9V46-LWPA]. In a remarkable admission of the apparent post-
modernist thinking among today’s Michigan Department of Environmental Quality 
(MDEQ) senior officials, Mr. Brian Rudolph, MDEQ Saginaw Bay District Office 
Supervisor, stated during his deposition that the terms “science” and “scientist” are 
now “colloquial terms.” See Transcript of Deposition of Brian Rudolph at 85:21–86:3, 
Michigan Dep’t of Envtl. Quality v. Boyce Hydro, LLC (2018) (No. 16-8538-CE), 
https://nebula.wsimg.com/158f66f0862a74368559d0313506c087?AccessKeyId 
=7F494AADE6AF42D36823&disposition=0&alloworigin=1.  
 169. See Kogan, Discerning the Forest from the Trees, supra note 42, at 321 
(discussing sustainable development and its ties to political ideology).  
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must be ensured that it “doesn’t become green capitalism.”170 Their 
Marxist cousins have called out the new New York congresswoman’s 
Green New Deal as a “massive political fraud . . . entirely directed to 
and dependent upon the Democratic Party.”171 They have endeavored 
to set the historical record straight by emphasizing how “[t]he Green 
New Deal was formulated by the Green New Deal Group of global 
Greens in 2007” and subsequently “modified by the Green Party 
United States.”172 It is this radical subculture that clearly embraces the 
thesis of at least one European academic commentator who believes 
that communism is ultimately required to truly achieve social and 
ecological sustainability.173 Arguably, this is what former Vice 
 
 170. We Have to Make Sure the “Green New Deal” Doesn’t Become Green 
Capitalism: A Conversation With Kali Akuno of Cooperation Jackson, MRONLINE 
(Jan. 12, 2019), https://mronline.org/2019/01/12/we-have-to-make-sure-the-green-
new-deal-doesnt-become-green-capitalism/ [https://perma.cc/773T-QQYH] (“In 
These Times spoke with Kali Akuno, director of the CJA-affiliated Cooperation 
Jackson, a Mississippi-based group that aims to build a ‘solidarity economy’ that is 
‘anchored by a network of cooperatives and worker-owned democratically self-
managed enterprises.’”).  
 171. See Will Morrow, The Political Fraud of Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez’s 
‘Green New Deal’, POPULARRESISTANCE.ORG (Nov. 25, 2018), 
https://popularresistance.org/the-political-fraud-of-alexandria-ocasio-cortezs-green-
new-deal/ [https://perma.cc/FJ2S-DLLL] (discussing Marxist views on the proposed 
plan). 
 172. Id. (criticizing the Green New Deal).  
 173. See Liodakis, supra note 143, at 11 (“If we are to seriously search for the 
establishment of sustainability conditions, we should clearly reject, on both theoretical 
and ideological grounds, the monopoly of dominant neoclassical economics and the 
attitude or practice of ‘business as usual.’” (citing Peter Söderbaum, Democracy and 
Sustainable Development: Implications for Science and Economics, 60 REAL WORLD 
ECONS. REV. 107 (2012))).  
But, as argued, even ecological modernization and apparently radical 
changes within capitalism will not be adequate. . . . As argued elsewhere, 
the conditions of a social and ecological sustainability can be seriously 
searched for only within a communist perspective. There is, however, an 
enormous amount of theoretical and ideological work to be done, as well as 
social and class struggle, before we can hopefully proceed in this direction. 
As follows from our analysis in this paper, in the transformation process 
towards communism, common property regimes can be developed and 
tested at various levels, while social struggle and experimentation will 
contribute to a crystallization of socially and ecologically more rational 
institutions. Common property and collective action, along with a relevant 
institutional configuration, will most likely promote cooperative 
interdependence, capture any external effects and increase social 
efficiency, thus creating the most crucial conditions for a sustainable 
development and co-evolution with nature.  
Id. (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
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President Al Gore really meant when he wrote in his magnus opus, 
Earth in the Balance, that a “wrenching” or “radical transformation 
of society” is needed.174  
In an apparent effort to buttress and build upon the socialist 
bonafides of the Green New Deal and one of its key House promotors, 
2020 Democratic Presidential candidate U.S. Senator Bernie Sanders 
recently introduced his new $16.3 trillion climate change plan.175 It 
may be recalled that Sanders had previously supported the New Green 
Deal which the new Bronx congresswoman and U.S. Senator Ed 
Markey of Massachusetts had introduced earlier this year176 as a 
 
 174. See Bobbie Johnson, Gore Urges U.S. to Try for 100% Renewable 
Energy Within a Decade, THE GUARDIAN (Nov. 9, 2008), 
https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2008/nov/10/renewable-energy-
alternative-energy [https://perma.cc/B7XX-HZLL] (“[Former Vice President Al 
Gore] said: ‘The early uses of electricity were aimed at specialised applications and 
gimmicks.’ But the web’s real purpose, he suggested, was ‘to bring about a higher 
level of consciousness about our planet and the imminent danger . . . we face because 
of the radical transformation in the relationship between human beings and the 
earth.’”) (emphasis added); see also Joan Beck, Even Spin Doctors Can’t Disguise Al 
Gore’s Eco-Panic, CHI. TRIBUNE (Sept. 24, 1992), https://www.chicagotribune.com/ 
news/ct-xpm-1992-09-24-9203270059-story.html [https://perma.cc/Y4T4-Z7MZ] 
(“What he means is ‘embarking on an all-out effort to use every policy and program, 
every law and institution, every treaty and alliance, in short, every means to halt the 
destruction of the environment and to preserve and nurture our ecological system. 
Minor shifts in policy, marginal adjustments in ongoing programs, moderate 
improvements in laws and regulations, rhetoric offered in lieu of genuine change—
these are all forms of appeasement, designed to satisfy the public`s desire to believe 
that sacrifice, struggle and a wrenching transformation of society will not be 
necessary.’ Gore’s ‘sacrifice, struggle and a wrenching transformation of society’ 
suddenly got translated into ‘new opportunities for jobs’ in the hands of Bill Clinton’s 
spin doctors. But Gore’s book leaves no doubt whatsoever that the vice presidential 
candidate advocates severe restrictions on American lifestyles, new global 
governmental constraints and massive assistance from the United States to Third 
World countries—all in the service of environmental alarms that are still highly 
controversial.”). 
 175. See The Green New Deal, BERNIE, https://berniesanders.com/issues/the-
green-new-deal/ [https://perma.cc/EB5A-45Q8] (last visited Oct. 15, 2019). 
 176. See Juana Summers, Bernie Sanders Unleashes $16 Trillion Climate 
Plan that Builds on New Green Deal, USA TODAY (Aug. 22, 2019), 
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/elections/2019/08/22/bernie-sanders-
climate-plan-green-new-deal-follow-costs-16-trillion/2081655001/ [https://perma.cc/ 
5XPD-9FE7] (“Sanders’ climate plan provides the most detail yet on how he 
envisions the climate change moonshot taking shape if he is elected president. Sanders 
describes his plan, released Thursday, as a ‘ten-year, nationwide mobilization 
centered on equity and humanity’ that would create 20 million new jobs. The Green 
New Deal resolution, which Ocasio-Cortez put forth with Sen. Ed Markey of 
Massachusetts, calls on the nation to eliminate its carbon footprint by 2030 and to 
shift away from fossil fuels such as oil and coal and replace them with renewable 
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congressional resolution.177 Sanders has long referred to the radical 
transformation of society the New Green Deal (and now, his new 
climate change plan) would require as engendering “democratic 
socialism” rather than outright “Marxism.”178 However, only time will 
tell whether the changes to be wrought by the “radical transformation 
of society” Sanders and Gore have called for would be any more or 
less extreme than the “progressive transformation of economy and 
society” that European “social democracy”-based sustainability or SD 
and the precautionary principle require.179 
What is certain, currently, is that the philosophical 
underpinnings of the European precautionary principle, as a central 
tenet of sustainability or SD, are closely related to post-modernism.180 
The European precautionary principle is obsessed with the 
uncertainties and potential (possible) hazards that new activities, 
technologies, and industries may pose to human health and the 
environment, and thus it does not focus on the probable risks that 
 
energy sources such as wind and solar power.”); see also Matthew Daly, Ocasio-
Cortez: No ‘Middle Ground’ on Fighting Climate Change, AP NEWS (May 13, 2019), 
https://apnews.com/4359d6588f9740aca1ab24a9745f2c9d [https://perma.cc/HSM8-
V82U] (“Rep. Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez and Sen. Bernie Sanders rallied support for 
the Green New Deal on Monday night, with the New York congresswoman saying 
there should be ‘no middle ground’ when it comes to climate change and the Vermont 
senator calling for a political revolution. . . . The Green New Deal, introduced by 
Ocasio-Cortez and Sen. Ed Markey of Massachusetts, has been blocked in the Senate, 
and Democratic House leaders refuse to take it up, but activists and politicians who 
back the plan are pushing to make it a top issue in the 2020 campaign. . . . The Green 
New Deal calls for virtual elimination by 2030 of greenhouse gas emissions 
responsible for global warming and meeting 100 percent of U.S. power demand 
through renewable and zero-emission energy sources, including nuclear power.”).  
 177. See Recognizing the Duty of the Federal Government to Create a Green 
New Deal, H.R. Res. 109, 116th Cong., 1st Sess. (2019).  
 178. Sam Frizwell, Here’s How Bernie Sanders Explained Democratic 
Socialism, TIME (Feb. 20, 2019), https://time.com/4121126/bernie-sanders-
democratic-socialism/ [https://perma.cc/VQ96-MGN8] (“In attempt to widen the 
appeal of his brand of democratic socialism, Vermont Sen. Bernie Sanders on 
Thursday tied himself to the legacy of Franklin Roosevelt and called for far-reaching 
social programs to reduce income inequality. . . . ‘When I use the world socialist—
and I know some people aren’t comfortable about it—I’m saying that it is imperative,’ 
Sanders said, that we ‘create a government that works for all and not just the few.’ 
Democratic socialism, Sanders said, is not tied to any Marxist belief or the abolition 
of capitalism. ‘I don’t believe government should own the means of production, but I 
do believe that the middle class and the working families who produce the wealth of 
America deserve a fair deal,’ he said.”). 
 179. See World Comm’n on Env’t & Dev. Aug. Rep., supra note 127, at ch.2, 
4–5. 
 180. See Bergkamp & Kogan, supra note 87, at 499. 
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specific uses and exposures actually cause. In addition, the European 
precautionary principle shifts the legal burden of proof from the 
government showing harm to economic actors showing safety (zero 
risk, zero harm). It also reduces the scientific evidentiary threshold for 
establishing harm for ex ante regulatory purposes and for post-hoc 
judicial relief purposes from direct evidence of causation to indirect 
correlation181 or even, as this Article will clearly show, to 
circumstantial “weight-of-the-evidence”-secured by means of 
abductive reasoning.182  
The European precautionary principle, in other words, “directly 
challenges the conventional modern scientific paradigm that requires 
strong causal evidence.”183 Consequently, the entrenched technocratic 
U.S. federal and state bureaucracies will find it easier to more 
frequently, extensively, and disproportionately regulate the domestic 
economic and technological activities of its citizens and residents at 
the expense of Americans’ natural individual inalienable negative 
rights to “life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness,” which the U.S. 
Constitution and U.S. Bill of Rights recognize as sacrosanct.184 These 
sacrosanct documents and Americans’ continued faith and belief in 
the principles of economic and political freedom and liberty for which 
they stand unfortunately remain the primary, if not the sole, bulwarks 
against pan-global democratic socialism and Marxism.  
III. USEPA’S KEY ROLE IN DEVELOPING PORTIONS OF THE 2012 
PROTOCOL TO THE CANADA–U.S. GREAT LAKES WATER QUALITY 
AGREEMENT INCORPORATING EUROPEAN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 
STANDARDS 
The evidence reveals that since its initial execution in 1972, 
successive U.S. administrations have made legal and political 
commitments to abide by the Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement 
(GLWQA) and its subsequent amendments. The GLWQA is an 
executive agreement (as opposed to a treaty)185 implementing Article 
 
 181. See Kogan, Local Sustainability Movement, supra note 133, at 472. 
 182. See Lawrence A. Kogan, Weight of the Evidence: A Lower Expert 
Evidence Standard Metastasizes in Federal Courts, Wash. Legal Found. Critical 
Legal Issues Working Paper Series No. 215 (forthcoming Feb. 2020), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3524113. 
 183. Kogan, Local Sustainability Movement, supra note 133, at 472, n.17.  
 184. See id. at 490–91. 
 185. See U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, 11 FAM, EXERCISE OF THE INTERNATIONAL 
AGREEMENT POWER, CONST. REQUIREMENTS 723.2 (2006), https://fam.state.gov/ 
FAM/11FAM/11FAM0720.html [https://perma.cc/D52Y-S8PW] (explaining the 
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IV of the Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909.186 “But it has also taken on 
a life of its own as one of [the United States’] oldest, and in some ways 
most durable, international environmental agreement.”187 
The legally binding GLWQA supplemented the prior 
aspirational Great Lakes Basin Compact into which the eight Great 
Lakes States had entered in 1955 and to which Congress finally 
granted its consent in 1968, subject to reservations.188 The Compact’s 
general purpose was the regional management of the Great Lakes 
through adoption of common conservation methods that balanced the 
states’ various uses of the lakes.189 The Compact created an interstate 
agency that continues in operation today known as the Great Lakes 
Commission consisting of representatives from each of the Great 
Lakes States,190 the recommendations of which remain legally non-
binding.191  
 
distinction between treaties and international agreements other than treaties—i.e., 
executive agreements). “International agreements (regardless of their title, 
designation, or form) whose entry into force with respect to the United States takes 
place only after the Senate has given its advice and consent are ‘treaties.’” Id. at 723.2-
1.  
International agreements brought into force with respect to the United States 
on a constitutional basis other than with the advice and consent of the Senate 
are ‘international agreements other than treaties.’ (The term ‘sole executive 
agreement’ is appropriately reserved for agreements made solely on the 
basis of the constitutional authority of the President.)  
Id. at 723.2-2.  
 186. See discussion infra Section III.E (concerning the Boundary Waters 
Treaty of 1909). 
 187. See Bradley C. Karkkainen, The Great Lakes Water Resources Compact 
and Agreement: Transboundary Normativity Without International Law, 39 WM. 
MITCHELL L. REV. 997, 1007 (2013), https://open.mitchellhamline.edu/cgi/ 
viewcontent.cgi?article=1511&context=wmlr [https://perma.cc/8HUA-FHRY]. 
 188. See generally GREAT LAKES COMM’N, 2018 Annual Report. 
 189. See Pub. L. No. 90-419, 82 Stat. 414 (1968). 
 190. Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement, Can.–U.S., Sept. 7, 2012, at 8 
(“Since 1999, the Canadian provinces of Ontario and Québec have served as associate 
members. The states and provinces are represented on the GLC by delegation 
members appointed by each jurisdiction.”). 
 191. See 82 Stat. at 417–18; see also Kelly Kane, The Great Lakes–St. 
Lawrence River Basin Agreement: What Happens in the Great Lakes Won’t Stay in 
the Great Lakes, 25 MICH. ST. INT’L L. REV. 429, 434–35 (2017) (“A major downfall 
of the Basin Compact is that it is not legally binding. Any recommendations made by 
the Commission are advisory only, and it therefore has no actual legal authority to 
enable it to protect the Lakes.”). 
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A. Successive U.S. Administrations’ Commitment to the GLWQA 
Since 1972 
The GLWQA was originally executed by Canada and the United 
States on April 15, 1972.192 Later that year, on October 18, 1972, 
Congress and the President enacted into law the Federal Water 
Pollution Control Act, the predecessor to the Clean Water Act of 
1977.193 Canada and the United States subsequently amended the 
GLWQA in 1978 and 1987.194 “[T]he 1978 Agreement introduced the 
concept of an ecosystem approach to management . . . . This was the 
first time an international agreement of any kind had embraced an 
‘ecosystem approach’ and such a sweeping, multi-faceted ecological 
restoration goal . . . .”195 
However, the most far-reaching changes to the 1972 GLWQA 
were made during the Obama administration. Articles 2 and 4 and 
Annexes 2.B and 10 of the new 2012 version of the treaty incorporate 
European legal standards such as the precautionary principle. While 
the Trump Administration revoked the Obama Administration Oceans 
Policy, which had incorporated the European precautionary principle, 
it surprisingly remained consistent with prior administrations and 
chose not to cease U.S. funding and implementation of the GLWQA. 
Arguably, the Trump administration was either unaware of or 
misadvised regarding the incorporation of that and other foreign legal 
standards within this new GLWQA version.  
The Obama administration’s Ocean Policy Task Force Final 
Recommendations well-recognized that the resources of the Great 
Lakes “are governed, in part, by a body of law, treaties, and regional 
policy that is distinct from our ocean and other coast areas. Of 
paramount significance is the Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement 
(GLWQA) with Canada and its implementation under various Federal 
laws . . . through use of ecosystem-based management.”196  
 
 192. See Canada and U.S. Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement: Overview, 
supra note 39. 
 193. See Federal Water Pollution Control Act, Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat. 
816 (1972); History of the Clean Water Act, EPA, https://www.epa.gov/laws-
regulations/history-clean-water-act [https://perma.cc/ 2UW8-4HJC] (last updated 
Aug. 8, 2017).  
 194. See Int’l Joint Comm’n, A Guide to the Great Lakes Water Quality 
Agreement: Background for the 2006 Governmental Review, at 1–2 (2006). 
 195. Karkkainen, supra note 187, at 1009. 
 196. WHITE HOUSE COUNCIL, supra note 80, at 50 (emphasis added). 
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B. The Obama Administration’s Significant Amendment of the 
GLWQA in 2012 
On September 7, 2012, the USEPA Administrator and Canada’s 
Environment Minister executed a significant amendment to the 
GLWQA that has since superseded the 1972 Agreement, as 
amended.197 It entered into force on February 12, 2013.198 The new 
2012 GLWQA was intended to facilitate “United States and Canadian 
action on threats to Great Lakes water quality and include[d] 
strengthened measures to anticipate and prevent ecological harm.”199 
Indeed, USEPA proudly displays on its website a page entitled “Great 
Lakes Water Quality Agreement (GLWQA).”200 This agency website 
describes the GLWQA as “a commitment between the United States 
and Canada to restore and protect the waters of the Great Lakes” and 
as providing “a framework for identifying binational priorities and 
implementing actions that improve water quality. EPA coordinates 
U.S. activities under the Agreement.”201 USEPA coordinates U.S. 
activities from the Chicago, Illinois-based Great Lakes National 
Program Office (GLNPO).202 The GLNPO is located at the USEPA 
Region 5 offices.203 USEPA Region 5 covers six of the Great Lakes 
States: Minnesota, Wisconsin, Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, and 
Ohio.204 
EPA neglects to mention anywhere on its website that each of 
the three key principles identified in the Obama administration’s Final 
Recommendations and the National Ocean Plan—precautionary 
 
 197. Press Release, EPA, United States and Canada Sign Amended Great 
Lakes Water Quality Agreement (Sept. 7, 2012) (on file at the EPA website archive) 
(emphasis added), https://archive.epa.gov/epapages/newsroom_archive/ 
newsreleases/9e6415ec5260e5c885257a7200669766.html [https://perma.cc/ZG84-
JQ3H]. 
 198. See generally Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement, supra note 190. 
 199. Id.; see generally Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement, supra note 190. 
 200. Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement, EPA, 
https://www.epa.gov/glwqa [https://perma.cc/U8MM-ZX2T] (last updated Jan. 29, 
2019) (emphasis added); Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement – GLWQA Annexes, 
EPA, https://www.epa.gov/glwqa/glwqa-annexes [https://perma.cc/3ZHR-UQ38] 
(last updated Mar. 2, 2018). 
 201. Id. 
 202. See About EPA – About the Great Lakes National Program Office 
(GLPO), EPA, https://www.epa.gov/aboutepa/about-great-lakes-national-program-
office-glnpo [https://perma.cc/HMG4-W628] (last updated Aug. 21, 2018). 
 203. See id. 
 204. See About EPA – EPA Region 5, EPA, https://www.epa.gov/aboutepa/ 
epa-region-5 [https://perma.cc/XS2P-XHRM] (last updated Oct. 17, 2019). 
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approach/Europe’s precautionary principle, ecosystem-based 
management, and marine spatial planning—are included within the 
GLWQA as legal obligations the United States and Canada must 
assume as a matter of international and federal law. USEPA also 
neglects to mention that of the nine Regional Planning Bodies serving 
the nine regional planning areas the Final Recommendations and the 
National Ocean Policy had previously established, only the Great 
Lakes Regional Planning Body has included, besides USEPA, a 
foreign government—i.e., the Government of Canada—as a 
participant. It is the Regional Planning Bodies that work to develop 
regional goals, objectives, and, ultimately, regional coastal and marine 
spatial plans (CMSP).205 
C. The Trump Administration’s Revocation of the Obama 
Administration Oceans Policy Does Not Stop U.S. Implementation 
of GLWQA 
The Trump administration recently issued Executive Order 
13840 titled “Ocean Policy To Advance the Economic, Security, and 
Environmental Interests of the United States.”206 This Order revoked 
the Obama administration’s Executive Order 13547, “Stewardship of 
the Ocean, Our Coasts, and the Great Lakes,”207 which had directed 
federal agencies to adopt and implement the Final Recommendations. 
Nevertheless, the Great Lakes Regional Planning Body and the 
fundamental principles pursuant to which its work program had been 
undertaken will effectively live on within the work of one or more of 
the bodies the U.S. and Canadian governments previously established 
to fulfill the international law obligations each assumed under the 
GLWQA. In other words, these principles will persist so long as 
congressional appropriations continue to support USEPA’s 
implementation of the GLWQA.208 Based on the author’s knowledge 
and experience and as noted below, the Congress and the President 
(who is likely unaware of the European/international environmental 
 
 205. See WHITE HOUSE COUNCIL, supra note 80, at 8, 46. 
 206. Exec. Order No. 13,840, 83 Fed. Reg. 29431 (June 22, 2018). 
 207. See Executive Order Regarding the Ocean Policy to Advance the 
Economic, Security, and Environmental Interests of the United States, 
WHITEHOUSE.GOV § 7 (June 19, 2018), https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-
actions/executive-order-regarding-ocean-policy-advance-economic-security-
environmental-interests-united-states/ [https://perma.cc/5VAY-QHZ7]; Ocean Policy 
to Advance the Economic, Security, and Environmental Interests of the United States, 
83 Fed. Reg. 29,431 (June 22, 2018). 
 208. See 33 U.S.C. § 1268(a)(C); 33 U.S.C. § 1268(c)(1)(A)–(c)(2)(A). 
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law hidden within this treaty’s four corners because he has been poorly 
or misadvised) have continued to fund the implementation of the 
GLWQA.209 
D. GLWQA Articles 4 and 2 Incorporate the European Precautionary 
Principle, Ecosystem-Based Management, and Weight-of-
Evidence Standards 
Article 4.1 of the GLWQA requires the government of the State 
of Michigan, along with the other Great Lakes State governments, to 
cooperate with the federal governments of Canada and the United 
States to develop and implement programs and other measures to 
fulfill the purpose of said Agreement “in accordance with the 
Principles and Approaches set forth in Article 2.”210 Article 4.2 of the 
GLWQA states that said programs and other measures shall include 
but are not limited to pollution abatement, control, and prevention 
programs; conservation programs; and enforcement actions and other 
measures to ensure the effectiveness of the programs described 
above.211 Article 4.3. of the GLWQA provides that the U.S. 
government had committed itself to seek enactment of any 
legislation necessary to implement the programs and other measures 
developed under Article 4 with cooperation, input, and advice from 
downstream jurisdictions.212 
1. European Precautionary Principle 
Significantly, Article 2.4(i) of the GLWQA imposes upon all 
treaty parties the directive to employ a “precautionary approach as set 
forth in the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development . . . in 
 
 209. See, e.g., Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2014, P.L. 113-76, 113th 
Cong. (Jan. 17, 2014), 128 Stat. 5, 128 Stat. 238-239, 128 Stat. 320; Consolidated 
Appropriations Act, 2017, P.L. 115-31, 115th Cong. (May 5, 2017), 131 Stat. 135, 
131 Stat. 475-476; Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2018, P.L. 115-141, 115th 
Cong. (March 23, 2018), 132 Stat. 348, 132 Stat. 669; Consolidated Appropriations 
Act, 2019, P.L. 116-6, 116th Cong. (Feb. 15, 2019), 133 Stat. 13, 133 Stat. 240-241. 
Through each of these consolidated acts, Congress authorized the USEPA to transfer 
up to $300 million of the funds appropriated for the Great Lakes Restoration Initiative 
to carry out activities that would support inter alia the implementation of the Great 
Lakes Water Quality Agreement. See also infra Section V.B. 
 210. Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement, supra note 190, at art. 4.1 
(emphasis added). 
 211. Id. at arts. 4.2(a), 4.2(c), 4.2(d). 
 212. See id. at arts. 4.3(c), 4.3(d), 4.3(f). 
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order to achieve the purpose of this Agreement.”213 In addition, Article 
2.4(f) imposes upon all treaty parties the directive to employ the 
ecosystem-based management (precautionary) approach, “taking 
management actions that integrate the interacting components of air, 
land, water, and living organisms, including humans.”214 As discussed 
above (regarding the Obama administration’s Ocean Policy Task 
Force Final Recommendations), despite the use of precautionary 
approach documentation language, the actual practice on the ground 
has been to resort to the “strong” European precautionary principle for 
compliance and enforcement purposes. Subject to these principles, 
Article 3.1(a)(v) imposes the general obligation to “support healthy 
and productive wetlands and other habitats to sustain resilient 
populations of native species.”215 In addition, Article 1(j) imposes the 
directive to employ “tributary management” focused on restoration of 
surface waters flowing into the “Waters of the Great Lakes,” namely 
tributaries with a substantial nexus to “waters of the United States,” 
including wetlands.216 
It is important to emphasize that although the amended 2012 
GLWQA text includes “precautionary approach” language, the federal 
Government of Canada incorporated the stronger precautionary 
principle and the ecosystem-based management approach within the 
Canadian Environmental Protection Act of 1999 (CEPA 1999).217 For 
example, Preambular paragraph 6 of CEPA 1999 states that “the 
Government of Canada is committed to implementing the 
precautionary principle that, where there are threats of serious or 
irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used 
as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent 
environmental degradation.”218 CEPA 1999 Article 2(1)(a) states that 
the Government of Canada shall “apply the precautionary principle” 
in the exercise of its powers to “protect the environment and public 
health.”219 CEPA 1999 Article 2(1)(c) states that the Government of 
Canada also shall “implement an ecosystem approach that considers 
the unique and fundamental characteristics of ecosystems.”220 CEPA 
1999 Part 3, Article 54(1)(b) provides that “[f]or [the] purpose of 
 
 213. Id. at art. 2.4(i). 
 214. Id. at arts. 2.4(b), 2.4(f), pmbl., para. 6. 
 215. Id. at art. 3.1.(a)(v) (emphasis added). 
 216. Id. at arts. 1(j), 2.4(n). 
 217. See Canadian Environmental Protection Act, S.C. 1999, c 33 (Can.). 
 218. Id. at pmbl., para. 6 (emphasis added). 
 219. Id. at art. 2(1)(a). 
 220. Id. at art. 2(1)(c). 
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carrying out the Minister’s mandate related to preserving the quality 
of the environment, the Minister shall issue . . . environmental quality 
guidelines specifying recommendations in quantitative or qualitative 
terms to support and maintain particular uses of the environment.”221 
Chapter 3 of the Government of Canada’s “Guide to Understanding 
the Canadian Environmental Protection Act, 1999” includes 
“sustainable development” and the “precautionary principle” as 
among the “key” guiding principles informing the Canadian 
government’s implementation of that statute.222 Also among the “key” 
guidelines is the “Framework for the Application of Precaution in 
Science-based Decision Making about Risk.”223  
2. Weight-of-Evidence Approach 
Implicit, if not explicit, in the Canadian government’s obligatory 
implementation of the European precautionary principle is its use of a 
“weight-of-evidence approach” in performing semi-quantitative and 
qualitative risk assessments.224 Such use likely harkens back to a 1994 
International Joint Commission (IJC) workshop report discussed 
below and to more recent international environmental law and World 
Trade Organization jurisprudence.225 
It was no coincidence, however, that on September 28, 2012 
(three weeks to-the-day following former Obama administration 
USEPA administrator Lisa Jackson’s execution of the GLWQA’s 
 
 221. Id. at art. 54(1)(b). 
 222. GOV’T OF CAN., A GUIDE TO UNDERSTANDING THE CANADIAN 
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION ACT 3, 5, 7 (2004). 
 223. GOV’T OF CAN., A FRAMEWORK FOR THE APPLICATION OF PRECAUTION IN 
SCIENCE-BASED DECISION MAKING ABOUT RISK 2 (2003).  
 224. See A GUIDE TO UNDERSTANDING THE CANADIAN ENVIRONMENTAL 
PROTECTION ACT, supra note 222, at 5, 7. 
 225. See Lawrence A. Kogan, REACH Revisited: A Framework for Evaluating 
Whether a Non-Tariff Measure Has Matured into an Actionable Non-Tariff Barrier 
to Trade, 28 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 489, 577–82, 610–13 (2013) (discussing the efforts 
of the European Union to change the paradigm of traditional quantitative risk 
assessment to semi-quantitative and qualitative risk assessment as an international 
science standard over the course of several World Trade Organization General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) 
Agreement decisions, and how the chemical safety reports—comprising part of the 
EU REACH regulation’s registration technical dossiers the European Commission—
required for imported high volume chemicals must contain references to “qualitative” 
or “semi-quantitative” risk assessments, the goal of which is to establish that chemical 
substances pose zero risk to human health or the environment, consistent with the 
European precautionary principle). 
732 Michigan State Law Review  2019 
legally significant 2012 amendments on September 7, 2012), the 
USEPA Science Advisory Board (SAB), a federal advisory 
committee,226 delivered to the former administrator its 
recommendations227 for further expanding and refining the Draft 
Ecological Assessment Action Plan of the SAB’s standing 
committee—the Risk Assessment Forum (RAF).228 The SAB RAF had 
developed and initially released that Action Plan in August 2011,229 
and it was subsequently reviewed by the USEPA SAB’s now-defunct 
Ecological Processes and Effects Committee (EPEC)230 in February 
2012.231 The SAB September 2012 recommendations found that “use 
of weight-of-evidence approaches in ecological risk assessments; 
improved communication of ecological assessment issues and results 
to decision-makers; and incorporation of ecosystem services into 
ecological risk assessment methods . . . have the greatest likelihood of 
achieving the agency’s goals in the near term.”232 However, the 
USEPA SAB recognized that successful employment of ecological 
risk assessment “frameworks for weighing and integrating multiple 
lines of evidence . . . will hinge on a weight-of-evidence [WOE] 
determination” that is reliant upon “statistically-based decision points 
 
 226. See All Federal Advisory Committees at EPA, EPA, 
https://www.epa.gov/faca/all-federal-advisory-committees-epa [https://perma.cc/ 
W7NW-C5J5] (last updated Oct. 23, 2019) (noting the EPA SAB is a chartered federal 
advisory committee of the EPA that “[p]rovides independent advice and peer review 
to EPA’s Administrator on the scientific and technical aspects of environmental 
issues”); see also Federal Advisory Committee Act, Pub. L. No. 92-463, 86 Stat. 770 
(1972) (highlighting that the SAB is subject to the federal advisory committee act). 
 227. See Office of the Adm’r Sci. Advisory Bd., SAB Review of the EPA’s 
Ecological Assessment Action Plan (Sept. 28, 2012). 
 228. See Risk Assessment Forum, EPA OFFICE OF THE SCI. ADVISOR, 
https://archive.epa.gov/raf/web/html/index.html [https://perma.cc/XEW3-FBH5] 
(last updated Feb. 20, 2016); About the Forum, EPA OFF. OF THE SCI. ADVISOR, 
https://archive.epa.gov/raf/web/html/aboutraf.html [https://perma.cc/J36A-E73D] 
(last updated Feb. 20, 2016). 
 229. See EPA, ECOLOGICAL ASSESSMENT ACTION PLAN (2016). 
 230. See Committees and Membership, EPA, https://yosemite.epa.gov/sab/ 
sabproduct.nsf/WebBOARD/CommitteesandMembership [https://perma.cc/W5CC-
ALK3] (last updated June 21, 2018) (discussing how EPA SAB had voted on May 21, 
2018, to retire the EPEC). 
 231. See Memorandum on Transmittal of RAF Ecological Action Plan and 
Charge to the SAB EPEC from Edward Ohanian, Chair, EPA Risk Assessment 
Forum, to Thomas Armitage, EPA Sci. Advisory Bd. Staff Office (Jan. 20, 2012) (on 
file with the EPA). 
 232. Cover Letter on SAB Review of the EPA’s Ecological Assessment 
Action Plan from Office of the Adm’r Sci. Advisory Bd., to Hon. Lisa P. Jackson, 
Adm’r, EPA (Sept. 28, 2012) (on file with the EPA). 
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rather than best professional judgment,” which do not presently 
exist.233 
According to the 2012 SAB Recommendations, “[a] well-
developed WOE approach would enable risk assessors to assign 
quantitative weights to results from different studies (with associated 
estimates of uncertainty) and to combine them into an assessment of 
defined risk.”234 The SAB, however, admonished USEPA regarding 
the “number of challenges inherent in using WOE in ecological risk 
assessments for decision-making.”235 For example, ecological risk 
assessments are not as amenable to formalization as are the human 
health risk assessments (which have discrete or common endpoints) to 
which the WOE approach has been applied.236 And since “WOE 
approaches have often been based on best professional judgment[, 
they] . . . have varied widely in their scientific rigor and statistical 
credibility.”237 Consequently, the USEPA SAB recommended that the 
lines of evidence (LOE) used in the WOE process “should adequately 
characterize physical, chemical and biological conditions” and the 
“quality of the data underlying a particular LOE should factor into the 
assigned weights.”238  
As the SAB concluded, “[t]he ‘bottom-line’ is that integration of 
different lines of evidence is essential given that ‘today’s 
environmental challenges are increasingly subtle and 
complex’ . . . particularly so given the reality of global climate 
change.”239 As of 2012, the SAB conceded that “[d]ata quality and the 
reliability of different studies should also be considered in a WOE 
approach. Applying an arbitrary weighting scheme without a solid 
theoretical foundation to integrate different LOE into a single risk 
score may not actually improve decision-making.”240 In addition, the 
SAB admitted that the weight-of-evidence approach had been 
employed as a “qualitative” professional judgment-based tool bereft 
of a probabilistic basis.241 “The evaluation of WOE has progressed 
 
 233. SAB Review of the EPA’s Ecological Assessment Action Plan, supra 
note 227, at 2. 
 234. Id. at 3. 
 235. Id. 
 236. See id. 
 237. Id. 
 238. Id. at 4. 
 239. Id. at 12, 15–18 (citing “(Anasta 2012) . . . (cf. U.S. Fish and Wildlife 
Service and National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration 2012”)). 
 240. SAB Review of the EPA’s Ecological Assessment Action Plan, supra 
note 227, at 18. 
 241. See id. at 19. 
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over the years but as it is currently practiced, WOE is a qualitative tool 
without a probabilistic basis. A WOE is essentially a Bayesian 
approach without a realization of the calculation.”242 
The 2012 SAB Recommendations regarding how to properly 
employ WOE to ecological risk assessments must be taken with a 
grain of salt, however, because SAB significantly failed to address and 
arguably misrepresented WOE’s successful use in human 
toxicological risk assessments. As the National Research Council 
(NRC) subsequently reported in its 2014 review of USEPA’s 
Integrated Risk Information System (IRIS), it is clear that the EPA had 
actually used WOE in a scientifically unreliable manner to integrate 
lines of evidence of various qualities into a single judgment for 
purposes of assessing identified possible hazards rather than probable 
risks posed by toxic chemicals to human health.243 According to the 
USEPA SAB,  
the phrase weight of evidence has become far too vague as used in practice 
today and thus is of little scientific use. In some accounts, it is characterized 
as an oversimplified balance scale on which evidence supporting hazard is 
placed on one side and evidence refuting hazard on the other, without 
aggregating the weight on either side of the balance or assigning weights to 
each individual study on each side. . . . [I]ts use in the literature and by 
scientific agencies, including EPA, is vague and varied.244  
Indeed, the NRC report noted the paucity of high-quality human data 
and animal data for most of the toxic chemicals in commercial use in 
the United States. It concluded, therefore, that the best evidence 
USEPA could assemble would be based on inferences drawn from a 
chemical’s (or similar compound’s) potential toxicity or the putative 
mechanism by which a chemical might (possibly) cause harm.245 In 
effect, the NRC had implied that USEPA’s employment of an 
administrative presumption of harm/hazard via application of 
Europe’s precautionary principle as the basis of a WOE approach to 
integrating various lines of qualitative evidence of the hazard(s) toxic 
chemicals posed to human health was not scientifically reliable.246 
At least one allegedly peer reviewed article released in 2015 
agreed with the NRC’s conclusion that the “weight-of-evidence” 
process was “too vague and detractive to the practice of evaluating 
 
 242. Id.  
 243. NAT’L RES. COUNCIL, REVIEW OF EPA’S INTEGRATED RISK INFORMATION 
SYSTEM (IRIS) PROCESS 86–87 (National Academies Press 2014). 
 244. Id. 
 245. Id. at 87. 
 246. See id. at 86–87. 
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human health risks of chemicals.”247 It acknowledged how “many 
[WOE] applications have been largely qualitative and subjective in 
nature” and that “[m]oving the [WOE] methodology away from 
qualitative, vague and controversial methods towards generalizable, 
quantitative and transparent methods for appropriately managing 
diverse lines of evidence is paramount for both regulatory and public 
acceptance of hazard assessments.”248 
In December 2016, just prior to the close of the Obama 
administration, the USEPA SAB Risk Assessment Forum (RAF) 
released its WOE guidelines, which the SAB had previously 
recommended in 2012.249 The SAB RAF document stated that it 
“provides a framework, a set of properties of evidence, a scoring 
system, tables for presenting results of weighting, and weighing 
evidence, a system for organizing evidence in terms of types and the 
characteristics they address and a means of dealing with ambiguous or 
discrepant results.”250 In addition, it stated that the framework and 
methods “also provide an integrated approach to both infer a quality 
of interest and estimate an associated quantitative value.”251 
The 2016 USEPA WOE Guidelines define WOE “as an 
inferential process that assembles, evaluates, and integrates evidence 
to perform a technical inference in an assessment. [WOE] methods 
have been derived to estimate a quantity, inform model selection, or 
reach qualitative conclusions in an assessment.”252 The 2016 USEPA 
 
 247. See Igor Linkov et al., From ‘Weight of Evidence’ to Quantitative Data 
Integration Using Multicriteria Decision Analysis and Bayesian Methods, 32(1) 
ALTEX 3, 3 (2015); see also ALTEX, https://www.altex.org/index.php/altex 
[https://perma.cc/2EV5-VZFT] (last visited Oct. 30, 2019). 
 248. Linkov et al., supra note 247, at 3. 
 249. See generally EPA, EPA/100/R-16/001, WEIGHT OF EVIDENCE IN 
ECOLOGICAL ASSESSMENT (2016).  
 250. Id. at xi. 
 251. Id. 
 252. Id. at 1 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
As part of that inferential process, WoE characterizes properties of pieces 
of evidence and of bodies of evidence. First, WoE determines the degree of 
support for a hypothesis that a piece or type of evidence provides (i.e., the 
weight of a piece of evidence dropped into a pan of the scales). Hence, 
weights indicate which pieces and types of evidence make the greatest 
contribution to the inference. Second, WoE determines the degree of 
support for a hypothesis, relative to alternatives, that the available body of 
evidence provides (i.e., the accumulated weight in one pan relative to the 
other). These cumulative weights not only inform inferences, they also 
indicate how much confidence assessors have in the conclusion. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
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WOE Guidelines state that in the context of the Clean Water Act, 
WOE is used “to determine the cause of biological impairment” of a 
waterbody.253 According to the guidelines, “[o]nce the cause of water 
body impairment has been determined, the sources can be identified 
so that [Total Maximum Daily Loads (TDMLs)] can be developed.”254 
In addition, the guidelines note that “[t]he TMDL process often 
includes evaluation of the results, which can lead to removal of the 
stream reach from the 303(d) list. This outcome assessment can rely 
on biological endpoints and could involve [WOE].”255  
The 2016 USEPA WOE Guidelines provide a summary of the 
proposed WOE framework,256 as well as the following conclusory 
statement: “In summary, this document is intended to help ecological 
assessors improve the practice of [WOE] without imposing 
burdensome prescriptions.”257 The Guidelines then set forth differing 
WOE methods: for quantitative results in Appendix B;258 for deriving 
a computational (mathematical) model (i.e., model selection by 
weight-of-evidence, model comparisons, weighting of evidence for 
model assumptions) in Appendix C;259 and for qualitative conclusions 
in Appendix D.260 The Guidelines also set forth in Appendix E 
“characteristics of inferred qualities” which include characteristics of 
both “specific causation” and “general causation,” called “Cormier’s 
causal characteristics,” and characteristics of biological impairment.261 
This appendix is rather curious because it states that causal 
characteristics “can be used to demonstrate that, at least in [specific] 
cases, the agent could cause the effect,” not does cause the effect.262 
This statement is significant because Europe’s precautionary principle 
focuses on possible hazards theoretically capable of causing (i.e., that 
could cause) harm, rather than on probable risks scientifically 
 
 253. Id. at 10. 
 254. Id. (citations omitted). 
 255. Id. 
 256. See id. at 59 (presenting a Weight-of-Evidence Summary). 
 257. Id. at 60. 
 258. See id. at apps. B-1 to -4 (outlining Weight-of-Evidence methods for 
quantitative results). 
 259. See id. at app. C-1 (outlining Weight-of-Evidence methods for deriving 
a model). 
 260. See id. at apps. D-1 to -6 (outlining Weight-of-Evidence approaches for 
qualitative conclusions). 
 261. Id. at apps. E-1 to -4. 
 262. Id. at apps. E-1 to -4 (outlining Weight-of-Evidence Characteristics of 
Inferred Qualities) (emphasis added). 
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demonstrated to cause harm.263 This effectively translates into a 
general causation evidentiary standard at trial.264  
Likely concerned that the new Trump administration would not 
support the “last minute” WOE guidelines released at the close of the 
Obama administration, USEPA employees set out to publish an 
allegedly peer-reviewed article that would extol the guidelines’ 
perceived virtues.265 During November 2017, for example, three EPA 
employees jointly authored an article published in the Journal of 
Integrated Environmental Assessment and Management entitled “A 
Weight of Evidence Framework for Environmental Assessments: 
Inferring Qualities,”266 to which the publisher subsequently granted the 
public access. This article applauded the USEPA for having 
“developed a generally applicable framework . . . [that] can increase 
the consistency and rigor of [WOE] practices and provide greater 
transparency than ad hoc and narrative-based approaches.”267 The 
article’s authors concluded that the basic WOE framework “can help 
to achieve that goal without being so prescriptive or onerous that it 
inhibits the production of useful environmental assessments.”268 
The 2017 article’s “cheerleading” of the USEPA WOE 
Guidelines raises certain red flags concerning the objectivity and 
independence of its authors who also had authored and/or contributed 
to the 2016 USEPA WOE Guidelines.269 Indeed, the three authors of 
the 2017 article acknowledged it had been derived from the 2016 
USEPA WOE Guidelines.270 For example, Glenn W. Suter was the 
lead/primary author of the 2017 article and of the 2016 USEPA WOE 
Guidelines.271 Susan Cormier and Mace G. Barron co-authored the 
2017 article and served as technical contributors to the 2016 USEPA 
 
 263. See supra Section III.D.1. 
 264. See Kogan, Weight of the Evidence, supra note 182 (quoting Milward v. 
Acuity Special Prods. Grp., 639 F.3d 11, 13 (1st Cir. 2011)); see also RESTATEMENT 
(THIRD) OF TORTS § 28 cmt. c(4) (2010) (“[T]o establish general causation at trial, one 
must show the association [i.e., between a substance and a disease] is merely plausible 
or possible, whereas ‘specific causation’ exists when exposure to an agent cause a 
particular plaintiff’s disease.”). 
 265. Glen Suter et al., A Weight of Evidence Framework for Environmental 
Assessments: Inferring Qualities, 13 INTEGRATED ENVTL. ASSESSMENT MGMT. 966, 
1038–44 (2017).  
 266. Id. 
 267. Id. at 1038. 
 268. Id. at 1043. 
 269. See id. at 1038–44. 
 270. See id. 
 271. See Risk Assessment Forum, supra note 228, at 9. 
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WOE Guidelines.272 Suter’s and Cormier’s authorship of portions of 
the 2016 USEPA WOE Guidelines, in fact, ensured that a number of 
their respective publications were listed as references sources (eight 
articles for Suter and six articles for Cormier).273  
Within the 2016 USEPA WOE Guidelines themselves, various 
other red flags arise concerning the objectivity and independence of 
three of the four persons selected as “External Peer Reviewers.”274 A 
close review of the Guidelines reveals that four articles previously 
authored/coauthored by external peer reviewer Peter Chapman, one 
article previously authored/coauthored by external peer reviewer 
Valery Forbes, and four articles previously authored/coauthored by 
external peer reviewer Igor Linkov had been included as reference 
sources in the Guidelines.275 In addition, external peer reviewer 
Chapman, an environmental consultant, also was a member of the 
now-defunct USEPA SAB standing committee known as the 
Ecological Processes and Effects Committee (EPEC) that had 
reviewed the 2011 SAB RAF Action Plan and developed the SAB 
RAF’s 2012 recommendations.276 Curiously, these recommendations 
had cited Chapman’s own work (three authored/coauthored articles), 
Cormier’s work (four authored/coauthored articles), Suter’s work 
(three authored/coauthored articles), and external peer reviewer 
Linkov’s work (two authored/coauthored articles).277 Such self- and 
cross-citation practices strongly suggest a lack of objectivity, if not a 
lack of independence of each of the authors, as well as a flawed peer 
review process in contravention of the federal standards of the 
Information Quality Act.278 
3. Information/Data Quality and Independent Peer Review 
Although USEPA secured SAB external peer review of the 2016 
WOE Guidelines, the agency failed to ensure that the review complied 
with the federal Information Quality Act (IQA)279 peer review 
 
 272. See id. 
 273. See id. 
 274. Id. 
 275. See id. 
 276. See id. 
 277. See id. 
 278. See Information Quality Act, Pub. L. 106-544, 114 Stat. 2763, 2763A-
153 to -154 (2000) (codified at 44 U.S.C. § 3516 (2000)).  
 279. See id. 
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standards280 and the standards to ensure information quality, 
objectivity, utility, and integrity that the White House Office of 
Management and Budget’s Office of Information and Regulatory 
Affairs (OMB-OIRA) had promulgated.281 Arguably, the SAB 
external peer review of the 2016 WOE Guidelines also failed to meet 
the EPA’s own IQA Guidelines282 and Peer Review Handbook.283 The 
2016 WOE Guidelines were subject to these standards because 
USEPA had publicly represented the WOE Guidelines as agency 
knowledge of scientific facts or data (i.e., scientific information,284 
including scientific assessments,285 or even “influential scientific 
information”)286 reflecting the agency’s point of view, which the 
agency communicated and disseminated to the public via its agency 
website.287 “OMB’s guidelines establish a rebuttable legal 
 
 280. See Final Information Quality Bulletin for Peer Review, 70 Fed. Reg. 
2664 (Jan. 14, 2005). 
 281. See Guidelines for Ensuring and Maximizing the Quality, Objectivity, 
Utility, and Integrity of Information Disseminated by Federal Agencies, 67 Fed. Reg. 
8452 (Feb. 22, 2002).  
 282. See EPA, EPA/260R-02-008, GUIDELINES FOR ENSURING AND 
MAXIMIZING THE QUALITY, OBJECTIVITY, UTILITY, AND INTEGRITY OF INFORMATION 
DISSEMINATED BY THE ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY (2002). 
 283. See EPA, SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY POLICY COUNCIL PEER REVIEW 
HANDBOOK (4th ed. 2015). 
 284. See Final Information Quality Bulletin for Peer Review, 70 Fed. Reg. at 
2675 (“5. The term ‘scientific information’ means factual inputs, data, models, 
analyses, technical information, or scientific assessments based on the behavioral and 
social sciences, public health and medical sciences, life and earth sciences, 
engineering, or physical sciences. This includes any communication or representation 
of knowledge such as facts or data, in any medium or form, including textual, 
numerical, graphic, cartographic, narrative, or audiovisual forms. This definition 
includes information that an agency disseminates from a Web page, but does not 
include the provision of hyperlinks to information that others disseminate.”). 
 285. Id. (“7. The term ‘scientific assessment’ means an evaluation of a body 
of scientific or technical knowledge, which typically synthesizes multiple factual 
inputs, data, models, assumptions, and/or applies best professional judgment to bridge 
uncertainties in the available information. These assessments include, but are not 
limited to, state-of-science reports; technology assessments; weight-of-evidence 
analyses; meta-analyses; health, safety, or ecological risk assessments; toxicological 
characterizations of substances; integrated assessment models; hazard determinations; 
or exposure assessments.”) (emphasis added). 
 286. Id. (“6. The term ‘influential scientific information’ means scientific 
information the agency reasonably can determine will have or does have a clear and 
substantial impact on important public policies or private sector decisions.”). 
 287. See Lawrence A. Kogan, Revitalizing the Information Quality Act as a 
Procedural Cure for Unsound Regulatory Science: A Greenhouse Gas Rulemaking 
Case Study 5 (Wash. Legal Found. Critical Legal Issues Working Paper Series, 
Working Paper No. 191, 2015). 
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presumption of ‘objectivity’ in favor of formal, independent, external 
peer reviews of agency-disseminated scientific information or 
assessments.”288  
Peer reviews of influential scientific information “may be 
conducted either internally or externally—i.e., they may be conducted 
and managed either by the federal agency itself or by an independent 
third-party entity the federal agency has commissioned to manage the 
peer review.”289 USEPA has exercised its discretion to permit internal 
as well as external peer reviews of third-party information, depending 
on its importance.290 USEPA’s Peer Review handbook provides that 
review by an established federal advisory committee, such as the 
EPA’s Scientific Advisory Board (SAB), constitutes an example of an 
acceptable external peer review mechanism.291 However,  
when external peer review is conducted under the auspices of the Science 
Advisory Board (SAB) . . . the SAB Staff Office in the Office of the 
Administration is responsible for selecting and vetting independent experts 
. . . . The SAB Staff Office selects peer reviewers after a public nomination 
and comment process and after evaluating candidates for potential COIs 
[conflicts-of-interest] or appearance of a loss of impartiality.292  
USEPA deems reports produced by the SAB as products of 
independent peer review.293 “Peer reviews conducted by stakeholders 
of their own products may be considered peer input but not 
independent peer review, unless principles and policies articulated in 
the USEPA’s Peer Review Handbook can be applied.”294 USEPA 
considers peer review by refereed scientific journals “as adequate for 
reviewing the scientific credibility and validity of the findings (or 
data) in that article, and therefore, a satisfactory form of peer 
review.”295 
 
 288. Id.  
 289. Id. at 6.  
 290. See SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY POLICY COUNCIL PEER REVIEW 
HANDBOOK, supra note 283, at 53–55 (“[Influential scientific information] intended 
to support the most important decisions, or for work products that have special 
importance in their own right, the recommended approach is an internal review 
followed by an external peer review. Generally, the more complex, novel and/or 
controversial the product, or the higher impact it is likely to have, the more the DM 
should consider implementing a peer review involving external experts and providing 
opportunities for public participation.”). 
 291. See id. at 56. 
 292. Id. at 36–37. 
 293. See id. at 48. 
 294. Id. (emphasis added). 
 295. Id. at 56. 
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With respect to influential scientific information, in addition to 
requiring the disclosure of each peer reviewer’s name, identity, and 
organizational affiliations, OMB’s Peer Review Bulletin calls for a  
verbatim copy of each peer reviewer’s comments or a copy of the 
summarized comments of the group of peer reviewers as a whole without 
attribution to specific peer reviewers. The summary must include any 
disparate and dissenting views. In addition, federal agencies must post the 
entire peer-review report contemporaneously on the agency’s website along 
with all materials related to the peer review, including any charge statement 
to peer reviewers and any agency response(s) to the peer-review report.296  
Clearly, the absence of any peer review report, any individual peer 
reviewer comments, or any Peer Review Plan297 concerning USEPA 
SAB’s WOE Guidelines strongly suggests that EPA failed to adhere 
to these IQA-related standards. Similarly, the Guidelines’ lead 
author’s dissemination and placement of the WOE Guidelines on the 
Research.gate.net publication website for what appears to be an ad hoc 
attempt at “crowd-sourced” academic peer review or an informal 
solicitation for public comments does not satisfy OMB or EPA IQA 
standards.298 
Peer reviewers of influential scientific information must be 
independent of the agency sponsoring the review.299 This means that 
USEPA is (and other federal agencies are) required to preclude all 
scientists who have participated in the development of influential 
scientific information from serving as peer reviewers of such a work 
product. It also obliges USEPA (and other federal agencies) to avoid 
 
 296. Kogan, Revitalizing the Information Quality Act, supra note 287, at 9.  
 297. See SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY POLICY COUNCIL PEER REVIEW 
HANDBOOK, supra note 283, at 94–95. 
 298. See GLENN W. SUTER, WEIGHT OF EVIDENCE FOR ECOLOGICAL 
ASSESSMENTS (2016) https://www.researchgate.net/publication/315792218 
[https://perma.cc/DSR8-838N]; see also SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY POLICY COUNCIL 
PEER REVIEW HANDBOOK, supra note 283, at 61. Another method which might be 
used to find peer reviewers is public solicitation. The Science Inventory can assist the 
public solicitation process by announcing the opportunity for public nominations and 
by providing background on the review topic the public may find useful for 
identifying potential reviewers they may wish to nominate. EPA’s Science Advisory 
Board uses the Internet to solicit names for both ad hoc and standing advisory 
committees. These names, along with short biographical sketches, are also posted so 
that the public may not only nominate, but also comment on potential advisory 
committee members. See EPA Science Advisory Board, EPA (last updated Jan. 31, 
2019) (making publicly available the Advisory Committee Meetings and Report 
Development: Process for Public Involvement). 
 299. See SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY POLICY COUNCIL PEER REVIEW 
HANDBOOK, supra note 283, at 70. 
742 Michigan State Law Review  2019 
using the same peer reviewer in multiple influential scientific 
assessments.300 USEPA (and other federal agencies), furthermore, 
must ensure that peer reviewers serving as federal employees 
(including special government employees) comply with applicable 
federal ethics requirements and that such agencies employ National 
Academy of Sciences conflicts of interest policies for selecting non-
federal government employees to serve on peer review committees.301 
Such policies must address conflicts of interest arising from 
investments, from agency, employer, and business affiliations, and 
from grants, contracts, and consulting income.302 In effect, USEPA’s 
Peer Review Handbook defines an “independent peer reviewer” as an 
expert who is “not . . . associated with the generation of the specific 
work product, either directly by substantial contribution to its 
development or indirectly by significant consultation during the 
development of the [specific] product.”303 Peer reviewers also should 
be “impartial”—i.e., free from conflicts of interest.304  
It cannot be determined without further inquiry whether the four 
external peer reviewers of USEPA SAB’s WOE Guidelines had 
financial or institutional affiliation-based conflicts of interest.305 
Nevertheless, it is clear that USEPA did not consider that three of the 
four peer reviewers had been directly (and indirectly via consultation) 
associated with the development of the WOE Guidelines they later 
peer reviewed.306 The failure of peer reviewers to “red flag” the several 
instances where author–contributors had made reference to their own 
prior published works identified as supporting sources within the 
WOE Guidelines strongly suggests that other than an independent 
peer review compliant with IQA peer review standards had taken 
place.307 Therefore, these Guidelines are not scientifically reliable 
within the meaning of Federal Rule of Evidence 702 and the United 
 
 300. See Final Information Quality Bulletin for Peer Review, 70 Fed. Reg. at 
2675. 
 301. See id. 
 302. See id. at 2675. 
 303. SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY POLICY COUNCIL PEER REVIEW HANDBOOK, 
supra note 283, at 70 (emphasis added). 
 304. Id. 
 305. Risk Assessment Forum, supra note 228, at 9. 
 306. See id. 
 307. Since it is abundantly evident that the EPA SAB WOE Guidelines were 
rushed through and released in the closing weeks of the Obama administration, the 
SAB likely had little opportunity to ensure its peer review of those Guidelines 
complied with the IQA’s rigorous federal information quality standards. See SCIENCE 
AND TECHNOLOGY POLICY COUNCIL PEER REVIEW HANDBOOK, supra note 283, at 70. 
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States Supreme Court’s ruling in Daubert v. Merrell Dow 
Pharmaceuticals, Inc.308 Thus, they should be redrafted and peer 
reviewed once again, this time consistent with the IQA’s rigorous 
federal information quality standards.309  
E. GLWQA Articles 1, 3, and 7 and Annex 10 Subject U.S. 
Implementation to the Science and/or Policy Advice of the 
International Joint Commission 
1. Articles 1 and 3 
Pursuant to GLWQA Articles 1(d) and 3(6), the United States 
agreed to take advice and recommendations from the International 
Joint Commission (IJC) previously established by the Canada–U.S. 
Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909.310 The 1909 Boundary Waters 
Treaty covers water quantity and water quality issues in shared 
waterways and related watersheds along the entire Canada–U.S. 
border.311  
2. Article 7 
GLWQA Article 7(1) authorizes the IJC to analyze, disseminate, 
and independently verify data and information obtained from the 
Parties, State, and Provincial Governments, and watershed 
management agencies relating to Great Lakes water quality and 
pollution that enters boundary waters from tributary waters and other 
sources.312 GLWQA Article 1(i) defines “Tributary waters” as 
“surface waters that flow directly or indirectly into the Waters of the 
Great Lakes.”313 
GLWQA Article 7(1)(c)(i)–(ii) authorizes the IJC to tender 
advice and recommendations to the Parties concerning “the social, 
economic and environmental aspects of current and emerging issues 
related to the quality of the Waters of the Great Lakes,” including Lake 
Erie, and regarding “matters covered under the Annexes” to the 
 
 308. 509 U.S. 579, 596 (1993).  
 309. See, e.g., 114 Stat. at 2763A-153 to -154. 
 310. See Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement, supra note 190, at arts. 1(d), 
3(6), 7(1); see also Treaty Between the United States and Great Britain Relating to 
Boundary Waters, and Questions Arising Between the United States and Canada, 
U.K.–U.S., Jan. 11, 1909, 36 Stat. 2448. 
 311. See Boundary Waters Treaty, supra note 310, at 1. 
 312. See Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement, supra note 190, at art. 7(1)(a). 
 313. Id. at art. 1(i). 
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GLWQA.314 GLWQA Article 7(1)(e)(ii) authorizes the IJC to “assist[] 
in and advis[e] on scientific matters related to the Great Lakes Basin 
Ecosystem, including . . . tendering scientific advice and 
recommendations to the Parties and to State and Provincial 
Governments . . . [and] watershed management agencies.”315  
3. Article 8 
Pursuant to GLWQA Article 8(1), “[t]he Parties . . . direct[ed] 
the [IJC] to establish a Great Lakes Water Quality Board, a Great 
Lakes Science Advisory Board and a Great Lakes Regional Office to 
assist in exercising the powers and responsibilities assigned to it under 
this Agreement.”316 The Great Lakes Water Quality Board has since 
served as the principal advisor to the Canada–U.S. International Joint 
Commission under the Canada–U.S. Great Lakes Water Quality 
Agreement.317 It inter alia ensures the implementation of the GLWQA 
by the Canadian and U.S. governments.318 Current and former319 
USEPA representatives have long served an active ongoing senior role 
on the Great Lakes Water Quality Board.320  
 
 314. Id. at arts. 7(1)(c)(i)–(ii). 
 315. Id. at art. 7(1)(e)(ii) (emphasis added) 
 316. Id. at art. 8(1). 
 317. See Great Lakes Water Quality Board, IJC, https://www.ijc.org/en/wqb 
[https://perma.cc/YK6J-TV3J] (last visited Oct. 30, 2019). 
 318. See id. 
 319. One such former USEPA representative, David Ullrich, who has 
continuously served as Co-Chair of the Great Lakes Water Quality Board from 
February 2014 to the present, served previously as Deputy Regional USEPA 
Administrator and as Water Enforcement Attorney, Air Enforcement Chief, Deputy 
Regional Counsel, and Waste Management Director. See David Ullrich, LINKEDIN, 
https://www.linkedin.com/in/david-ullrich-54337115. [https://perma.cc/P2FR-
YYJM] (last visited Oct. 30, 2019). Also, Chris Korleski currently serves as the 
Federal Member of the International Joint Commission Great Lakes Water Quality 
Board and Director of USEPA’s Great Lakes National Program Office based in 
Chicago, Illinois. See Great Lakes Water Quality Board: Members, IJC, 
https://www.ijc.org/en/wqb/who/members [https://perma.cc/L775-USPC] (last 
visited Oct. 30, 2019). 
 320. Indeed, between 2011 and 2016, both current and former USEPA 
representatives had served as Co-chair, member-participants, and/or observers of 
Great Lakes Water Quality Board biannual meetings. See GREAT LAKES WATER 
QUALITY BD., 179TH MEETING, SUMMARY OF DISCUSSION 1 (2011); GREAT LAKES 
WATER QUALITY BD., 180TH MEETING, SUMMARY OF DISCUSSION 1 (2012); GREAT 
LAKES WATER QUALITY BOARD – 181ST MEETING, SUMMARY OF DISCUSSION 1 (2012); 
GREAT LAKES WATER QUALITY BD., 182ND MEETING, SUMMARY OF DISCUSSION 1 
(2013); GREAT LAKES WATER QUALITY BD., 183RD MEETING, SUMMARY OF 
DISCUSSION 1 (2014); GREAT LAKES WATER QUALITY BD., 184TH MEETING, 
 The Europeanization of the Great Lakes States 745 
4. Annex 10 
In addition, GLWQA “Annex 10 – Science” directly obligates 
the United States (and indirectly obligates the State of Michigan and 
the other seven Great Lakes States) to use adaptive (ecosystem-based) 
science management techniques to review available scientific 
information to inform management actions and policy development 
and to consider IJC/Great Lakes Science Advisory Board advice.321 
Canada and the United States also must establish and maintain 
comprehensive (precautionary) science-based ecosystem indicators to 
assess the state of the Great Lakes and to anticipate emerging threats, 
thereby reinforcing the role of the IJC in such decision-making.322 
A review of the IJC’s prior work clearly shows how an earlier 
1994 IJC report recommending application of the “weight-of-
evidence” (WOE) approach of establishing scientific support for 
proposed regulatory actions had significantly influenced the drafting 
of the new 2012 GLWQA precautionary principle provisions 
discussed above.323 In that 1994 report, the IJC introduced the WOE 
approach as part of the IJC’s call for a precautionary set of 
environmental policies.324 The 1994 IJC report equated use of the 
WOE approach, which “is not a value-neutral exercise,” with the use 
of a precautionary approach “[w]hen the harm is large, the uncertainty 
is great, and our ability to predict the future is limited.”325 
 
SUMMARY OF DISCUSSION 1 (2014); GREAT LAKES WATER QUALITY BD., 185TH 
MEETING, SUMMARY OF DISCUSSION 1 (2014); GREAT LAKES WATER QUALITY BD., 
186TH MEETING, SUMMARY OF DISCUSSION 1 (2014); GREAT LAKES WATER QUALITY 
BD., 187TH MEETING, SUMMARY OF DISCUSSION 1 (2015); GREAT LAKES WATER 
QUALITY BD., 188TH MEETING, SUMMARY OF DISCUSSION 1 (2015); GREAT LAKES 
WATER QUALITY BD., 189TH MEETING, SUMMARY OF DISCUSSION 1 (2015); GREAT 
LAKES WATER QUALITY BD., 190TH MEETING, SUMMARY OF DISCUSSION 1 (2015); 
GREAT LAKES WATER QUALITY BD., 191ST MEETING, SUMMARY OF DISCUSSION 1 
(2016); GREAT LAKES WATER QUALITY BD., 192ND MEETING, SUMMARY OF 
DISCUSSION 1 (2016). 
 321. See Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement, supra note 200, at Annex 
10(B)(1), (C)(1)–(2). 
 322. See id. at Annex 10(D).  
 323. Compare Jack Weinberg & Joe Thorton, Scientific Inference and the 
Precautionary Principle, in APPLYING WEIGHT OF EVIDENCE: ISSUES AND PRACTICE, 
A REPORT ON A WORKSHOP HELD OCTOBER 24, 1993, at 20 (Michael Gilbertson & 
Sally Cole-Misch eds., 1994), with Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement, supra note 
200, at Annex 10(B)–(D). 
 324. See Weinberg & Thorton, supra note 323, at 20.  
 325. Id. at 21, 23. 
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Significantly, the 1994 IJC report acknowledged that the 
precautionary principle “must be built into the rules of inference,” 
even though it “derives neither from scientific principles nor from 
some thoughtful consideration of public ethics and morality.”326 The 
1994 IJC report reassured precautionary principle advocates that 
although “[s]ome argue[d] that the IJC’s ‘weight of evidence 
approach’ is weaker than the ‘precautionary principle’[, said] 
interpretation [was] false, however, and in sharp conflict with the 
IJC’s usage.”327 In addition, the 1994 IJC report emphasized how, 
“[u]nlike the current scientific and policy framework, this 
[precautionary inference] approach reverses the burden of proof, 
framing the question with the null hypothesis: ‘What evidence must 
we IGNORE to conclude that a causal relationship does not exist.’”328 
According to the 1994 IJC report, “[p]recautionary inference requires 
a holistic consideration of an integrated body of direct and 
circumstantial evidence. The focus shifts from whether or not causal 
relationships have been definitively proven to considering whether a 
body of direct and/or circumstantial evidence suggest a plausible 
hypothesis that harm has occurred.”329 
F. GLWQA Article 7(5) and Annex 2 Lakewide Action and 
Management Plans 
1. Article 7(5) and Annex 2.A 
GLWQA Article 7(5) states that “[i]n addition to the 
responsibilities outlined in this article, the [IJC] has specific roles and 
responsibilities pursuant to . . . Annex 2 – Lakewide Management.”330 
GLWQA Annex 2.A states that its purpose is “to contribute to the 
achievement of the General and Specific Objectives of [the GLWQA] 
by assessing the status of each Great Lake, and by addressing 
environmental stressors that adversely affect the Waters of the Great 
Lakes . . . on a lakewide scale through an ecosystem approach.”331  
 
 326. Id. at 23. 
 327. Id. at 24. 
 328. Id. at 25. 
 329. Id. at 26 (emphasis added). 
 330. Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement, supra note 190, at art. 7(5). 
 331. See id. 
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2. Annex 2.B 
Pursuant to Annex 2.B, the Parties shall, in consultation with 
State, Provincial, local, and tribal governments, undertake various 
lakewide management actions.332 These include inter alia the scientific 
evaluations of the state of the waters of each Great Lake, the reporting 
of such evaluations’ findings, and the development and 
implementation of specific binational strategies to address Annex 4 
nutrient threats to water quality.333 In addition, such actions also should 
include scientific evaluations of the nearshore waters of each of the 
Great Lakes and the development of an integrated nearshore 
framework.334 Two key actions called for by such a framework include 
the identification of high ecological value nearshore areas335 and the 
determination of chemical, physical, or biological integrity of which 
are subject to high stress individual or cumulative impacts. Another 
key action includes the establishment of priorities for nearshore and 
whole lake prevention, restoration, and protection.336 Furthermore, the 
lakewide management actions shall “include consideration of non-
point source runoff, shoreline hardening, climate change impacts, 
habitat loss, invasive species, dredging and contaminated sediment 
issues, bacterial contamination, contaminated groundwater, and other 
factors where they are identified as a source of stress to the nearshore 
environment.”337 In sum, GLWQA Annex 2.B effectively requires 
Canada and the United States to actively employ Europe’s 
precautionary principle to improve each Great Lake’s water quality by 
addressing in advance the environmental stressors potentially 
revealing the symptoms of land-based point and nonpoint sources of 
pollution.338 
 
 332. See id. at Annex 2(A). 
 333. See id. at Annex 2(B)(1)–(6). 
 334. See id. at Annex 2(B)(7)(a)–(f). 
 335. See id. at Annex 2(B)(7)(c)–(d). 
 336. See id. at Annex 2(B)(7)(f). 
 337. Id. at Annex 2(B)(7)(g). 
 338. See id. at Annex 2(B)(1)–(7). 
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3. Annex 2.C—Lakewide Action and Management Plans 
(LAMPs)—Lake Huron339 
Annex 2.C requires the Parties to “document and coordinate 
these management actions through the development of Lakewide 
Action and Management Plans (LAMP) for each Great Lake,” which 
shall be issued every five years with annual updates in between.340 
Once a five-year LAMP has been issued, “the Parties shall provide a 
copy to the [IJC] for advice and recommendations.”341  
The five-year LAMP for Lake Huron, which the Michigan 
Department of Environmental Quality (MDEQ) co-authored, for 
example, was released in 2018.342 It covers most of the east coast of 
Michigan for the period spanning 2017 through 2021.343 This LAMP 
relays that Lake Huron overall is in “fair” condition with significant 
declines in chemical pollutants since the 1970s, but fish and wildlife 
 
 339. This Article’s primary focus is on the federal and international law 
obligations the State of Michigan has assumed as the result of its participation in the 
GWLQA and other Great Lakes-related initiatives and how they have impacted state 
landowners, including hydroelectric dam owner-operators. Therefore, although 
Michigan’s coastline touches four of the five Great Lakes (Michigan, Erie, Superior 
and Huron), the following discussion will be limited to the LAMPs developed for 
Lakes Huron. See Lake Michigan LAMPs and Associated Reports, EPA (June 3, 
2019), https://www.epa.gov/greatlakes/lake-michigan-lamps-and-associated-
reports#lamps [https://perma.cc/9LAR-Y8Q7] (hosting annual reports spanning the 
years 2013–2017); see also EPA, LAKE SUPERIOR LAKEWIDE ACTION AND 
MANAGEMENT PLAN 2015–2019 (2016) (consisting of the most recent five-year 
LAMP for Lake Superior, which was released in 2016 and covers the period spanning 
2015–2019); Lake Erie LAMP and Associated Reports, EPA (Sept. 11, 2019), 
https://www.epa.gov/greatlakes/lake-erie-lamps-and-associated-reports#annual-repts 
[https://perma.cc/52Q6-J4AM] (hosting reports spanning the years 2012–2017); Lake 
Superior LAMPs and Associated Reports, EPA (June 3, 2019), 
https://www.epa.gov/greatlakes/lake-superior-lamps-and-associated-reports#annual-
reports [https://perma.cc/7QHG-XEHT] (hosting seven individual Lake Superior 
LAMPs available for public review); Lake Erie LAMPs, EPA (Nov. 28, 2018), 
https://www.epa.gov/greatlakes/lake-erie-lamps#basics [https://perma.cc/EPC8-
G6KC] (hosting reports for the years spanning 1999–2010); Lake Michigan LAMPs, 
EPA (Dec. 16, 2015), https://www.epa.gov/greatlakes/lake-michigan-lamps 
[https://perma.cc/6F95-VRBK] (hosting Lake Michigan LAMP Bi-Annual Reports 
spanning the years 2000–2008). The following discussion will be limited to the 
LAMPs developed for Lake Huron. 
 340. Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement, supra note 200, at Annex 2(C). 
 341. Id. 
 342. See ENV’T AND CLIMATE CHANGE CAN. AND THE U.S. EPA, Lake Huron 
Lakewide Action and Management Plan 2017–2021, at ii (2018). 
 343. Id.  
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consumption advisories remain.344 “The majority of nearshore waters 
are of high quality, but areas of the southeast shore, Saginaw Bay, and 
eastern Georgian Bay experience episodic algal blooms.”345 Chemical 
contaminants and nutrients and bacterial pollution have been 
identified as the first two of five priority threats for Lake Huron. In 
addition, lakewide priorities for 2017 included “[i]mproved 
understanding of nutrients (sources, sinks, pathways and loadings) and 
nutrient-related issues (nuisance and harmful algal blooms),”346 
especially in and around Saginaw Bay, which contains “abundant 
coastal wetlands that support a world class fishery” and “is designated 
a globally Important Bird Area for migratory waterfowl and 
shorebirds.”347  
Section 3 of the Lake Huron LAMP focuses on the 
interconnectedness of the Lake Huron watershed, which “is the largest 
watershed of all the Great Lakes. The water quality of Lake Huron 
depends on the health of its watershed.”348 It states that “[i]nland lakes 
and wetlands act as reservoirs that help to moderate the quantity of 
water moving through the watershed and remove excess nutrients and 
sediments otherwise released by severe storms.”349 “[W]etlands filter 
and absorb nutrients like phosphorous and nitrogen that can 
potentially stimulate algal blooms.”350 Agricultural lands contribute to 
the nutrients found in inland lakes and wetlands and, if responsibly 
farmed with “use of buffer strips, cover crops, grassed waterways, and 
two-stage ditches[, can] help to minimize soil erosion and flooding.”351 
However, this comes at a price that farmers and ultimately consumers 
must bear. The report also notes that “[i]n U.S. waters, over 10,000 
km (6213.7 miles) of stream habitat were at one time accessible to 
Lake Huron fish.”352 However, “[d]ams and barriers fragment and 
degrade river habitat and prevent fish migration.”353  
Regional threats to Lake Huron’s main basin include watershed 
nutrient and sediment inputs from agriculture and overland runoff and 
erosion.354 Regional threats to Michigan’s western shores of Lake 
 
 344. Id. at viii. 
 345. Id.  
 346. Id. at ix. 
 347. Id. at 6. 
 348. Id. at 7. 
 349. Id. at 9. 
 350. Id. 
 351. Id. at 8. 
 352. Id. at 9. 
 353. Id. 
 354. Id. at 42, fig. 24. 
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Huron include nonpoint source pollution (NPS), loss and degradation 
of stream habitat, and loss of connectivity due to dams and barriers.355 
Regional threats to Saginaw Bay include Tittabawassee River and 
Saginaw River floodplain sediment contamination due to Dow 
Chemical Company-emitted dioxin and furans, land runoff and soil 
erosion, and loss of fish and wildlife habitat due to agricultural nutrient 
inputs and dams and barriers.356  
Indeed, the Lake Huron LAMP takes the position that 
hydropower dams “threaten the diversity of native fishes by restricting 
or eliminating connectivity between lake and critical spawning, 
nursery, and overwintering habitat” and that dams and their 
reservoirs/impoundments “interrupt the natural flow of water, 
nutrients, and sediment to Lake Huron, alter temperature regimes (e.g., 
thermal heating), and increase the transformation and exposure of 
toxic pollutants (e.g. mercury).”357 Among the lakewide actions the 
2017 Lake Huron LAMP recommended were “[f]ederal, regional, 
and multi-jurisdictional initiatives that examine opportunities for dam 
decommissioning and removal.”358 These include the University of 
Wisconsin’s GIS platform known as “Fishwerks,” which identifies 
barriers to restoration of native fisheries, and the Great Lake 
Restoration Initiative (GLRI),359 which funds dam removal.360 In fact, 
the Lake Huron LAMP includes dam removal among its lakewide 
actions for the five-year period spanning 2017 to 2021, to be achieved 
by the MDEQ and the Michigan Department of Natural Resources 
(MDNR), working together with inter alia the U.S. National Oceanic 
and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), the U.S. Army Corps of 
Engineers (USACE), the U.S. Department of Agriculture Natural 
Resources Conservation Service (USDA-NRCS), the U.S. 
Department of Agriculture Forest Service (USFS), and the U.S. Fish 
and Wildlife Service (USFWS).361  
 
 355. See id. 
 356. See id.  
 357. Id. at 54. 
 358. Id. at 54. 
 359. See id. at 54–55. 
 360. See U.S. FISH AND WILDLIFE SERV., RESTORING THE GREAT LAKES 7 
(2012). 
 361. See Exec. Order No. 13,340; see also ENV’T AND CLIMATE CHANGE CAN. 
AND THE U.S. EPA, supra note 342, at xii (“Stream Connectivity: Restore stream 
connectivity and function through dam removal, the construction of fish passage 
alternatives (e.g., ladders), and stream culvert improvements to compensate for loss 
of riverine habitat.”) (emphasis added). 
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In addition, Lake Huron-related GLRI funding will be used to 
remove the Maple River Dam, a northern Michigan dam previously 
operated for approximately forty years to generate hydroelectric 
power,362 which “holds back nearly 43 acres of water in Lake 
Kathleen.”363 The Maple River is a major river in the Cheboygan river 
drainage basin, which includes over 900,000 acres and numerous 
rivers and lakes, and the Cheboygan River empties into Lake Huron.364 
The MDNR reported in 2015 that removal of the Maple River Dam, 
along with the Cheboygan Dam on the main stem of the Cheboygan 
River, the “Alverno, Kleber and Tower Dams on the Black River, and 
the Golden Lotus Dam on the Pigeon River would open up a 
significant amount of spawning and nursery habitat to migratory fish 
species, and has the potential to increase production of Chinook 
salmon and steelhead smolts.”365 
However, dam removal seems to be part of the broader GLRI 
agenda to restore natural fisheries habitat across the Great Lakes 
region.366 In 2012, for example, the USFWS and the Federal Aid in 
Wildlife Restoration Act partially funded the removal of the Brown 
Bridge Hydroelectric Dam, located in Traverse City, Michigan. The 
USFWS had billed the Brown Bridge dam removal project as “an 
important first step in what could be a larger effort to remove or 
modify three additional dams downstream in the Boardman River to 
improve the ecosystem and fish habitat.”367 Apparently, Congress had 
appropriated the monies USFWS utilized in that project through the 
GLRI and USEPA.368 In 2018, the GLRI funded the removal of the 
 
 362. See U.S. FISH AND WILDLIFE SERV., ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT FOR 
MAPLE RIVER DAM REMOVAL AND ROAD CROSSING IMPROVEMENTS – MAPLE RIVER, 
PELLSTON, MI 2 (2018). 
 363. Ben Thorp, Trump Removal Budget Hurts Dam Removal Near Lake 
Huron, GREAT LAKES ECHO (June 15, 2017); see also Ben Thorp, Dam Removal on 
Lake Huron Tributary at Risk, WCMU PUBLIC RADIO (June 15, 2017), 
https://radio.wcmu.org/post/dam-removal-lake-huron-tributary-risk#stream/0 
[https://perma.cc/ML9Y-V2XU]. 
 364. Maple River, TIP OF THE MITT WATERSHED COUNCIL, 
https://www.watershedcouncil.org/maple-river.html; [https://perma.cc/DBV4-SRR3] 
(last visited Oct. 30, 2019); see also Cheboygan River Watershed, TIP OF THE MITT 
WATERSHED COUNCIL, https://www.watershedcouncil.org/cheboygan-river-
watershed.html [https://perma.cc/YE2L-GL7C] (last visited Oct. 30, 2019). 
 365. MICH. DEP’T OF NAT. RES. FISHERIES DIV., FISHERIES REPORT 10 – 
CHEBOYGAN RIVER ASSESSMENT 32 (2015). 
 366. See RESTORING THE GREAT LAKES, supra note 360, at 7. 
 367. See id. at 7. See generally U.S. FISH AND WILDLIFE SERV., FINAL BROWN 
BRIDGE DAM REMOVAL ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT (2012). 
 368. See RESTORING THE GREAT LAKES, supra note 360, at 7. 
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Sabin Hydroelectric Dam on the Ottaway-Boardman River in Grand 
Traverse, Michigan (northwestern Michigan), and the removal is 
scheduled to be completed in 2019.369 GLRI funding,370 in part, 
pursuant to the Great Lakes Legacy Act,371 will be used to underwrite 
the removal of the Gorge Dam, which previously generated 
hydroelectric power on the Cuyahoga River in Ohio.372  
G. GLWQA Annex 4’s Focus on Nutrient Loads Nonpoint Source 
Runoff Pollutants  
Moreover, GLWQA Annex 4 – Nutrients, Sections B.1, B.2, and 
B.3 identify three of the Lake Ecosystem Objectives, namely (1) to 
minimize the extent of hypoxic zones associated with excessive 
phosphorus; (2) to maintain the levels of algal biomass below the level 
constituting a nuisance condition; and (3) to maintain cyanobacteria 
biomass at levels that do not produce concentrations of toxins that 
pose a threat to human or ecosystem health in Great Lakes Waters.373  
To achieve this objective, Canada and the United States each 
must require and achieve reductions in phosphorous concentrations.374 
 
 369. See GLRI-Funded Removal of Sabin Dam Underway in Grand Traverse 
County, Mich., GREAT LAKES RESTORATION (Dec. 11, 2018), https://www.glri.us/ 
node/163 [https://perma.cc/S5SE-C935]; see also Wrapping Up 2018 with the Return 
of a River, CONSERVATION RES. ALL. (Feb. 25, 2019), https://www.rivercare.org/ 
news/wrapping-up-2018-with-the-return-of-a-river [https://perma.cc/TTH8-7YLK]. 
 370. See generally Jennifer Conn, Officials Launch Sediment Study for Gorge 
Dam Removal, CLEVELAND.COM (Sept. 13, 2008), https://www.cleveland.com/akron/ 
index.ssf/2018/09/officials_launch_sediment_stud.html [https://perma.cc/W4YG-
99VM]; Jennifer Conn, Gorge Dam Removal Pushing Ahead, Despite Threats to 
Great Lakes Restoration Funds, CLEVELAND.COM (Mar. 19, 2017), 
https://www.cleveland.com/akron/index.ssf/2017/03/officials_still_looking_to_tak.h
tml [https://perma.cc/QZ3M-8LPL]. 
 371. See generally Ohio EPA: Gorge Dam Project Agreement Signed, 
DREDGING TODAY.COM (June 29, 2018) (discussing how a cooperative agreement had 
been signed by the Ohio EPA and the USEPA Great Lakes National Program to create 
a plan for contaminated sediment management funded by the Great Lakes Legacy Act 
incident to the dam’s removal).  
 372. See Bob Downing, Gorge Dam Holds Back More than Water; Sediment 
Removal is a Big Task, AKRON BEACON J. (Apr. 24, 2013), https://www.ohio.com/ 
akron/news/gorge-dam-holds-back-more-than-water-sediment-removal-is-a-big-task 
[https://perma.cc/9L7W-BWWD]. 
 373. Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement, supra note 200, at Annex 4. 
 374. Id. at Annex 4 § C. For example, Annex 4 – Nutrients, Section C 
identifies an interim objective for total phosphorous concentration of 10 ug/l for Lake 
Erie’s eastern and central basins, a total phosphorous concentration target of 15 ug/l 
for Lake Erie’s western basin, and a phosphorous total loading target of 11,000 metric 
tons per year for all of Lake Erie. Id. Annex 4, Section C also imposes interim 
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Annex 4 – Nutrients, Section C.2(a)–(b) provides that with respect to 
the nearshore waters of the Great Lakes, the Parties shall “develop 
Substance Objectives for phosphorous concentrations for nearshore 
waters, including embayments and tributary discharge” for Lake Erie, 
and also “shall establish load reduction targets for priority watersheds 
that have a significant localized impact on the Waters of the Great 
Lakes” (i.e., Lake Erie).375 
GLWQA Annex 4 – Nutrients, Section D.3 provides that “the 
Parties shall assess and, where necessary, develop and implement 
regulatory and non-regulatory programs to reduce phosphorous 
loading from agricultural and rural non-farm point and non-point 
sources.”376 Annex 4 also requires the Parties to develop and 
implement programs to assess the current effectiveness of best 
management practices (BMPs) to manage phosphorous use.377 Such 
programs shall “support the ongoing development and implementation 
of new approaches and technologies for the reduction of phosphorous 
from agricultural and rural non-farm sources.”378 
Annex 4 – Nutrients, Section D.6 requires the Parties to develop 
for Lake Erie within five years of entry into force of the GLWQA 2012 
revisions “phosphorous reduction strategies and domestic action plans 
to meet Substance Objectives for phosphorous concentrations, loading 
targets, and loading allocations apportioned by country, developed 
pursuant to this Annex.”379 Annex 4 – Nutrients, Section D.7 requires 
the Parties to “identify watersheds that are a priority for nutrient 
control” and to “develop and implement management plans, including 
phosphorous load reduction targets and controls for these watersheds, 
as appropriate.”380 In sum, Sections C and D of GLWQA Annex 4 are 
currently concerned with reducing phosphorous concentrations 
emanating from nonpoint sources within the upper and lower 
watersheds and along the shores of each of the Great Lakes States and 
lakeside Canadian provinces believed to be resulting in the drainage 
of such nutrient loads into the Great Lakes.381 
 
objectives for a total phosphorous concentration of Lake Huron of 5 ug/l and 
phosphorous total loading targets for Main Lake Huron and Saginaw Bay, 
respectively, of 2,800 and 440 metric tons per year. Id. 
 375. Id. at Annex 4 § B.1–B.3, C.2(a)–(b). 
 376. Id. at Annex 4 § D.3. 
 377. See id. at Annex 4 § D.3(a).  
 378. Id. at Annex 4 § D.3(b). 
 379. Id. at Annex 4 § D.6–7. 
 380. Id. at Annex 4 § D.7. 
 381. See id. 
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During August 2016, the Great Lakes Water Quality Board’s 
Legacy Issues Work Group, which the IJC formed during 2015, 
submitted to the IJC its report identifying priority actions for nutrient 
management in the Lake Erie basin.382 This summary report contained 
recommendations for IJC consideration regarding “how watershed 
management plans should be used to manage nutrient pollution in 
Lake Erie.”383 Its authors reasoned that “Lake Erie is lacking a 
consistent framework for developing and implementing a lake-wide 
nutrient management plan that incorporates the eastern, central, and 
western sub-basins, as well as, watershed and sub-watershed plans that 
consider downstream water quality impacts.”384 IJC’s recommended 
solution was for the Canadian and U.S. federal governments to work 
with provincial and state governments to “ensure that lake-wide basin, 
sub-basin, watershed and sub-watershed management plans . . . are 
developed for nutrient management in Lake Erie.”385  
This report relates how, in June 2015, “the governors of Ohio 
and Michigan and the premier of Ontario signed an agreement to 
reduce phosphorus inputs [from those areas] to the western waters of 
Lake Erie by 40 percent over the next ten years.”386 It also shows how, 
in February 2016, “the Governments of Canada and the United States 
announced the adoption of a binational target to reduce total 
phosphorus entering Lake Erie by 40 percent” and how “[t]o meet this 
target[,] . . . Canada and the United States . . . committed to 
developing domestic action plans by February 2018, via Annex 4 
(Nutrients) of the GLWQA.”387 As the Work Group’s report also 
reveals, “[n]utrient loading from the western and central Lake Erie 
sub-basins is a significant issue for the whole of Lake Erie. As harmful 
algae blooms continue in the western and central sub-basins, concerns 
about impacts of excess nutrients on the eastern Lake Erie sub-basin 
are also mounting.”388  
 
 382. GREAT LAKES WATER QUALITY BOARD LEGACY ISSUES WORK GROUP, 
EVALUATING WATERSHED MANAGEMENT PLANS NUTRIENT MANAGEMENT 
APPROACHES IN THE LAKE ERIE BASIN AND KEY LOCATIONS OUTSIDE OF THE LAKE 
ERIE BASIN 1 (2016). 
 383. Id. 
 384. Id.  
 385. Id.  
 386. Id. at 4. 
 387. Id. 
 388. Id. at 8. 
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As would be expected, the March 2016 full version of the report 
was much more detailed and identified Lake Erie’s eutrophication 
issues as a historic problem attributable to the  
early and intense development of its lands for agricultural and urban 
uses. . . . Nearly 70 percent of the Lake Erie watershed is devoted to 
agricultural land uses, growing crops, and meat and dairy producing 
animals . . . . Agriculture typically represents the major land use in most of 
the watershed plans reviewed and is a significant source of nutrients to the 
Lake Erie watershed through soil erosion, runoff and/or tile drainage from 
synthetic fertilizer and manure applications and other crop production and 
livestock operations.389  
This report, furthermore, indicated that the states of Michigan and 
Ohio and the Canadian province of Ontario had “agreed to reduce 
phosphorous by 40 percent in the Lake Erie basin.”390 This strongly 
suggests that it is at these locations where most of the agricultural 
activity adversely impacting Lake Erie occurs.391  
Since, as the report’s authors concluded, “[a]griculture is a major 
source of nutrients into surface waters,”392 the report provided the 
following “tried and tested” strategies tailored toward agricultural 
entities. First, it recommended the imposition of regular USDA soil 
testing requirements every three years to ensure that nutrients are 
applied sparingly at the proper rate during periods of little or no 
rainfall.393 Second, the report recommended the following “strategies 
for limiting the transport of nutrients via surface runoff, erosion, and 
agricultural tile drainage [that] are customary in the [Lake Erie basin 
and sub-basin watershed and nutrient management] plans 
reviewed.”394 It specifically identified the need for “[c]onservation 
tillage and no-till farming practices . . . designed to reduce erosion and 
runoff from farm fields.”395 It also extolled the use of cover crops that 
 
 389. HULL & ASSOCS., INC. & BLUEMETRIC ENVTL., INC., EVALUATING 
WATERSHED MANAGEMENT PLANS – NUTRIENT MANAGEMENT APPROACHES IN THE 
LAKE ERIE BASIN AND KEY LOCATIONS OUTSIDE OF THE LAKE ERIE WATERSHED 1, 10 
(March 2016) (emphasis added). 
 390. Id. at 2. 
 391. See ENV’T AND CLIMATE CHANGE CAN. AND THE U.S. EPA, STATE OF THE 
GREAT LAKES 2017 TECHNICAL REPORT 414, 418, 435 fig. 4 (2017) (illustrating 
graphically the watershed and sub-watershed areas of Ohio, southeastern Michigan, 
and the Canadian province of Ontario as the major agricultural areas surrounding Lake 
Erie).  
 392. See HULL & ASSOCS., INC. & BLUEMETRIC ENVTL, INC., supra note 389, 
§ 3.2.2. 
 393. § 3.2.1.  
 394. § 3.2.2. 
 395. Id. 
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“impede the flow of water to minimize erosion,” the use of 
“[w]etlands—natural or constructed—[to] trap eroded nutrients and 
concentrate them into biomass,” and the use of “[t]ile drainage control 
structures [which] can also be useful tools for maximizing nutrient 
uptake.”396 Third, it recommended nutrient “[m]onitoring plans that 
incorporate regular sampling, and sampling at appropriate times (i.e., 
after heavy rainfalls), [to] increase the likelihood of successful nutrient 
management . . . . For more accurate measures of dissolved nutrients, 
water samples must be sent to certified analytical laboratories.”397 
According to the report’s authors, these recommendations, along with 
those made with respect to other than agricultural lands, were intended 
to be “used to achieve nutrient load reduction targets [that] restore and 
protect Lake Erie.”398 There is no doubt that USEPA representatives 
had served an active senior role in the Great Lakes Water Quality 
Board during the development of this report.399 
On June 6, 2017, USEPA’s Science Advisory Board (SAB) 
dispatched a report and cover letter to the new USEPA administrator 
informing him of “SAB’s consensus advice and recommendations on 
the development of nutrient load reduction targets for Lake Erie.”400 
Apparently, USEPA had charged the SAB with reviewing and 
evaluating USEPA’s modeling approach for developing nutrient load 
reduction targets for Lake Erie and the models’ results. The USEPA 
SAB website reaffirmed the relationship of the SAB report to USEPA 
Region 5’s/USG’s responsibilities under GLWQA. 
The USEPA SAB concluded that the “models used for the 
simulations are limited by the data available for calibration and 
validation, and this affects the ability to rigorously evaluate model 
quality.”401 The SAB also concluded that the “Modeling Subgroup 
applied and evaluated the suite of models independently, rather than 
as part of an ensemble approach” and had accepted some models for 
 
 396. Id. 
 397. § 3.4. 
 398. Id. at iii. 
 399. See infra Part VI and accompanying footnotes; see also GREAT LAKES 
WATER QUALITY BD., WATERSHED MANAGEMENT OF NUTRIENTS IN LAKE ERIE 17 
(2017). 
 400. See Cover Letter of SAB Review of Lake Erie Nutrient Load Reduction 
Models and Targets from Dr. Peter S. Thorne, Chair, Sci. Advisory Bd., and Dr. 
William S. Schlesinger, Chair, SAB Lake Erie Phosphorus Objectives, to Hon. E. 
Scott Pruitt, Adm’r, EPA (June 6, 2017). 
 401. EPA, EPA-SAB-17-06, SAB REVIEW OF LAKE ERIE NUTRIENT LOAD 
REDUCTION MODELS AND TARGETS 10 (2017); see also Cover Letter of SAB Review 
of Lake Erie Nutrient Load Reduction Models and Targets, supra note 400. 
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use “despite deficiencies.”402 Nevertheless, the “SAB [found] that the 
40% reduction in total phosphorous load to the Western and Central 
Basins of Lake Erie recommended by the Task Team will improve 
Lake Erie water quality and reduce harmful algal blooms.”403 In 
addition, the SAB indicated that  
[w]hile phosphorous has always been considered the limiting nutrient for 
Lake Erie and most other lakes, there is increasing evidence of the possible 
need for nitrogen control as well . . . . There is increasing support for 
adopting a multiple nutrient strategy to reduce eutrophication, in both fresh 
and salt waters. For Lake Erie, this means that, after the initial consideration 
of P control, N and P control should be considered . . . .”404  
The SAB report spoke in universal terms without identifying any 
specific contribution of point or nonpoint source pollution. It also 
recommended that USEPA “should seek opportunities to work 
with . . . [USDA] to increase local farmers’ use of agricultural 
technologies aimed at more efficient use of fertilizers and reducing 
nutrient loadings to Lake Erie.”405 
During the third quarter of 2017, USEPA and Environment and 
Climate Change Canada released their own joint report entitled “The 
State of the Great Lakes 2017.”406 The report, in part, emphasized the 
need for more forest cover alongside agricultural lands to prevent 
nutrient runoff from entering the Great Lakes.407 The report went on to 
indicate the “poor” condition of Lake Erie, particularly its western 
basin, and identified that the fewest forests and the greatest amount of 
agricultural lands are located in Ohio, Indiana, Michigan, and the 
Canadian Province of Ontario.408 This report also focused mostly on 
pollution caused by toxic chemicals and persistent organic pollutants 
discharged into Lake Erie tributaries from commercial and industrial 
sources.409 
 
 402. Cover Letter of SAB Review of Lake Erie Nutrient Load Reduction 
Models and Targets, supra note 400; see also SAB REVIEW OF LAKE ERIE NUTRIENT 
LOAD REDUCTION MODELS AND TARGETS, supra note 401, at 1. 
 403. Cover Letter of SAB Review of Lake Erie Nutrient Load Reduction 
Models and Targets, supra note 400. 
 404. Id.; see also SAB REVIEW OF LAKE ERIE NUTRIENT LOAD REDUCTION 
MODELS AND TARGETS, supra note 401, at 4.  
 405. Id. at 11. 
 406. STATE OF THE GREAT LAKES 2017 TECHNICAL REPORT, supra note 391.  
 407. See id. at 414, 418.  
 408. Id. at 146, 435 fig. 4. 
 409. See id. 
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During November 2017, the IJC released its First Triennial 
Assessment of Progress on Great Lakes Water Quality.410 Objective 5 
of the report entitled “Wetlands and Other Habitats” (i.e., “water that 
supports healthy and productive wetlands and other habitats to sustain 
native species populations”) emphasized wetlands’ important role in 
providing “vital ecological habitat” and improving “water quality by 
slowing the runoff of nutrients and filtering pollutants.”411 The report 
suggested following the lead of northwestern Ohio which “is creating 
small-scale wetlands adjacent to agricultural land as a way to slow the 
transport of nutrients into receiving waters and thus improve water 
quality.”412 It also suggested that “governments . . . commit to 
adopting minimal thresholds to protect natural habitats on a watershed 
basis. This might include a goal to restore and protect 40 percent of 
historic wetlands of a watershed, or committing to buffer strips with 
natural vegetation along both sides of streams within a watershed.”413 
The report focused mostly on pollution caused by toxic chemicals and 
persistent organic pollutants discharged into Lake Erie tributaries 
from commercial and industrial sources.414 
During December 2017, the IJC Great Lakes Water Quality 
Board issued a report, the development of which had been led by the 
Board’s Legacy Issues Work Group, setting forth five 
recommendations for watershed management of nutrients entering 
Lake Erie.415 These recommendations engendered (1) ongoing federal, 
state, and provincial watershed monitoring activities to determine 
nutrient loading and identify necessary significant reductions 
thereof;416 (2) development of Lake Erie basin-by-basin plans focusing 
 
 410. See INT’L JOINT COMM’N, FIRST TRIENNIAL ASSESSMENT OF PROGRESS ON 
GREAT LAKES WATER QUALITY – FINAL REPORT (Nov. 28, 2017). 
 411. Id.  
 412. Id. 
 413. Id.  
 414. See id. 
 415. See GREAT LAKES WATER QUALITY BD., WATERSHED MANAGEMENT OF 
NUTRIENTS IN LAKE ERIE, supra note 399, at 5–8. This report contained an “Appendix 
A” entitled, Great Lakes Water Quality Board Legacy Issues Work Group, Watershed 
Management of Nutrients in Lake Erie – Workshop Summary Report (Final Report 
Apr. 2017). Appendix A included the minutes/agenda of a February 1–2, 2017, 
binational watershed management planning and implementation workshop intended 
“to build support for the recommendations in the [Water Quality Board’s] August 
2016 report” discussed above. See Appendix A Summary at i. Among the issues 
discussed were the nine elements to be included in watershed management plans 
requesting USEPA funding under CWA Section 319 to address water quality 
impairments. See id. at Appendix A, 4–5.  
 416. See id. at Appendix A, 6. 
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on the sub-watershed level that identify binational upstream nutrient 
load reduction targets, achievement of which would be facilitated by 
a watershed planning bureaucracy;417 (3) at least one-half federal, 
state, and provincial government funding;418 (4) establishment of 
parameters by which to monitor and measure watersheds for total 
phosphorus, nitrogen, dissolved reactive phosphorus, and dissolved 
oxygen, also considering atmospheric loading of phosphorous and 
climate change basin impacts;419 and (5) public communication of 
intergovernmental nutrient load management/reduction efforts.420  
During February 2018, the IJC released another report that 
assessed fertilizer application and impacts in the western Lake Erie 
Basin.421 This report identified “[n]on point agricultural release” as 
“the largest single source of excess nutrients to western Lake Erie. 
Because phosphorous . . . is the limiting nutrient for algal growth in 
most freshwater systems, the sources, transformations and effects of 
excess [phosphorous] were the focus of much of the assessment, 
although nitrogen . . . [was] also briefly discussed.”422 
In addition, during March 2018, USEPA released the U.S. 
Action Plan for Lake Erie, which indicated that GLWQA Annex 4 – 
Nutrients had already been updated following the February 2016 
formal adoption by Canada and the United States of new phosphorus 
loading/reduction targets for the western and central basins of Lake 
Erie.423 The report indicated that “[w]hile the bulk of the phosphorus 
reductions will come from sources in Ohio, Michigan, and Indiana, all 
five of the U.S. states in the basin are committed to taking action to 
reduce nutrient loadings and minimize problems of excessive algal 
growth in Lake Erie.”424 
Significantly, the cover of the USEPA Action Plan states that 
“[t]his document outlines federal and state efforts to achieve the 
 
 417. See id. at 7. 
 418. See id. 
 419. See id. at 7–8. 
 420. See id. at 8. 
 421. See generally INT’L JOINT COMM’N, FERTILIZER APPLICATION PATTERNS 
AND TRENDS AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS FOR WATER QUALITY IN THE WESTERN LAKE 
ERIE BASIN (2018). 
 422. Id. 
 423. See EPA, EPA U.S. ACTION PLAN FOR LAKE ERIE – COMMITMENTS AND 
STRATEGY FOR PHOSPHORUS REDUCTION 2018–2023 (2018). 
 424. Id. at ii; see also EPA Announces Action Plan to Combat Harmful Algal 
Blooms in Lake Erie, EPA (Mar. 7, 2018), https://www.epa.gov/newsreleases/epa-
announces-action-plan-combat-harmful-algal-blooms-lake-erie [https://perma.cc/ 
3R8E-K3L2]. 
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binational phosphorus load reduction targets adopted in 2016 under 
the Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement.”425 The report generally 
concludes that “loss of wetlands and riparian vegetation,” in part, 
contribute to the resurgence of algae in Lake Erie.426 The USEPA 
Action Plan noted that while generally “[f]ederal, state and local 
authorities have numerous regulatory and nonregulatory programs and 
authorities available to help meet the reduction goals laid out in this 
plan, . . . new regulations or stronger enforcement of existing 
regulations will need to occur.”427 Among the new emerging 
technologies to be utilized are “drainage water management, saturated 
buffers, phosphorus removal beds or structures, two stage ditches, 
blind inlets, and phosphorus-optimal wetlands.”428 
In addition, the USEPA Action Plan cited a white paper prepared 
by a commissioned group of experts which recommended a 40% 
phosphorus load reduction target in all states and provinces 
surrounding Lake Erie.429 For agricultural lands, the U.S. Action Plan 
set forth no fewer than six measures to manage “tributary phosphorus 
loading to address algae impacts in the Lake Erie basin.”430 These 
included reduced nutrient applications, soil testing, soil and water 
conservation, crop rotations, wetland creation, use of erosion control 
structures and buffers, and tile drainage management systems.431 The 
USEPA U.S. Action Plan emphasized that “[w]herever possible in the 
landscape, . . . restore wetlands and riparian habitat to filter nutrients 
while benefiting aquatic environments.”432 
H. Michigan’s Implementation of GLWQA Annex 4 Consistent with 
USEPA and European Sustainability Initiatives  
Consistent with the USEPA Action Plan, on November 10, 2016, 
the MDEQ433 announced the release of its biennial 2016 Integrated 
Report (IR) to the USEPA which designated “Michigan waters of the 
 
 425. EPA U.S. ACTION PLAN FOR LAKE ERIE, supra note 423, cover p. 
 426. Id. at 5.  
 427. Id. at 15. 
 428. Id. 
 429. See id. at 17. 
 430. Id. at 16. 
 431. See id. 
 432. Id. 
 433. This Article refers to the Michigan Department of Environmental Quality 
and/or to its acronym “MDEQ” and not, except as otherwise noted, to said agency as 
renamed by Michigan’s new governor, the Michigan Department of Environment, 
Great Lakes and Energy or to its acronym “DEGLE” or “EGLE.” 
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Western Lake Erie Basin as impaired due to extensive algal blooms 
caused by excessive levels of phosphorous.”434 According to the 
November 2016 IR, “[t]he repeated, persistent, and extensive 
cyanobacteria blooms impacting the western basin of Lake Erie have 
been determined to be excessive/nuisance conditions leading to 
ecological imbalance . . . not supporting . . . other indigenous aquatic 
life and wildlife.”435  
When MDEQ used the word “impaired” it meant “impaired” 
within the meaning of Clean Water Act § 303(d). “Impaired waters – 
Under section 303(d) of the Clean Water Act, states, territories, and 
authorized tribes are required to develop lists of impaired waters. 
These are waters that are too polluted or otherwise degraded to meet 
the water quality standards set by states, territories, or authorized 
tribes.”436 In assessing the status of Michigan surface waters for this 
purpose, the 2016 IR indicates that MDEQ places each water body “in 
at least one of five reporting categories . . . based upon the amount of 
information known about the water body’s water quality status, the 
degree of designated use support, and the type of impairment 
preventing designated use support.”437 In addition, the 2016 IR 
indicates that the GLWQA Annex 4 workgroup had revealed the 
significance of the cyanobacteria blooms in Lake Erie as pollutants 
facilitating changes to Lake Erie’s ecosystem, the primary cause of 
which was excessive nutrients, particularly total phosphorus, for 
which load targets of 40% reductions were established.438  
A Michigan sustainability/SD report, released approximately 
one month earlier in October 2016, had expressly stated that the state’s 
water strategy “takes an ecosystem approach” and “recognizes that the 
core values identified with water are four-fold: environmental, 
 
 434. Western Lake Erie Basin Impairment Reported by MDEQ, EGLE (Nov. 
10, 2016), https://www.michigan.gov/egle/0,9429,7-135--397204--,00.html 
[https://perma.cc/X6F8-7WC7]. 
 435. MICH. DEP’T OF ENVTL. QUALITY, WATER QUALITY AND POLLUTION 
CONTROL IN MICHIGAN 2016 SECTIONS 303(D), 305(B), AND 314 INTEGRATED REPORT 
xi, 65 (2016) (“[T]he Clean Water Act (CWA), requires states to provide the United 
States Environmental Protection Agency (USEPA) with an assessment of the quality 
of their waters [Section 305(b)], a list of waters that do not support their designated 
uses or attain Water Quality Standards (WQS) and require the development of Total 
Maximum Daily Loads (TMDLs) [Section 303(d)], and an assessment of status and 
trends of publicly owned lakes (Section 314).”).  
 436. MICH. OFFICE OF THE GREAT LAKES, SUSTAINING MICHIGAN’S HERITAGE: 
A STRATEGY FOR THE NEXT GENERATION 71 (2016). 
 437. WATER QUALITY AND POLLUTION CONTROL IN MICHIGAN 2016 SECTIONS 
303(D), 305(B), AND 314 INTEGRATED REPORT, supra note 435, at 1. 
 438. See id. at 30–31, 65–66. 
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economic, social and cultural”—i.e., European-style sustainable 
development.439 To preserve these values, the Michigan SD report 
recommended that MDEQ, MDNR, and other Michigan state agencies 
undertake a comprehensive review, to be completed by 2017, “of all 
state and local laws, regulations and rules which impact water to 
remove barriers, inconsistencies, overlaps and reduce regulatory 
process to improve and facilitate investment in sustainable water-
based economics in Michigan.”440 The goal of this review was to 
facilitate the future imposition of water efficiency targets and 
agriculture water conservation measures, as well as the future 
promotion of “voluntary” best agricultural water management 
practices.441 In addition, the Michigan SD report also emphasized how 
Michigan would retain its state law and regulatory tools for 
implementing the Clean Water Act (CWA), “including Section 404 
pertaining to wetlands and Section 402 pertaining to pollution 
control,” to ensure “consistency with federal laws related to 
management of its wetland, lake and stream resources, and [to create] 
permitting systems to address Michigan-specific issues.”442 Based on 
the report’s list of acronyms, there is no doubt MDEQ/MDNR would 
resort to making NREPA legislative amendments and enhancing 
NREPA enforcement measures to maintain consistency with (or 
supremacy over, as the case may be)443 both the federal CWA and the 
GLWQA.444  
The press release announcing the 2016 IR also had stated that 
the impaired Michigan waterway listing further supported “the need 
for the goals [previously] established by the Western Basin of Lake 
Erie Collaborative Agreement” (WBLECA).445 The State of Michigan 
had begun taking part in the WBLECA during June 2015, along with 
the State of Ohio and the Canadian Province of Ontario.446 The 
WBLECA “established the goal of a 40 percent reduction of total 
phosphorous loads to Lake Erie by 2025, with an interim goal of a 20 
 
 439. SUSTAINING MICHIGAN’S HERITAGE: A STRATEGY FOR THE NEXT 
GENERATION, supra note 436, at 7. 
 440. Id. at 43. 
 441. See id. at 43–44. 
 442. Id. at 69. 
 443. See infra Part VI (describing Michigan’s CWA § 404 waiver authority). 
 444. See SUSTAINING MICHIGAN’S HERITAGE: A STRATEGY FOR THE NEXT 
GENERATION, supra note 436, at 72. 
 445. Western Lake Erie Basin Impairment Reported by MDEQ, supra note 
434. 
 446. See Great Lakes and St. Lawrence Governors and Premiers, Western 
Basin of Lake Erie Collaborative Agreement (2015). 
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percent reduction by 2020.”447 It also required each state and province 
to develop an implementation plan outlining their proposed actions 
and deadlines for achieving them.448 Michigan released its WBLECA 
Implementation Plan in January 2016, and it expressly stated that its 
purpose was integrally intertwined with the goals of GLWQA Annex 
4.449 It “is to define actions toward the collaborative goal, serve as 
interim approach to domestic action plans to be developed under the 
Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement Annex 4 process, provide focus 
for allocation of resources for actions, and identify actions and 
potential policy and/or program needs.”450 In furtherance thereof, 
Michigan had imposed a statewide residential fertilizer phosphorous 
ban in 2012 and a similar citywide ban in Ann Arbor in 2006, and, as 
of 2016, had been focusing on requiring phosphorous reductions in the 
Detroit River, Raisin River, and the state’s portion of the Maumee 
River basin Michigan shares with Ohio.451  
Furthermore, as the website of the State of Michigan’s Office of 
the Great Lakes reported, the USEPA Action Plan incorporated major 
elements of Michigan’s Lake Erie Domestic Action Plan.452 The 
Michigan Domestic Action Plan, which the MDEQ, MDNR, and the 
Michigan Department of Agriculture had developed, was released on 
February 28, 2018.453 It affirmed the state’s commitments to curtail 
point source and nonpoint source discharges to the Great Lakes under 
the WBLECA and the GLWQA Annex 4 and set forth the “process 
and tactics for Michigan to implement their obligations as a 
jurisdiction” alongside the other states surrounding Lake Erie,454 
especially Ohio and Indiana. These three states have been identified 
as responsible for the bulk of the phosphorous discharges into Lake 
 
 447. Id. 
 448. See id. 
 449. See MICH. DEP’T OF ENVTL. QUALITY WATER RES. DIV., MICHIGAN’S 
IMPLEMENTATION PLAN – WESTERN LAKE ERIE BASIN COLLABORATIVE 1 (2016) 
(reproducing the Western Basin of Lake Erie Collaborative Agreement, signed June 
13, 2015, as Attachment 1). 
 450. Id.  
 451. See id. at 2. 
 452. See Taking Action on Lake Erie, MICH. DEP’T OF ENV’T, GREAT LAKES & 
ENERGY, https://www.michigan.gov/egle/0,9429,7-135-3313_3677_95226-507535--
,00.html [https://perma.cc/DYY9-EKVD] (last visited Oct. 30, 2019) (“Michigan’s 
plan is one of several from surrounding states integrated into the U.S. Environmental 
Protection Agency’s comprehensive plan released March 2018.”).  
 453. See MICH. DEP’T OF ENV’T, GREAT LAKES & ENERGY, MICHIGAN’S LAKE 
ERIE DOMESTIC ACTION PLAN 1 (2018). 
 454. Id. at 4, 11–12. 
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Erie.455 In sum, the Michigan Lake Erie Domestic Action Plan set forth 
various “voluntary conservation land management practices” and 
federal/state subsidized programs targeting Michigan’s farmers to 
ensure the required nutrient load reductions can be achieved,456 
consistent with the wetland restoration goals such Plans,457 like the 
Michigan SD Plan,458 USEPA Action Plan,459 and the GWLQA,460 have 
identified. 
I. Great Lakes Executive Committee Report Addressing 
Groundwater Science Relevant to GLWQA Annex 8 
GLWQA Article 5(2) authorizes Canada and the United States 
to establish a Great Lakes Executive Committee (GLEC), which the 
Parties shall co-chair “to help coordinate, implement, review and 
report on programs, practices and measures undertaken to achieve the 
purpose of this Agreement.”461 Environment and Climate Change 
Canada and USEPA are the GLEC co-chairs.462 The GLEC shall 
convene meetings at least twice a year and shall invite representatives 
from federal, state, provincial, local, and tribal governments and their 
agencies.463 The Parties also shall appoint Annex-specific sub-
 
 455. See EPA Announces Action Plan to Combat Harmful Algal Blooms in 
Lake Erie, supra note 424. 
 456. See MICHIGAN’S LAKE ERIE DOMESTIC ACTION PLAN, supra note 453, at 
12–15. 
 457. See id. at 12. 
 458. See SUSTAINING MICHIGAN’S HERITAGE: A STRATEGY FOR THE NEXT 
GENERATION, supra note 436, at 20-21, 23, 69. Significantly, Michigan views the 
State’s authority to implement CWA § 404 at or above the federal 
USEPA/USACE/USFWS level, pursuant to the international ecosystem approach to 
ensuring health and protection of water resources, as being consistent with the State’s 
international sustainable development obligations and compliance with the 
longstanding regional governance instruments and institutions, including the IJC, 
GLWQA, Great Lakes–St. Lawrence River Water Resource Compact Agreement, 
Conference of Great Lakes–St. Lawrence Governors and Premiers, Great Lakes 
Commission, etc. See id. at 69.  
 459. See EPA U.S. ACTION PLAN FOR LAKE ERIE, supra note 423, at 16, 29, 
38. 
 460. See Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement, supra note 190, at art. 
3.1(a)(v). 
 461. See id. at arts. 5(2), 5(2)(a). 
 462. See Great Lakes Executive Committee Members, BINATIONAL.NET, 
https://binational.net/glec-cegl/mem/ [https://perma.cc/2TDU-XL2B] (last visited 
Oct. 30, 2019). 
 463. See Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement, supra note 190, at arts. 
5(2)(a)–(b). 
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committees to the GLEC and shall, in consultation with the GLEC, 
establish priorities for said sub-committees.464 Furthermore, the Parties 
shall prepare, in consultation with the GLEC, a binational Progress 
Report of the Parties documenting actions taken domestically and 
binationally in implementation of the GLWQA.465 
Annex 8 was added by the 2012 Protocol to the GLWQA, which 
committed the Parties to coordinate groundwater science and 
management actions.466 Annex 8.B.3 requires the Parties to coordinate 
binational activities together with domestic programs to assess, 
protect, and manage the quality of groundwater and manage 
groundwater-related stresses affecting the waters of the Great Lakes, 
which includes the lake waters and connecting river systems and all 
open and nearshore waters.467 Tributary waters include surface waters 
that flow directly or indirectly into the waters of the Great Lakes.468 
Annex 8.D requires the Parties to report their progress implementing 
Annex 8 every three years.469  
The significance of this reporting obligation lies partly in the 
GLWQA parties’ prior failure to recognize the importance of 
groundwater to Great Lakes water quality at the time the GLWQA was 
first executed in 1972 and partly in the relative paucity since then of 
holistic science-based reported information defining the scope and 
extent of observed interactions between surface waters and 
groundwaters.470 In other words, at the end of each three-year Annex 
8.D reporting period, it is anticipated that the GLWQA parties will 
have acquired new information better explaining how surface water 
quality affects groundwater quality, how surface waters contribute to 
groundwater recharge, and how groundwater quality and quantity 
contributes to the health and maintenance of watersheds, wetlands, 
and the overall Great Lakes ecosystem.471 They could then utilize such 
information to meet their GLWQA Annex 2 commitment to develop 
 
 464. Id. at arts. 5(2)(b), (d). 
 465. Id. at art. 5(2)(e). 
 466. See id. at Annex 8.A. 
 467. See id. at Annex 8.B.3; see also id. at art. 1(j). 
 468. See id. at art. 1(i). 
 469. See id. at Annex 8.D. 
 470. See GREAT LAKES EXEC. COMM. ANNEX 8 SUBCOMM., GROUNDWATER 
SCIENCE RELEVANT TO THE GREAT LAKES WATER QUALITY AGREEMENT: A STATUS 
REPORT 1–2 (Dec. 2015) (“At that time, groundwater and surface water were still 
considered as two separate systems, with almost no appreciation for their 
interaction.”).  
 471. See U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, REPORT 00-4008, THE IMPORTANCE OF 
GROUND WATER IN THE GREAT LAKES REGION 12–13 (2000).  
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and implement effective integrated nearshore frameworks that 
consider the physical, chemical, and ecological links among (1) Great 
Lakes Basin watersheds; (2) streams, wetlands, groundwater, and 
open waters of the lakes; and (3) critical habitat for Great Lakes 
biota.472  
In 2016, the GLEC Annex 8 Subcommittee released its first final 
status report discussing the groundwater science relevant to the 
GLWQA.473 This status report concluded that groundwater can enter 
the Great Lakes as direct and indirect discharge.474 Direct discharge 
occurs when water flows into the Great Lakes through the lakebed.475 
Indirect discharge occurs “when groundwater is discharged into 
tributary waters (secondary lakes, streams, or wetlands) that then 
eventually flow into the Great Lakes.”476 It is believed that “indirect 
discharges via tributary streams provide a greater groundwater 
contribution than direct discharge to the Great Lakes.”477 The report 
also concluded that groundwater flows can either improve or 
contaminate surface water quality.478 Contamination can occur as the 
result of road salt, nutrients, industrial compounds, dissolved metals, 
petroleum hydrocarbons, and pharmaceuticals, etc.479 Ultimately, the 
quantity and flow paths of the discharging water will determine the 
effects on the receiving body of water.480 Groundwater can moderate 
surface water temperatures to provide suitable habitats, can moderate 
pH in surface waters, and can provide nutrients that affect the growth 
and distribution of aquatic plants (macrophytes) and vegetation.481 
Finally, the status report concluded that human activities, such as 
urban development or other large or extensive infrastructures like 
dams and reservoirs, can alter groundwater recharge rates and runoff 
 
 472. See GREAT LAKES EXEC. COMM. ANNEX 8 SUBCOMM., supra note 470, at 
2–3. 
 473. See id. at 1. 
 474. See id. at 48 (explaining water runs through direct and indirect channels). 
 475. See id. at 11 (explaining water is considered direct when it flows through 
a lakebed). 
 476. Id. at 11. 
 477. Id. 
 478. See id. at 12 (evaluating the effects groundwater flow has on surface 
water quality). 
 479. See id. (explaining that contamination can occur through many 
substances). 
 480. See id. at 12 (explaining how the flow path of water affects the receiving 
body of water). 
 481. See id. (describing how groundwater affects surface water). 
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into surface water bodies.482 However, there “are relatively few studies 
in the Great Lakes Basin that estimate how groundwater recharge 
varies in both space and time.”483 The study concluded that aside from 
the significant local effects of population growth on groundwater 
availability, “the greatest water stress was caused by climate 
change.”484 Relying upon this report’s findings, therefore, the 
GLWQA parties, or even the Great Lakes States themselves, could 
arguably justify further federal and state funding of dam removal 
projects within their jurisdictions.485  
IV. MICHIGAN’S INTERNATIONAL, FEDERAL, AND STATE LAW 
OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE GREAT LAKES–ST. LAWRENCE RIVER 
BASIN AGREEMENT AND INTERSTATE WATER RESOURCES COMPACT 
On October 3, 2008, Congress, consistent with the United States 
Constitution,486 passed proposed federal legislation consenting to the 
interstate Compact regarding water resources in the Great Lakes–St. 
Lawrence River Basin that the States of Michigan, Illinois, Indiana, 
Minnesota, New York, Ohio, and Wisconsin and the Commonwealth 
of Pennsylvania had executed on December 13, 2005.487 Former 
President Bush then signed that legislation into federal law on the 
same day.488 The Compact implements the international law 
obligations Michigan and such other states assumed under the 
international Great Lakes–St. Lawrence River Basin Sustainable 
 
 482. See id. at 13 (discussing how humans affect the groundwater/surface 
water system). 
 483. Id. at 59. 
 484. Id. 
 485. See, e.g., Kevin Bunch, Proposed Dam Removal Would Expand Fish 
Habitat on St. Croix, INT’ JOINT COMM’N (Aug. 19, 2019), https://www.ijc.org/ 
en/proposed-dam-removal-would-expand-fish-habitat-st-croix [https://perma.cc/ 
G97A-9U6Y]; MICH. DEP’T OF ENVTL. QUALITY, STATE OF THE GREAT LAKES 
REPORT: RESTORING THE LAKES chs. 6–4, 8–4, 10–2 (2007).  
 486. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 3 (“No State shall, without the Consent 
of Congress . . . enter into any Agreement or Compact with another State . . . .”). 
 487. See Great Lakes–St. Lawrence River Basin Water Resources Compact of 
2008, Pub. L. No. 110-342, § 1, 122 Stat. 3739 (2008) (“Joint Resolution [e]xpressing 
the consent and approval of Congress to an interstate compact regarding water 
resources in the Great Lakes–St. Lawrence River Basin.”). 
 488. See Press Release, Office of the Press Sec’y, President Bush Signs H.R. 
3986, S. 1760, S. 2135, S.J.Res. 35, S.J.Res. 45 Into Law (Oct. 3, 2008) (on file with 
the White House). See generally 122 Stat. 3739.  
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Water Resources Agreement489 they executed with the Canadian 
Province of Ontario and the Government of Quebec on the same 
day.490 The Compact does not abrogate or infringe upon or otherwise 
undermine the treaty power of the United States or alter or amend any 
international treaty or term the United States has executed with 
Canada or another nation.491  
Specifically, Congress consented to the parallel state legislation 
Michigan and the other Great Lakes States had enacted to implement 
the interstate Compact and the international Agreement upon which it 
is based.492 The provisions of the Compact as ratified by Congress are 
codified in Part 342 of Michigan’s Natural Resources and 
Environmental Protection Act (NREPA) at Michigan Compiled Laws 
(MCL) § 324.34201,493 while the provisions of the Compact as ratified 
by the State are codified in NREPA at MCL § 324.32201.494 “Specific 
provisions from the Compact and Agreement for water management 
and water conservation and efficiency program elements and their 
corresponding legal citations” are referenced in Michigan’s Draft Five 
Year Program Review Report of the Great Lakes–St. Lawrence River 
Basin Water Resources Compact.495 The Michigan Department of 
 
 489. See Great Lakes–St. Lawrence River Basin Sustainable Water Resources 
Agreement, Can.–U.S., Dec. 13, 2005. 
 490. See §§ 1.1, 4.5, 122 Stat. at 3739, 3749. See generally Great Lakes–St. 
Lawrence River Basin Sustainable Water Resources Agreement, supra note 489 
(indicating that the Canadian Province of Ontario and the Government of Quebec 
were parties to the agreement).  
 491. See § 8.2, 122 Stat. at 3762. 
 492. Such Michigan state legislation included (1) Public Act 190 (SB 212), 
and (2) Public Act 184 (HB 4343). See 2008 Mich. Pub. Acts No. 4; 2008 Mich. Pub 
Acts No. 91. The Michigan House Fiscal Agency noted in its summary of HB 4343 
that “[t]he bill would add a new Part 342 to the [NREPA] to ratify the . . .           
Compact. . . . The Agreement and Compact detail how the Great Lakes states and 
provinces are to manage and protect the waters of the Great Lakes and St. Lawrence 
River Basin . . . .” HOUSE FISCAL AGENCY, GREAT LAKES–ST. LAWRENCE RIVER BASIN 
WATER RESOURCES COMPACT: A REVISED SUMMARY OF HOUSE BILL 4343 AS 
INTRODUCED 2-28-07, at 1 (2007). In addition, the Michigan House Fiscal Agency 
noted in its June 2008 summary of SB 212 that “[t]he proposed new Section of Part 
327 NREPA (Section 32730) concerns the effect of the Compact on Michigan law and 
the authority of the Council created by the Compact with respect to Michigan law,” 
including for court enforcement and penalties imposition purposes. HOUSE FISCAL 
AGENCY, RATIFY GREAT LAKES WATER COMPACT: A SUMMARY OF SENATE BILL 212 
AS PASSED BY THE SENATE 5-14-08 at 1–2 (2008) (emphasis added).  
 493. See MICH. COMP. LAWS § 324.34201, art. I (2005).  
 494. See generally § 324.32201. 
 495. See STATE OF MICH., GREAT LAKES–ST. LAWRENCE RIVER BASIN WATER 
RESOURCES COMPACT DRAFT—FIVE-YEAR PROGRAM REVIEW REPORT 1–2 (providing 
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Environmental Quality (MDEQ) (renamed on April 22, 2019, the 
Michigan Department of Environment, Great Lakes, and Energy 
(DEGLE or EGLE))496 is designated as the “lead agency responsible 
for Michigan’s water management and water conservation and 
efficiency programs” and consequently is the lead overseer of 
Michigan’s implementation of the Compact and Agreement.497 
The Compact required Michigan and the other states, within five 
years of the Compact’s effective date, to create a program for the 
management and regulation of new or increased withdrawals and 
consumptive uses of Great Lakes–St. Lawrence River Basin (Basin) 
waters, including both surface and ground water.498 These rules were 
to be adopted and implemented consistent with the Compact’s 
“Decision-Making Standard,”499 which implements Article 203 of the 
Great Lakes–St. Lawrence River Basin Sustainable Water Resources 
Agreement.500 This Decision-Making Standard imposed several 
requirements. For example, it required inter alia that any proposed 
lake water withdrawals or consumptive uses (1) “result in no 
significant individual or cumulative adverse impacts to the quantity or 
quality” of Basin waters and its surrounding ecosystem;501 (2) 
“incorporate Environmentally Sound and Economically Feasible 
Water Conservation Measures”;502 and (3) are “in compliance with all 
applicable municipal, State and federal laws [e.g., Clean Water Act], 
as well as regional interstate and international agreements, including 
the Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909.”503  
The Compact also required Michigan and the other Great Lakes 
States, within two years of the Compact’s effective date, to 
collectively (1) identify and define certain water conservation and 
efficiency objectives based on certain specified benchmarks;504 (2) 
 
the corresponding MCL provisions for numerous Compact/Agreement 
Sections/Articles). 
 496. See Press Release, Mich. Dep’t of Env’t, Great Lakes and Energy Media 
Office, MDEQ to Become EGLE on April 22nd (Apr. 17, 2019) (describing the 
reorganization and unveiling of EGLE’s new logo). 
 497. GREAT LAKES–ST. LAWRENCE RIVER BASIN WATER RESOURCES 
COMPACT DRAFT—FIVE-YEAR PROGRAM REVIEW REPORT, supra note 495, at 1–2. 
 498. See § 4.10.1, 122 Stat. at 3754–55. 
 499. §§ 4.11–12, 122 Stat. at 3755–56 
 500. See Great Lakes–St. Lawrence River Basin Sustainable Water Resources 
Agreement, supra note 489, at 6, 10.  
 501. § 4.11(2), 122 Stat. at 3755. 
 502. § 4.9(4)(e), 122 Stat. at 3754. 
 503. § 4.9(4)(f), 122 Stat. at 3754. 
 504. See §§ 1.2, 2.2, 4.1, 4.2(1)(a)–(e), 122 Stat. at 3739, 3744, 3747, 3748.  
770 Michigan State Law Review  2019 
“develop [their] own Water conservation and efficiency goals and 
objectives consistent with the Basin-wide goals and objectives”;505 and 
(3) “develop and implement a Water conservation and efficiency 
program, either voluntary or mandatory, within [their] jurisdiction[s] 
based on the Party’s goals and objectives.”506 Michigan and each of 
the other states also must report annually to the Great Lakes–St. 
Lawrence River Basin Water Resources Council, consisting of the 
Governors of such states, and make available to the public their 
assessment of whether their respective programs are meeting their 
goals and objectives.507 
The primary purpose of the Compact and Agreement and the 
corollary state laws is to collectively protect, conserve, restore, 
improve, and effectively manage Basin waters and natural resources 
cooperatively, consistent with the European precautionary principle.508 
For example, Compact Section 1.3.2.a states that the “current lack of 
full scientific certainty should not be used as a reason for postponing 
measures to protect the Basin ecosystem,” and Section 1.3.2.h states 
that the adaptive [ecosystem-based] management approach to the 
conservation of Basin resources shall consider the uncertainties in and 
evolution of scientific knowledge concerning Basin waters and natural 
resources.509 In addition, Compact Section 4.5.1.d provides that the 
protection of the integrity of the Great Lakes–St. Lawrence River 
Basin Ecosystem shall be the overarching principle guiding the 
regional review of a party’s proposal(s) to undertake activities therein, 
 
 505. § 4.2(2), 122 Stat. at 3748. 
 506. Id. 
 507. See id. In addition, SJR 45 approved and recognized that the Compact 
required Michigan and other states, two (2) years of the Compact’s effective date, to 
“commit to promote Environmentally Sound and Economically Feasible Water 
Conservation Measures” that inter alia “promote efficient use of [w]ater[,] [i]dentif[y] 
and shar[e] . . . best management practices and state of the art conservation and 
efficiency technologies,” and apply “sound planning principles.” § 4.2.4(a)–(c). 
Furthermore, Michigan and these other states must “implement [consistent therewith] 
. . . a voluntary or mandatory [w]ater conservation program for all, including existing 
Basin [w]ater users.” § 4.2(5).  
 508. Lawrence A. Kogan, The Extra-WTO Precautionary Principle: One 
European “Fashion” Export the United States Can Do Without, 17 TEMP. POL. & CIV. 
RTS. L. REV. 491, 525–28 (2008). 
 509. § 1.2(2)(a), 122 Stat. at 3743; see also Great Lakes–St. Lawrence River 
Basin Sustainable Water Resources Agreement, supra note 489, at 2–3 (“The 
objectives of this Agreement are: a. To act together to protect, conserve, and restore 
the Waters of the Great Lakes–St. Lawrence River Basin because current lack of 
scientific certainty should not be used as a reason for postponing measures to protect 
the Basin Ecosystem.”).  
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recognizing the uncertainties surrounding the proposal’s future 
environmental impacts.510 These Compact provisions implement 
Michigan’s and the other Great Lakes States’ obligation to follow the 
European precautionary principle under Article 209 of the Great 
Lakes–St. Lawrence River Basin Sustainable Water Resources 
Agreement.511 Article 209.b requires the parties to “take into account 
the current state of scientific knowledge, or uncertainty, and 
appropriate Measures to exercise caution in cases of uncertainty, if 
serious damage may result.”512 And Article 209.c mandates that the 
parties “[c]onsider Adaptive Management principles and approaches 
[i.e., ecosystem-based management], considering and providing 
adjustments for the uncertainties in, and evolution of science 
concerning the Basin’s water resources, watersheds and 
ecosystems.”513  
Compact Section 4.15.1, furthermore, requires the parties to 
assess the cumulative impacts of St. Lawrence River Basin water 
withdrawals, diversions, and consumptive uses every five years or 
when more than fifty million additional gallons per day on average 
have been lost within any ninety-day period since the last five-year 
assessment.514 Compact Section 4.15.1.b requires the parties to “[g]ive 
substantive consideration to climate change or other significant threats 
to Basin Waters.”515 When undertaking such substantive 
consideration, the parties must “take into account the current state of 
scientific knowledge or uncertainty and appropriate Measures to 
exercise [pre]caution in cases of uncertainty if serious damage may 
result.”516  
 
 510. See § 4.5(1)(d), 122 Stat. at 3750; see also GREAT LAKES–ST. LAWRENCE 
RIVER BASIN WATER RESOURCES COMPACT: A REVISED SUMMARY OF HOUSE BILL 
4343 AS INTRODUCED 2-28-07, supra note 492, at 6 (“Principle for reviewing 
proposals. The overarching principle for reviewing proposals subject to regional 
review is the protection of the basin ecosystem in the face of uncertainty.”). 
 511. See Great Lakes–St. Lawrence River Basin Sustainable Water Resources 
Agreement, supra note 489, at 2. 
 512. Id. at 16 (emphasis added). 
 513. Id. (emphasis added). 
 514. See § 4.15(1), 122 Stat. at 3758. 
 515. § 4.15(1)(b), 122 Stat. at 3759. 
 516. Id.; see also § 4.15(1)(c), 122 Stat. at 3759 (discussing how adaptive 
management principles must take into account the uncertainties in and evolution of 
science concerning Basin water resources, watersheds and ecosystems); GREAT 
LAKES–ST. LAWRENCE RIVER BASIN WATER RESOURCES COMPACT: A REVISED 
SUMMARY OF HOUSE BILL 4343 AS INTRODUCED 2-28-07, supra note 492, at 12–13 
(“Assessment of cumulative impacts . . . [g]ive substantive consideration to climate 
change or other significant threats to basin waters and take into account the current 
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At least one legal commentator has noted that although the Great 
Lakes–St. Lawrence River Basin Sustainable Water Resources 
Agreement “is legally non-binding” on Michigan and the other Great 
Lakes States “(because U.S. states and Canadian provinces may not 
make international law) [under their respective systems of federalism, 
which authority is reserved only to the federal government], it is 
considered morally obligatory.”517 He also emphasized, however, that 
since “the eight U.S. states [including Michigan] are already, in effect, 
legally bound to its substantive provisions insofar as they are identical 
to those in the legally binding Compact,” the Compact “should ensure 
[the states’] cooperation and compliance” and “creat[e] an incentive 
for Ontario and Quebec also to cooperate and comply” with the 
Agreement.518 Another legal commentator, meanwhile, has expressed 
skepticism toward the Agreement’s effectiveness given its legally 
non-binding nature.519 She has called for Canada and the United States 
to execute a legally binding international agreement to ensure that the 
residents of the Canadian provinces, representing only “40% of the 
basin population,” are adequately protected against Great Lakes–St. 
Lawrence River Basin diversions.520  
V. KEY U.S. GREAT LAKES GOVERNANCE AND FUNDING 
INSTRUMENTALITIES 
The U.S. federal and state governments have utilized several key 
governance and funding instrumentalities to facilitate the eight Great 
Lakes States’, including Michigan’s, protection and preservation of 
the Great Lakes and St. Lawrence River Basin, consistent with the 
European precautionary principle and the ecosystem-based 
management principle, at the expense of constitutionally protected 
 
state of scientific knowledge, or uncertainty, and exercise [pre]caution in the face of 
uncertainty if serious damage could result.”); Michigan PA 190, at Art. 4 § 4.15b, p. 
14; Great Lakes–St. Lawrence River Basin Sustainable Water Resources Agreement, 
supra note 489, at 15–16 (“The assessment of Cumulative Impacts shall form a basis 
for the review of the Standard and the Exception Standard[,] and their 
application . . . [g]ive[s] substantive consideration to climate change or other 
significant threats to Basin Waters and take[s] into account the current state of 
scientific knowledge, or uncertainty, and appropriate Measures to exercise 
[pre]caution in cases of uncertainty, if serious damage may result.”). 
 517. Karkkainen, supra note 187, at 1000. 
 518. Id. 
 519. See Kane, supra note 191, at 451–52. 
 520. Id. at 452 (“The Agreement imposes no legal consequences on the states 
for failing to consider the objections of the Great Lakes premiers.”). 
 The Europeanization of the Great Lakes States 773 
private property rights. These instrumentalities are the Federal Great 
Lakes Advisory Board, the Great Lakes Restoration Initiative, and the 
Great Lakes Commission.  
A. The Federal Great Lakes Advisory Board (GLAB) 
On December 13, 2018, USEPA Region 5 Administrator and 
Great Lakes National Program Manager, Cathy Stepp, issued a press 
release announcing that (then) Acting USEPA Administrator Andrew 
Wheeler had approved the reestablishment of the federal advisory 
committee known as the Great Lakes Advisory Board (GLAB).521 The 
GLAB had previously been chartered by USEPA in 2012,522 and its 
charter was subsequently renewed in 2014 and 2016.523 The GLAB’s 
Charter stated that the objective of the GLAB was to “provide advice 
and recommendations on matters related to the Great Lakes 
Restoration Initiative . . . [and] on domestic matters related to 
implementation of the U.S.–Canada Great Lakes Water Quality 
Agreement.”524 The December 13, 2018, press release reaffirmed this 
primary objective and scope of activities.525 
Apparently, the GLAB had been reestablished in response to a 
May 21, 2018, letter signed by twenty-four members of Congress that 
had previously been dispatched to former USEPA Administrator Scott 
 
 521. See About EPA – EPA Region 5, supra note 204 (identifying the regions 
EPA Region five covers: the States of Minnesota, Wisconsin, Illinois, Indiana, 
Michigan, and Ohio and thirty-five federally recognized Indian Tribes); see also News 
Releases from Region 05, EPA Re-Establishes Great Lakes Advisory Board, EPA 
(Dec. 13, 2018), https://www.epa.gov/newsreleases/epa-re-establishes-great-lakes-
advisory-board [https://perma.cc/HA8D-3PCN].  
 522. See EPA, Establishment of the Great Lakes Advisory Board (GLAB), 77 
Fed. Reg. 31,975, 32,089 (proposed May 31, 2012); EPA, Proposed Information 
Collection Request; Comment Request; Underground Injection Control (UIC) 
Program, 79 Fed. Reg. 46,335, 46,437 (proposed Aug. 8, 2014); GREAT LAKES 
ADVISORY BD., UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY CHARTER 
(renewed May 12, 2016 by EPA and filed with Congress on June 13, 2016).  
 523. See EPA Re-Establishes Great Lakes Advisory Board, EPA (Dec. 13, 
2018), https://www.epa.gov/newsreleases/epa-re-establishes-great-lakes-advisory-
board [https://perma.cc/77ZT-T4FT].  
 524. UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY CHARTER, supra 
note 522 (emphasis added). 
 525. See EPA Re-Establishes Great Lakes Advisory Board, supra note 523 
(“The GLAB will advise on matters related to the Great Lakes Restoration Initiative 
and the implementation of the Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement between the 
United States and Canada.”). 
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Pruitt.526 The letter requested that he “maintain the Great Lakes 
Advisory Board,” rather than abolish it.527 The letter emphasized the 
ongoing importance of the GLAB, which had been and continues to 
be subject to the public meetings notice and participation requirements 
of the Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA)528 and applicable 
agency regulations and guidance in directing the GLRI’s 
investments.529 The FACA database reveals that the GLAB, for fiscal 
years 2015,530 2016,531 and 2018,532 had convened at least one dozen 
public meetings and had issued at least one public report.533 That report 
“emphasiz[ed] prevention, protection and sustainability as much as 
restoration, in keeping with the Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement 
and the 2005 Great Lakes Regional Collaboration Strategy.”534  
 
 526. See Letter from Congressional Members, to Hon. Scott Pruitt, Adm’r, 
EPA (May 21, 2018). 
 527. Id.  
 528. See generally Federal Advisory Committee Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-
463, 86 Stat. 770 (Oct. 6, 1972).  
 529. See Gen. Servs. Admin., Federal Advisory Committee Management, 66 
Fed. Reg. 37,575, 37,728 (July 19, 2001); see also WHITE HOUSE OFFICE OF MGMT. 
AND BUDGET, CIRCULAR NO. A-135, MANAGEMENT OF FEDERAL ADVISORY 
COMMITTEES (1994).  
 530. See Committee Detail, Great Lakes Advisory Board, Fiscal Year 2015, 
FACADATABASE.GOV, https://www.facadatabase.gov/FACA/ 
FACAPublicCommittee?id=a10t0000001h0k6 [https://perma.cc/5HFJ-8E5R] 
(established June 15, 2012). In FY 2015, the GLAB convened four public meetings, 
two of them by conference call. See id. “The GLAB provided advice on 
incorporating . . . Adaptive Management into the Great Lakes Restoration Initiative. 
The GLAB issued ten recommendations in its September 2015 report 
‘Recommendations for Integrating Adaptive Management into Implementation of the 
GLRI.’” Id. 
 531. See Committee Detail, Great Lakes Advisory Board, Fiscal Year 2016, 
FACADATABASE.GOV, https://www.facadatabase.gov/FACA/ 
FACAPublicCommittee?id=a10t0000001h0On [https://perma.cc/N9SJ-2GT5] 
(established June 15, 2012). During FY 2016, the GLAB convened four public 
meetings and EPA-formed the Science and Information Subcommittee (SIS) “to assist 
the GLAB in providing ongoing advice to the Administrator in her capacity as Chair 
of the Interagency Task Force (IATF) on Great Lakes technical issues. The GLAB 
and SIS each held 4 public meetings to discuss issues regarding the Great Lakes 
Restoration Initiative.” Id. The report reveals that the “Agency reviewed the GLAB’s 
recommendations and took action on them during FY 2016.” Id.  
 532. See 2019 Current Fiscal Year Report: Great Lakes Advisory Board, 
FACADATABASE.GOV (Oct. 14, 2009).  
 533. See GREAT LAKES ADVISORY BD., RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE GREAT 
LAKES INTERAGENCY TASK FORCE ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE FY 2015–2019 
GREAT LAKES RESTORATION INITIATIVE ACTION PLAN 1, 3 (2013).  
 534. Id. at 2. 
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It should be noted that seven of the congressional members who 
had signed the May 21, 2018, letter to former USEPA Administrator 
Pruitt were Republicans, while an additional two letter signatories 
were members of the Minnesota Farmer’s Labor Party (FLP).535 The 
FLP movement had long reflected European socialist ideas “to the left 
of both the New Deal of the 1930s and the Democratic Party of the 
early 2000s.”536  
B. The Federal Great Lakes Restoration Initiative (GLRI) 
In addition, the May 21, 2018, congressional letter noted above 
also had referenced the February 28, 2017, hearing of the Interior, 
Environment, and Related Agencies Subcommittee of the powerful 
 
 535. See Letter from Congressional Members, supra note 526. These 
congressional members included David P. Joyce (R-OH) (lead signatory), Marcy 
Kaptur (D-OH), Debbie Dingell (D-MI), Janice Schawkosky (D-IL), Bill Huizenga 
(R-MI), Mike Quigley (D-IL), Gwen S. Moore (D-WI), Brian Higgins (D-NY), John 
Moolenaar (R-MI), Bobby L. Rush (D-IL), Brenda L. Lawrence (D-MI), Daniel T. 
Kildee (D-MI), Sean Patrick Maloney (D-NY), Marcia L. Fudge (D-OH), Paul 
Mitchell (R-MI), Daniel W. Lipinski (D-IL), Bradley S. Schneider (D-IL), Betty 
McCollum (Farmer Labor Party-MN), Richard M. Nolan (Farmer Labor Party-MN), 
Fred Upton (R-MI), Sander M. Levin (D-MI), Peter Visclosky (D-IN), Chris Collins 
(R-NY), and Mike Bishop (R-MI). See id. 
 536. Paul Lubotina, The Minnesota Farm-Labor Party: The Role of Third 
Parties in the Americanization of European Labor Radicals in the Great Lakes 
Region, 4 UPPER COUNTRY: J. LAKE SUPERIOR REGION 1, 13 (2016); Graeme Anfinson, 
A Brief History of the MN Farmer-Labor Party, SOCIALIST REVOLUTION (June 19, 
2011), https://socialistrevolution.org/a-brief-history-of-the-mn-farmer-labor-party 
[https://perma.cc/CB8Z-6U7Q]; Eric Blanc, The Ballot and the Break, JACOBIN (Dec. 
4, 2017), https://www.jacobinmag.com/2017/12/democratic-party-minnesota-farmer-
labor-floyd-olson [https://perma.cc/S93F-VD4X]; Paul D’Amato, What Lessons to 
Take from Farmer-Labor Parties?, SOCIALISTWORKER.ORG (Mar. 20, 2018), 
https://socialistworker.org/2018/03/20/what-lessons-to-take-from-farmer-labor-
parties [https://perma.cc/49LJ-P592]; Frederick L. Johnson, The ‘Mother of the 
Farmer-Labor Party’ Didn’t Really Want to Add the ‘D’ to the Beginning, MINNPOST 
(Mar. 20, 2017), https://www.minnpost.com/mnopedia/2017/03/mother-farmer-
labor-party-didn-t-really-want-add-d-beginning/ [https://perma.cc/LMG6-SW6V]; 
Karvey Klehr, Dubious Alliance: The Making of Minnesota’s DFL Party, by John 
Haynes, COMMENTARY (Dec. 1984), https://www.commentarymagazine.com/articles/ 
dubious-alliance-the-making-of-minnesotas-dfl-party-by-john-haynes/ [https:// 
perma.cc/B9TS-NHVH]; Tom O’Connell, Minnesota Farmer-Labor Party, 1924–
1944, MNOPEDIA, http://www.mnopedia.org/minnesota-farmer-labor-party-1924-
1944 [https://perma.cc/7TEV-CLKF] (last modified Feb. 6, 2019); Henry Rodgers, 
Democratic-Farmer-Labor Party Member Suspended After Saying Republicans 
Should Be Brought ‘to the Guillotines’, DAILY CALLER (Oct. 16, 2018), 
https://dailycaller.com/2018/10/16/democratic-party-william-davis-minnesota-
suspended-guillotines/ [https://perma.cc/C5RL-U5AX].  
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House of Representatives Appropriations Committee.537 Congressman 
Higgins, one of the letter’s Democratic signatories, had previously 
testified at that committee hearing.538 Representative Higgins’s 
prepared testimony revealed that “[s]ince the creation of the Great 
Lakes Restoration Initiative [GLRI] in 2010, nearly $2.2 billion ha[d] 
been invested in projects to clean up the Great lakes . . . .”539 The GLRI 
“is the largest investment in the Great Lakes in two decades and funds 
a variety of activities including [through issuance of] grants and the 
direct implementation of Great Lakes Legacy Act projects.”540 While 
the Great Lakes Legacy Act had last been reauthorized in 2008, its 
projects have since been funded under the GLRI.541 When the GLRI 
was established in 2010, the Interior, Environment, and Related 
Agencies Subcommittee had proposed appropriations of 
approximately $475 million to support USEPA’s fulfillment of that 
program’s objectives, along with USEPA’s implementation of the 
 
 537. See generally Letter from Congressional Members, supra note 526. 
 538. See Interior, Environment, and Related Agencies Appropriations for 
2018: Hearings Before a Subcomm. of the Comm. on Appropriations H.R., 115th 
Cong. 15 (2017). 
 539. Id. at 21–23 (statement of Brian Higgins (NY-26)). 
 540. Great Lakes Funding, EPA, https://www.epa.gov/great-lakes-funding 
[https://perma.cc/SN6X-SE4Z] (last updated Aug. 2, 2019). The Great Lakes Legacy 
Act authorized the appropriation of $50 million annually, from 2004 to 2008, on a 
35% non-Federal cost-share-basis, for contaminated sediment remediation in the 
Great Lakes States. It also authorized USEPA to give priority to projects in “Areas of 
Concern” located wholly or partially in the United States that: “1. Constitute remedial 
action for contaminated sediment; 2. Have been identified in a Remedial Action Plan 
(RAP) and are ready to be implemented; 3. Use an innovative approach, technology, 
or technique that may provide greater environmental benefits or equivalent 
environmental benefits at a reduced cost; or 4. Include remediation to be commenced 
not later than 1 year after the date of receipt of funds for the project.” Environmental 
Protection Agency, Implementation of the Great Lakes Legacy Act of 2002, 71 Fed. 
Reg. 25,504, 25,505 (May 1, 2006); About the Great Lakes Legacy Act, EPA, 
https://www.epa.gov/great-lakes-legacy-act/about-great-lakes-legacy-act [https:// 
perma.cc/NC6F-NYVT] (last updated Sept. 5, 2019) (“The Legacy Act was 
authorized in 2002 with the first appropriation in 2004. The Act was Reauthorized in 
2008.”); Great Lakes Legacy Act, EPA, https://www.epa.gov/great-lakes-legacy-act 
[https://perma.cc/HPV5-EMA8] (last updated Aug. 23, 2019) (“The Great Lakes 
Legacy Act provides federal funding to accelerate contaminated sediment remediation 
in Areas of Concern.”); Great Lakes Funding, EPA, https://www.epa.gov/great-lakes-
funding [https://perma.cc/69AS-MQ8X] (last updated Aug. 2, 2019).  
 541. See Memorandum from the Resolutions Review Committee on 
Recommended Actions for the Resolutions Passed at the 2008 Annual Meeting in 
2018 Great Lakes Commission Annual Meeting (Aug. 29, 2018) (on file with Great 
Lakes Comm’n des Grands Lacs). 
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Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement (GLWQA).542 In effect, 
Congress, in an Interior Department appropriations bill subsequently 
enacted into law,543 had exercised its statutory “transfer authority” to 
authorize the USEPA Administrator to transfer to other federal 
department or agency heads up to $475 million of the funds 
appropriated for the GLRI and GLWQA for fiscal years 2010–2014.544 
These funds were to be used to develop a comprehensive, multi-year 
restoration action plan that will lead to the restoration of the Great 
Lakes and build upon the foundation of the Great Lakes Regional 
Collaboration Strategy.545  
The Congressional GAO subsequently reported in 2013 that 
approximately $300 million had been appropriated in fiscal years 2011 
and 2012 for the GLRI and that by September 2013, approximately 
$1.3 billion actually had been appropriated to the GLRI.546 The GAO 
report highlighted the 2010 Action Plan the USEPA and interagency 
task force had developed to guide their implementation of the GLRI.547 
It identified four key environmental problems: “(1) toxic substances 
 
 542. See Department of the Interior, Environment, and Related Agencies 
Appropriations Act, H.R. REP. NO. 111-316, at 35, 110 (2010) (accompanying H.R. 
2996). 
 543. See generally Administrative Provisions, Environmental Protection 
Agency, Pub. L. No. 111-88, 123 Stat. 2904, 2938 (2009) (“The [USEPA] 
Administrator is authorized to transfer up to $475,000,000 of the funds appropriated 
for the Great Lakes Initiative under the heading ‘Environmental Programs and 
Management’ to the head of any Federal department or agency, with the concurrence 
of such head, to carry out activities that would support the Great Lakes Restoration 
Initiative and Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement programs, projects, or activities; 
to enter into an interagency agreement with the head of such Federal department or 
agency to carry out these activities; and to make grants to governmental entities, 
nonprofit organizations, institutions, and individuals for planning, research, 
monitoring, outreach, and implementation in furtherance of the Great Lakes 
Restoration Initiative and the Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement.”). 
 544. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-15-526, GREAT LAKES 
RESTORATION INITIATIVE: IMPROVED DATA COLLECTION AND REPORTING WOULD 
ENHANCE OVERSIGHT 3 n.4 (2015) (“Transfer authority is statutory authority provided 
by Congress to transfer budget authority from one appropriation or fund account to 
another. In fiscal years 2010, 2012, 2014, and 2015, Congress did not provide 
appropriations for GLRI purposes. Instead, in those fiscal years, Congress provided 
EPA with transfer authority, up to a maximum amount, to undertake GLRI programs 
and projects. However, in fiscal years 2011 and 2013, Congress did provide EPA with 
specific appropriations for GLRI purposes.”).  
 545. See H.R. REP. NO. 111-316, at 111; see also 123 Stat. at 2938. 
 546. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-13-797, GREAT LAKES 
RESTORATION INITIATIVE: FURTHER ACTIONS WOULD RESULT IN MORE USEFUL 
ASSESSMENTS AND HELP ADDRESS FACTORS THAT LIMIT PROGRESS 3, 16 (2013).  
 547. Id. at Highlights. 
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and areas of concern; (2) invasive species; (3) nearshore health and 
nonpoint source pollution; (4) habitat and wildlife protection and 
restoration.”548 Habitat and wildlife protection and restoration included 
“revitalizing wetlands and other habitat” and comprehensively 
assessing “the entire Great Lakes coastal wetlands . . . by 2014.”549 
The GAO report also indicated that Goal #2 of the nonpoint source 
pollution focus area was to ensure that “[l]and use, recreation, and 
economic activities are managed to ensure that nearshore aquatic, 
wetland, and upland habitats will sustain the health and function of 
natural communities.”550  
Among USEPA’s many objectives for the habitat and wildlife 
protection focus area, three arguably imposed the greatest constraints 
on landowners’ ability to fully exercise their constitutionally protected 
private property rights. First, USEPA had sought, by 2010, to 
“compile and map the highest priority watersheds for implementation 
of targeted nonpoint source pollution control measures.”551 Second, 
USEPA had sought, by 2014, to “increase by 50 percent over 2008 
levels” the “area of agricultural lands in conservation and/or utilizing 
conservation tillage practices,” as revealed under U.S. Farm Bill 
programs’ required reduced erosion, nutrients, and/or pesticide 
loading.552 Third, USEPA had sought to ensure that, by 2014, “97,500 
acres of wetlands, wetland-associated upland, and high-priority 
coastal, upland, urban, and island habitats will be protected, restored 
or enhanced.”553 
In January 2014, Congress appropriated an additional $300 
million to the USEPA in carrying out activities that supported the 
GLRI and GLWQA programs, projects, and activities.554 In December 
2015, Congress appropriated an additional $300 million to the USEPA 
for use during fiscal year 2016 in supporting further implementation 
of the GLRI and the GLWQA.555 In addition, it amended the Federal 
Water Pollution Control Act (FWPCA/Clean Water Act (CWA)) by 
adding new § 118(c), which formally “established in the [USEPA] a 
 
 548. Id. at 9–10. 
 549. Id. at 10. 
 550. Id. at 88 (emphasis added). 
 551. Id. at 88. 
 552. Id. at 89–90. 
 553. Id. at 91–92. 
 554. See Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2014, Pub. L. No. 113-76, 128 
Stat. 5, 320 (2014). 
 555. See Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-113, 129 
Stat. 2242, 2557 (2015). 
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Great Lakes Restoration Initiative . . . to carry out programs and 
projects for Great Lakes protection and restoration.”556 Consistent with 
the 2013 GAO Report, two of the four “focus areas” toward which the 
USEPA was required to place the GLRI funding included “the 
prevention and mitigation of nonpoint source pollution” and “habitat 
and wildlife protection and restoration, including wetlands restoration 
and preservation.”557 The USEPA was directed to collaborate with 
federal partners “to select the best combination of programs and 
projects for Great Lakes protection and restoration” that could 
“achieve strategic and measurable environmental outcomes that 
implement the Great Lakes Action Plan and the Great Lakes Water 
Quality Agreement.”558  
In December 2016, Congress appropriated another $300 million 
for fiscal years 2017 through 2021 for USEPA to use in implementing 
programs or projects under the Great Lakes Restoration Initiative 
Action Plan or the Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement.559 
Consistent with both the 2013 GAO Report and the fiscal year (FY) 
2016 appropriations bill, the FY 2017 appropriations bill identified 
two of the four “Focus Areas” as “the prevention and . . . mitigation 
of nonpoint source pollution” and “habitat and wildlife protection and 
restoration, including wetlands restoration and preservation.”560 On 
February 15, 2019, the president signed into law H.J. Resolution 31 
titled “Making Further Continuing Appropriations for the Department 
of Homeland Security for Fiscal Year 2019, and for Other Purposes,” 
which included yet another appropriation of $300 million for the 
GLRI and GLWQA for fiscal year 2019.561 
In sum, these appropriations bills establish that the ongoing 
statutory authority for USEPA to continue its implementation of U.S. 
responsibilities under the GLWQA and the GLRI at the expense of 
 
 556. § 426(7)(A), 129 Stat. 2581.  
 557. See § 426, 129 Stat. at 2581 (amending FWPCA § 118(c)(7)(A)–(C) (33 
U.S.C. 1268(c)(7)(B)(iii)–(iv))); see also § 426, 129 Stat. at 2583 (amending FWPCA 
§ 118(c)(7)(G)). 
 558. § 426, 129 Stat. at 2582 (amending FWPCA § 118(c)(7)(C)(i)). 
 559. Water Infrastructure Improvements for the Nation Act of 2016, Pub. L. 
No. 114-322 § 5005, 130 Stat. 1628, 1889, 1890, 1892 (2016) (amending § 118(c)(7) 
of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act to add (C)(i)(I), and FWPCA § 
118(c)(7)(J)).  
 560. § 5005(B)(3)–(4), 130 Stat. at 1889–90 (amending FWPCA § 
118(c)(7)(B)(iii)–(iv)). 
 561. H.R. REP. NO. 116 at 85 (accompanying H.J. RES. 31).  
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landowners’ constitutionally protected private property rights is 
contained in CWA § 118(c) (33 U.S.C. § 1268).562 
C. The Great Lakes Commission 
As previously discussed, the Great Lakes Commission (GLC) 
was established in 1955 pursuant to Article IV of the Great Lakes 
Basin Compact,563 and it has since essentially served as an 
international “talk-shop”564 without legal “bite.” For example, the 
GLC’s mission has been to render advice and assistance to its 
members by “fostering dialogue, developing consensus, facilitating 
collaboration and speaking with a unified voice.”565 The objective of 
the GLC’s mission has been the advancement of “collective interests 
and responsibilities to promote economic prosperity and 
environmental protection and to achieve the balanced and sustainable 
use of [the] Great Lakes–St. Lawrence River basin water resources.”566  
Despite its limited role, the GLC (with a MDNR/MDEQ 
representative holding a GLC Board of Director’s seat) had managed, 
nevertheless, to obtain (not “earn”) approximately $75 million of 
revenues from international (the International Joint Commission 
(IJC)), federal, and private grants and contracts and state contributions 
over the course of nine years (from 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 
2014, 2015, 2016, and 2018),567 averaging approximately $8.3 million 
 
 562. See Great Lakes Funding Authority, EPA, https://www.epa.gov/great-
lakes-funding/great-lakes-funding-authority [https://perma.cc/NX5W-5BLR] (last 
visited Oct. 30, 2019). 
 563. See supra Part III. 
 564. See Talking Shop (also Talk Shop), LEXICO, https://www.lexico.com/en/ 
definition/talking_shop [https://perma.cc/LBC3-CFQS] (last visited Oct. 30, 2019) 
(“A place or group regarded as a centre for unproductive talk rather than action.”); see 
also Talking Shop, THE FREE DICTIONARY, https://idioms.thefreedictionary.com/ 
talking-shop [https://perma.cc/58U2-JKL5] (last visited Oct. 30, 2019) (“A group or 
organization that spends far more time, effort, and resources on discussing policy or 
possible actions than actually doing anything meaningful. Primarily heard in UK.”).  
 565. About, GREAT LAKES COMM’N, https://www.glc.org/about/ 
[https://perma.cc/XE4A-9QJU] (last visited Oct. 30, 2019). 
 566. Id. 
 567. See GREAT LAKES COMM’N, 2018 Annual Report, at 2, 5 (revealing as a 
GLC Board of Directors the Director of the MDNR Office of the Great Lakes, and 
$11,863,960 of revenues obtained from the IJC, USDOC-NOAA, USACE, USDA-
NRCS, USEPA, USFWS, USGS, MDEQ, and the State of Michigan); GREAT LAKES 
COMM’N, 2016 Annual Report, at 2, 5 (revealing as a GLC Board of Directors the 
Director of the MDEQ Office of the Great Lakes, and $11,516, 173 of revenues 
obtained from the IJC, USDOC-NOAA (various), USACE, USDA-NRCS, USEPA 
(various agencies), USFWS, USGS, MDEQ, and State of Michigan); GREAT LAKES 
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of unearned revenues per year. In addition, the GLC managed in 2018 
to pass a resolution applauding, supporting, and calling for the 
continued federal government support of the various structures (i.e., 
instrumentalities) and programs discussed above in this Article.568 For 
example, the GLC resolution lauded the federal government’s ongoing 
support for the GLRI since 2010 and the GLRI’s success inter alia in 
having facilitated the prevention of more than 402,000 pounds of 
phosphorus from entering the Great Lakes and causing harmful algal 
blooms and the restoration or protection of 180,000 acres of habitat.569 
The GLC resolution also supported another $300 million of GLRI 
funding in Fiscal Year 2019 and the strengthening of agricultural 
conservation (actually preservation) programs to reduce nonpoint 
 
COMM’N, 2015 Annual Report, at 2, 5 (revealing as Chair of the GLC Board of 
Directors the Director of the MDEQ Office of the Great Lakes, and $7,617,587 of 
revenues obtained from the IJC, USDOC-NOAA (various), USACE, USDA-NRCS, 
USEPA (various agencies), USFWS, USGS, MDEQ, and State of Michigan); GREAT 
LAKES COMM’N, 2013–2014 Annual Report, at 2, 4–5 (2014) (revealing as a GLC 
Board of Directors the Director of the MDEQ Office of the Great Lakes, and 
$7,282,946 of 2013 revenues and $6,671,057 of 2014 revenues obtained inter alia 
from the IJC, American Recovery and Reinvestment Act, USDOC-NOAA (various), 
USACE, USDA-NRCS, USDOE-NREL, USEPA (various agencies), USGS, MDEQ, 
and State of Michigan); Great Lakes Comm’n, 2012 Annual Report, at 2, 4–5 
(revealing as a GLC Board of Directors the Director of the MDEQ Office of the Great 
Lakes, and $9,433,001 of revenues obtained inter alia from the IJC, American 
Recovery and Reinvestment Act, USDOC-NOAA, USACE, USDA-NRCS, USDOE-
NREL, USEPA (various agencies), USFWS and USGS, MDEQ, and State of 
Michigan); GREAT LAKES COMM’N, 2011 Annual Report, at 2, 8–9 (revealing as a 
GLC Board of Directors the Director of the MDEQ Office of the Great Lakes, and 
$9,496,735 of revenues obtained inter alia from the IJC, American Recovery and 
Reinvestment Act, the Great Lakes Restoration Initiative, DOC-NOAA, USACE, 
USDA-NRCS, USDOE, USEPA (various), USFWS, U.S. Geologic Survey (USGS), 
MDEQ, and State of Michigan); GREAT LAKES COMM’N, 2010 Annual Report, at 2, 
8–9 (revealing as a GLC Board of Directors the Director of the MDNR Office of the 
Great Lakes, and $6,423,481 of revenues obtained inter alia from the IJC, Great Lakes 
Restoration Initiative, DOC-NOAA (various), USACE, USDA-NRCS, USDOE-
NREL, USDOE, Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE), USEPA (various 
agencies), USFWS, MDNR/MDEQ, and State of Michigan); GREAT LAKES COMM’N, 
2009 Annual Report, at 2, 8–9 (revealing as a GLC Board of Directors the Director of 
the MDNR Office of the Great Lakes, and $4,366,344 of revenues obtained inter alia 
from the IJC, the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act, DOC-NOAA (various), 
USACE, USDA-NRCS, USDOE-NREL, USEPA (various agencies), USFWS, 
MDEQ, and State of Michigan). 
 568. See GREAT LAKES COMM’N, Semiannual Meeting Res., An Agenda for 
Great Lakes Restoration and Economic Revitalization: Great Lakes Commission 
Federal Priorities for 2018, at 1–2 (Mar. 7, 2018).  
 569. See id. at 1. 
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source runoff to Western Lake Erie, Saginaw Bay, and Green Bay.570 
Furthermore, the GLC resolution called for the federal government to 
maintain the GLAB and to develop a new GLRI Action Plan.571 
In sum, it is clear, especially during the Obama administration, 
that Congress had funded and multiple U.S. federal executive branch 
agencies, including USEPA, had utilized the GLAB, GLRI, and GLC 
“structures”/“instrumentalities” in a mutually reinforcing manner to 
impose strict statutory and regulatory restrictions and enforcement 
regimes upon Michigan and other Great Lakes States landowners at 
the expense of their constitutionally protected private property rights, 
consistent with the European precautionary principle and ecosystem-
based management legal nostrums. 
VI. MICHIGAN’S NATURAL RESOURCES AND ENVIRONMENTAL 
PROTECTION ACT AND ITS CENTRAL ROLE IN STATE POLITICAL AND 
LEGAL ENVIRONMENTAL GOVERNANCE 
To recall, it is the thesis of this Article that the wetlands (Part 
303), inland lakes and streams (Part 301), floodplains (Part 31), and 
soil erosion and sedimentation control (Part 91) provisions of 
Michigan’s Natural Resources Environmental Protection Act 
(NREPA), as amended,572 and implementing regulations,573 and the 
NREPA enforcement and monitoring practices of the MDEQ and the 
Michigan Department of Natural Resources (MDNR), have 
effectively been “Europeanized” at the expense of the constitutionally 
protected private property rights of Michigan’s hydroelectric dam 
owner/operators, farmers, and other landowners. The following 
section of this Article discusses both the political and legal dimensions 
of NREPA’s central role in state political and legal environmental 
governance. 
 
 570. See id. at 1–2. 
 571. See id. at 2. 
 572. See MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 324.101, 324.30301 (regarding wetlands 
protection and restoration), 324.30101 (regarding maintenance of natural river flow), 
324.3101 (regarding unobstructed floodplains), 324.9101 (regarding soil erosion and 
sedimentation control), as amended by 2018 Mich. Pub. Acts No. 631 (eff. March 29, 
2019). It is this author’s professional opinion that these provisions, notwithstanding 
their amendment by P.A. 631, remain “Europeanized.” See discussion infra. 
 573. See MICH. ADMIN. CODE, ENV’T, GREAT LAKES AND ENERGY WATER 
RESOURCES DIV., PART 17, SOIL EROSION AND SEDIMENTATION CONTROL r. 323.1701–
323.1714 (2017) (acting as a guidance resource rather than a restatement of the 
Michigan code).  
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A. Michigan Environmental Politics and Policies 
1. The Outgoing Snyder Administration 
On December 11, 2018, the Michigan House of Representatives 
“gave final approval to [HB 4205] limiting the ability of the state to 
set stricter rules than any federal standard, sending it to [former] Gov. 
Rick Snyder for consideration.”574 This common-sense bill was signed 
into law as Public Act No. 602, on December 28, 2018.575 Act 602, for 
example, amended MCL § 24.232 and MCL § 24.245.576  
However, the problem with this new law is that it is “not 
retroactive, and would keep in place stricter-than-federal standards the 
state already had.”577 Nevertheless, it was still “met with heavy 
opposition from environmental groups and advocates, who see it 
limiting Michigan’s ability to set stricter-than-federal standards on 
important issues, including the emerging issue of contamination from 
per-and polyfluoroalkyl substances, known collectively as PFAS, 
which have been linked to health problems.”578 Unfortunately, this 
 
 574. Emily Lawler, Bill Limiting Michigan’s Environmental Rulemaking 
Power Heads to Snyder, MLIVE (Dec. 11, 2018), https://www.mlive.com/news/2018/ 
12/bill-limiting-michigans-environmental-rulemaking-power-heads-to-snyder.html 
[https://perma.cc/8AJ5-B3RY]. 
 575. See 2018 Mich. Pub. Acts No. 602; see also Memorandum from Hon. 
Rick Snyder, Gov., State of Mich., at 3053 (Dec. 28, 2018) (on file with 2018 Journal 
of the House). 
 576. See Mich. Pub. Acts No. 602. § 32(8) (amending MICH. COMP. LAWS § 
24.232 (2011)) (“Except for an emergency rule promulgated under section 48, and 
subject to subsection (10), if the federal government has mandated that this state 
promulgate rules, an agency shall not adopt or promulgate a rule more stringent than 
the applicable federally mandated standard unless the director of the agency 
determines that there is a clear and convincing need to exceed the applicable federal 
standard.”); see also Mich. Pub. Acts No. 602. § 45(1)–(3) (amending MICH. COMP. 
LAWS § 24.245 (2016)) (“(1) Except as otherwise provided in this subsection, an 
agency shall electronically submit a proposed rule to the legislative service bureau for 
its formal certification . . . (2) Except as provided in subsection (6), after notice is 
given as provided in this act and before the agency proposing the rule has formally 
adopted the rule, the agency shall prepare an agency report containing a synopsis of 
the comments contained in the public record, a copy of the request for rulemaking, 
and the regulatory impact statement required under subsection (3) . . . (3) . . . The 
regulatory impact statement must contain all of the following information: . . . (b) If 
§ 32(8) applies and the proposed rule is more stringent than the applicable federally 
mandated standard, a statement of the specific facts that establish the clear and 
convincing need to adopt the more stringent rule and an explanation of the exceptional 
circumstances that necessitate the more stringent standard.”).  
 577. Lawler, supra note 574.  
 578. Id. 
784 Michigan State Law Review  2019 
new Michigan law will not likely improve the legal and regulatory 
environment for Michigan property owners subject to the sweeping 
provisions of NREPA that had been amended by Act 98 (2013) and 
the almost unlimited discretion exercised by MDEQ officials in 
implementing and enforcing NREPA.  
NREPA Part 303 enables the State of Michigan to enact stricter-
than-federal CWA wetlands protection standards. These NREPA 
provisions effectively focus on the placing of fill material in wetlands 
(i.e., “soil, rocks, sand, water of any kind, or any other material that 
displaces soil or water or reduces water retention potential”)579 located 
in and proximate to floodplains and their adjacent tributaries within a 
given watershed, especially those draining into one or more of the four 
Great Lakes bordering the Michigan peninsula. They include Lakes 
Erie, Huron, Michigan, and Superior, which are considered, in part, 
waters of the State,580 U.S. traditional navigable waters,581 and 
international waters.582 
In addition, former Michigan Governor Snyder signed into law 
SB 1211 as Act No. 631, on December 28, 2018.583 Media reports 
quoted the law’s sponsor, Michigan State Senator Tom Casperson, as 
saying that the “bill would protect landowners against overzealous 
‘radicalism’ at the Department of Environmental Quality, which 
 
 579. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 324.30301(1)(d) (2019). 
 580. See § 324.3101(aa) (“‘Waters of the state’ mean groundwaters, lakes, 
rivers, and streams and all other watercourses and waters, including the Great Lakes, 
within the jurisdiction of this state.”); see also The Submerged Lands Act of 1986, 
Pub. L. No. 99-972, 67 Stat. 29 (Enacted Apr. 7, 1986) (defining the term 
“boundaries” as “includ[ing] the seaward boundaries of a State or its boundaries in 
the Gulf of Mexico or any of the Great Lakes as they existed at the time such State 
became a member of the Union, . . . but in no event shall the term ‘boundaries’ . . . be 
interpreted as extending from the coast line more than three geographical miles into 
the Atlantic Ocean or the Pacific Ocean, or more than three marine leagues into the 
Gulf of Mexico”); MICH. ADMIN. CODE r. 323.2203(p) (“‘Waters of the state’ [also] 
means . . . ‘[a]ll other water courses and bodies of water within the jurisdiction of the 
state, including wetlands as defined by part 303 of the act, wetlands protection, being 
[§§] 324.301 to 324.30323 of the Michigan Compiled Laws.’”).  
 581. See 33 C.F.R. § 329.4 (2010) (“Navigable waters of the United States are 
those waters that are subject to the ebb and flow of the tide and/or are presently used, 
or have been used in the past, or may be susceptible for use to transport interstate or 
foreign commerce.”); see also EPA, JURISDICTIONAL DETERMINATION FORM 
INSTRUCTIONAL GUIDEBOOK app’x D (2007).  
 582. See Water Resources Development Act of 1986, Pub. Law. No. 99-662, 
100 Stat 4082, 4230 (1986) (“[F]our of the Great Lakes are international waters and 
are defined as boundary waters in the Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909 between the 
United States and Canada . . . .”).  
 583. 2018 Mich. Pub. Acts No. 631.  
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enforces Michigan’s wetlands regulations.”584 Casperson also stated 
that “[i]f we don’t do something, we can kiss personal property rights 
goodbye. Because the government’s going to tell us what we can and 
can’t do no matter what.”585 
Act No. 631 amended MCL § 324.30301(1)(n), which defines a 
regulated “wetland” consistent with the federal definition of regulated 
wetlands contained within former Obama administration regulations 
that overbroadly defined the term “waters of the United States” 
(WOTUS).586 Pursuant to the Act 631 definition, a land or water 
feature will not be considered a regulated “wetland” unless it is a 
WOTUS under CWA § 502(7), is contiguous to the Great Lakes, Lake 
St. Clair, or an inland lake, pond, or stream, is more than five acres in 
size, harbors an endangered or threatened species, or is a rare and 
imperiled wetland.587 A wetland is not deemed contiguous to the Great 
Lakes, or an inland lake, pond, or stream, if “there is no direct physical 
contact and no surface water or interflowing groundwater connection 
to such a body of water.”588  
The MDEQ had greatly exaggerated how if Act 631 had been 
enacted following the Trump administration’s proposed rule change 
that would recodify the pre-2015 WOTUS definition,589 it would have 
 
 584. Jim Malewitz, Michigan House Panel Votes to Gut ‘Radical’ Wetlands 
Protections, BRIDGE (Dec. 18, 2018), https://www.bridgemi.com/michigan-
environment-watch/michigan-house-panel-votes-gut-radical-wetlands-protections 
[https://perma.cc/CRE3-NVPX].  
 585. Id. 
 586. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 324.30301(1)(n) (2019) (“Wetlands means a land 
or water feature, commonly referred to as a bog, swamp, or marsh, inundated or 
saturated by water at a frequency and duration sufficient to support, and that under 
normal circumstances does support, hydric soils and a predominance of wetland 
vegetation or aquatic life.”); see also BRIDGE, S.B. 1211 (H-1), DEQ ANALYSIS – PART 
1, at 2 (Dec. 13, 2018) (“The 2015 Obama administration ‘Clean Water Rule’ is 
currently in effect in Michigan.”). 
 587. See § 324.30301(l) (defining a “rare and imperiled wetland” as “(i) Great 
Lakes marsh. (ii) Southern wet meadow. (iii) Inland salt marsh. (iv) Coastal plain 
marsh. (v) Interdunal wetland. (vi) Lakeplain wet prairie. (vii) Lakeplain wet-mesic 
prairie. (viii) Coastal fen. (ix) Wet-mesic prairie. (x) Wet prairie. (xi) Prairie fen (xii) 
Northern fen. (xiii) Patterned fen. (xiv) Poor fen. (xv) Muskeg. (xvi) Relict conifer 
swamp. (xvii) Southern floodplain forest.”). 
 588. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 324.30321(4) (2019). 
 589. See Definition of “Waters of the United States” – Recodification of Pre-
Existing Rules; Extension of Comment Period, 83 Fed. Reg. 32,227 (July 12, 2018) 
(to be codified at 33 C.F.R. pt. 328); Definition of “Waters of the United States” – 
Recodification of Pre-Existing Rules; Extension of Comment Period, 82 Fed. Reg. 
39,712 (Aug. 22, 2017) (to be codified at 33 C.F.R. pt. 328); Definition of “Waters of 
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“remove[d] protection of” numerous types of wetlands, lakes, and 
streams currently protected under state law calibrated to the former 
Obama administration’s overbroad definition of WOTUS. According 
to MDEQ, the new law would allow the CWA § 404 permit-free filling 
and dredging of and constructing on non-WOTUS wetlands.590 These 
include wetlands not touching or inundated by the Great Lakes, 
wetlands not-continuously-connected to waterbodies, wetlands only 
physically connected to waterbodies vis-à-vis manmade connections 
(i.e., ditches), wetlands supporting plants or animals of identified 
regional importance (not endangered or threatened) and providing 
groundwater recharge, USDA-designated prior converted cropland 
irrespective of abandonment, non-WOTUS wetlands adjacent to 
artificially irrigated and flooded lakes and streams (i.e., Wixom 
Reservoir), and nonpermanent streams, lakes, or ponds and wetlands 
contiguous with them.591  
MDEQ estimated that “[i]f and when the new proposed Trump 
administration rule goes into effect in Michigan, approximately 3 
million of the 6.5 million acres of wetland (approximately half) will 
no longer be protected under S.B. 1211.”592 MDEQ estimated that even 
“[i]f the new proposed Trump administration rule does not go into 
effect in Michigan, approximately 380,000 wetlands, totaling 550,000 
acres (about a ½ million acres) that are not greater than 5 acres in size 
and not contiguous to the Great Lakes are at risk under S.B. 1211.”593 
For example, MDEQ estimated that “at least 5,000 wetlands, totaling 
approximately 10,000 acres” contiguous to impounds/reservoirs 
(inland lakes) would be at risk.594 MDEQ also opined that wetlands 
connected to waterbodies through a noncontinuous connection would 
be at risk, though specific estimations for such wetlands had not then 
been available.595 In effect, MDEQ had strenuously argued that the 
Trump administration’s implementation of its proposed “WOTUS” 
rule change would deprive Michigan of its ability to continue strict 
enforcement of NREPA Part 303 wetland protections in further 
diminishment of landowners’ constitutionally protected private 
property rights, consistent with the European precautionary principle 
 
the United States” – Recodification of Pre-Existing Rules; Extension of Comment 
Period, 82 Fed. Reg. 34,899 (July 27, 2017).  
 590. See BRIDGE, supra note 586, at 1. 
 591. See id. 
 592. Id. 
 593. Id. 
 594. Id. 
 595. See id. 
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and ecosystem based management approach to Great Lakes 
environmental stewardship.596  
2. The Incoming Whitmer Administration 
On December 27, 2018, Michigan Governor-elect Gretchen 
Whitmer announced her selection of the next MDEQ Director, Ms. 
Liesl Eichler Clark.597 The related press release stated that Clark, “the 
co-founder and partner of 5 Lakes Energy, a policy consulting 
firm[,] . . . served as president of the Michigan Energy Innovation 
Business Council and as deputy director for energy programs at the 
Michigan Department of Energy Labor and Economic Growth.”598 
Clark’s 5 Lakes Energy consulting firm specializes in rendering 
sustainability advisory services for corporate clients and in 
government sustainability policymaking.599 According to local media, 
Ms. Clark would replace Ms. Heidi Grether, who had been appointed 
to the post in mid-2016 by former Governor Snyder.600 Although Ms. 
Grether had been a former BP lobbyist, she nevertheless favored 
Governor-elect Whitmer’s executive order abolishing “industry-
heavy” environmental permit oversight boards, much to the surprise 
of environmental and natural resource advocates.601 
 
 596. See id. 
 597. See Kathleen Gray, Whitmer Names 10 More Appointees to Cabinet 
Positions, FREEP (Dec. 27, 2018), https://www.freep.com/story/news/politics/ 
2018/12/27/whitmer-key-cabinet-appointees/2422699002/ [https://perma.cc/M2U3-
7AQA]. 
 598. Id. 
 599. See Our Team, 5 LAKES ENERGY, https://5lakesenergy.com/our-team/ 
[https://perma.cc/W8GV-5764] (last visited Oct. 30, 2019) (“Collectively and 
individually, 5 Lakes Energy team members are recognized experts in clean energy, 
sustainability, water policy and environmental regulations.”); Facilitate – Community 
Engagement, 5 LAKES ENERGY, https://5lakesenergy.com/facilitate/ 
[https://perma.cc/PXN2-T6PG] (last visited Oct. 30, 2019) (“5 Lakes Energy has the 
expertise and experience to facilitate collaborative efforts that foster and galvanize 
community stakeholders to engage in adopting and accelerating sustainable practices. 
Building successful partnerships brings diverse resources and expertise to common 
purpose creating dynamic, sustained relationships that aggregate and leverage private, 
governmental, academic, and philanthropic and community assets.”).  
 600. See Jonathan Oosting, Whitmer Picks Leaders to Help ‘Fix the Damn 
Roads’ and Fight Water Contamination, THE DET. NEWS (Dec. 27, 2018), 
https://www.detroitnews.com/story/news/local/michigan/2018/12/27/whitmer-deq-
mdot-directors-michigan/2420360002/ [https://perma.cc/7DUK-BQSA].  
 601. Jay Greene, Former State Environmental Director Surprises with 
Support for Whitmer in DEQ Fight, CRAIN’S DET. BUS. (Feb. 7, 2019, 7:34 PM), 
https://www.crainsdetroit.com/voices-jay-greene/former-state-environmental-
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On February 4, 2019, newly elected Governor Whitmer signed 
an executive order overhauling the MDEQ and “charg[ing it] with 
environmental regulation, citing the need to more urgently protect the 
state’s water, bolster the response to climate change and direct more 
resources to communities disproportionately harmed by pollution and 
other environmental threats.”602 Pursuant to Executive Order 2019-2, 
the Governor renamed the MDEQ as the Department of Environment, 
Great Lakes, and Energy (DEGLE or EGLE).603 She also created a new 
advisory body known as the Interagency Environmental Justice 
Response Team within DEGLE, consisting of members from different 
state agencies, the mission of which is to “act in an advisory capacity 
with the goal of assuring that all Michigan residents benefit from the 
same protections from environmental hazards.”604 This executive 
order also established an Office of the Great Lakes (OGL) within 
EGLE, which would assume the responsibilities of the prior OGL of 
the MDNR/MDEQ.605 MDNR’s OGL had previously been created 
under NREPA § 32903.606 
 
director-surprises-support-whitmer-deq-fight [https://perma.cc/4GTH-Z9LT] (“The 
former 20-year BP oil and gas company executive took the stand that bucked the state 
Republican establishment and the Michigan Chamber of Commerce by writing a 
letter . . . to House legislators asking them not to support a resolution to overturn 
Whitmer’s executive order.”). 
 602. Jim Malewitz, Gretchen Whitmer Reshapes Michigan Environmental 
Watchdog Agency, BRIDGE (Feb. 4, 2019), https://www.bridgemi.com/michigan-
environment-watch/gretchen-whitmer-reshapes-michigan-environmental-watchdog-
agency [https://perma.cc/87VX-3RS3]. 
 603. See Mich. Exec. Order No. 2019-02 § 1(a) (Feb. 4, 2019).  
 604. See The American Environmental Justice Movement, INTERNET 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY, https://www.iep.utm.edu/enviro-j/ 
[https://perma.cc/MUB7-RCJ4] (last visited Oct. 30, 2019) (“Although 
environmentalism and the environmental justice movement are related, there is a 
difference. Environmentalism is concerned with humanity’s adverse impact upon the 
environment, but proponents are primarily concerned with the impact of an unhealthy 
environment thrust upon a collective body of life, entailing both human and non-
human existence, including in some instances plant life. The efforts of the 
environmental justice movement differ from those of the environmentalist movement 
in that, at the heart of environmental injustice, there are issues of racism and socio-
economic injustice.”); see also Mich. Exec. Order No. 2019-02 §§ 1(b)(1), (4) (Feb. 
4, 2019) (emphasis added).  
 605. See id. Mich. Exec. Order No. 2019-02 § 1(e) (establishing that the 
DEGLE “shall exercise the authorities, powers, duties, functions, and responsibilities 
transferred from the former Office of the Great Lakes to the [DEGLE] under section 
6(a) of this order”); see also § 6(a) (explaining that the new OGL would assume the 
responsibilities and authorities of the prior OGL of the MDNR, which was abolished). 
 606. See MICH. COMP. LAWS § 324.32903 (1994); see also Mich. Exec. Order 
2011-1 § IV.C.2 (Jan. 4, 2011) (describing that MDNR’s OGL had been 
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Historically speaking, the Michigan Legislature had created the 
OGL in the Great Lakes Protection Act (Act 128) of 1985 that was 
repealed in 1995 following the enactment of NREPA.607 NREPA 
established the OGL as “the lead agency within state government for 
the development of policies, programs, and procedures to protect, 
enhance, and manage the Great Lakes.”608 OGL’s mission inter alia 
was  
to implement an ecosystem approach to this state’s Great Lakes 
policies[,] . . . [p]rovide representation at the national level for this state’s 
Great Lakes interests[,] . . . [r]epresent th[e] state before Great Lakes policy 
development bodies such as the international joint commission[, 
and] . . . [a]dvocate the interests of this state in actions, policies, and 
legislation affecting the Great Lakes proposed in other Great Lakes states, 
Canadian provinces, Great Lakes policy development bodies, and the 
federal government.609 
Michigan’s Republican-dominated House quickly voted on 
February 6, 2019, to reject Executive Order 2019-2.610 The 
Republicans apparently were angry that said Order had abolished the 
Environmental Permit Review Commission that the Legislature had 
just previously directed MDEQ to establish in June 2018 pursuant to 
Public Act No. 268.611 These politicians did not appear to have a 
problem with Whitmer restructuring the executive agencies or the 
impact such restructuring would have on the regulated community, so 
long as the “industry-dominated panels that would review 
environmental rules and permit decisions under a law passed by the 
GOP-controlled Legislature and signed by then-Gov. Rick Snyder just 
last year” would have survived.612 According to the Republicans, the 
issue was essentially one of separation of powers, and they accused 
Whitmer of eliminating the panels created by the legislature via 
 
“subsequently transferred to the [MDEQ] by Executive Order 1995-18, MCL 
324.99903, and transferred by Type I transfer to the [MDNR] by Executive Order by 
Executive Order 2009-45,” and then transferred back to MDEQ by Type 1 transfer 
per Executive Order No. 2011-1).  
 607. MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 323.31–.41 (1985). 
 608. § 324.32903 (emphasis added). 
 609. § 324.32903(a)–(c), (g) (emphasis added). 
 610. Paul Egan, House Votes to Reject Whitmer’s Environmental Executive 
Order, FREEP (Feb. 6, 2019), https://www.freep.com/story/news/local/michigan/ 
2019/02/06/gretchen-whitmer-executive-order-michigan-deq/2792427002/ [https:// 
perma.cc/2S3D-L4HR]. 
 611. See 2018 Mich. Pub. Acts No. 1377 § 1301; MICH. COMP. LAWS § 
324.1313 (2019); see also Mich. Exec. Order No. 2019-02 § 4(a)(2); Egan, supra note 
610. 
 612. Egan, supra note 610.  
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executive order as “an ‘abuse of power’ and an ‘after-the-fact veto.’”613 
What the legislature did not reveal, however, was that the 
environmental permit panel established by former Governor Snyder 
pursuant to Act 268 had the authority, in a contested case, to overrule 
a final adverse permit decision or order made by an administrative law 
judge supporting the MDEQ Director.614  
On February 14, 2019, Michigan’s Republican-controlled 
Senate also voted to reject Whitmer Executive Order 2019-2 on the 
same grounds.615 Senate Majority Leader Mike Shirkey was quoted as 
saying that Whitmer’s order “went ‘a step too far’ by eliminating 
business-friendly panels the Legislature created last year to oversee 
environmental rules and permit applications.”616 He also “invited 
Whitmer to draft another executive order to reorganize the 
environmental department” provided she clarified “‘the ‘undefined 
conceptual idea of environmental justice’ in the rejected version.”617  
3. The Apparent Hypocrisy (and Expediency) of Michigan’s 
Republican Legislators 
Clearly, many of the members of Michigan’s Republican-led 
Legislature had previously been unconcerned that the last MDEQ 
Director was a former BP America, Inc., executive and lobbyist well-
versed in the European notion of “sustainability/SD” and international 
regulatory law concepts such as the European precautionary 
principle.618 Perhaps they, their legislative directors, and their chiefs of 
 
 613. Beth LeBlanc & Jonathan Oosting, Republicans Fume as House Votes to 
Reject Whitmer’s Environmental Order, THE DET. NEWS (Feb. 6, 2019), 
https://www.detroitnews.com/story/news/local/michigan/2019/02/06/legislature-
challenge-whitmer-order-nixed-environmental-panels/2787952002/ [https://perma. 
cc/LG8U-99L3]. 
 614. See 2018 Mich. Pub. Acts No. 268 § 1317(1), (4), at 1381–82. 
 615. See Paul Egan & Kathleen Gray, Legislature Votes to Reject Whitmer’s 
Environmental Executive Order, FREEP (Feb. 14, 2019), https://www.freep.com/story/ 
news/local/michigan/2019/02/14/gretchen-whitmer-environmental-executive-
order/2869421002/ [https://perma.cc/R6X3-VL5G].  
 616. Jonathan Oosting, Republicans Reject Whitmer Environmental Order in 
Rare Move, THE DET. NEWS (Feb. 14, 2019), https://www.detroitnews.com/story/ 
news/local/michigan/2019/02/14/michigan-senate-panel-votes-down-whitmer-
environment/2868809002/ [https://perma.cc/W3WW-H5L8].  
 617. Id.  
 618. See Greene, supra note 601 (quoting Heidi Grether in effectively stating 
an oxymoron—a healthy and sustainable environment is attractive to business: “I call 
on Gov. Whitmer to work closely with our legislative leaders to make Michigan both 
a great place to raise our families in a healthy and sustainable environment and 
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staff had been unaware of the economic harm the European 
precautionary principle has long caused European and third country 
industries? Perhaps they, their legislative directors, and their chiefs of 
staff had been unaware that the European precautionary principle has 
slowly but steadily been rising to the level of customary international 
law in the face of an inconsistent, if not tepid, U.S. government-
expressed protest/opposition to said nostrum in domestic and 
international fora?619 Perhaps they, their legislative directors, and their 
chiefs of staff had been unaware of the enlargement of the Office of 
the Great Lakes (OGL) and of Michigan’s ongoing and increased 
involvement in a number of Canada–U.S. water quality treaties that 
incorporate the European precautionary principle and ecosystem-
based management, which Michigan must now implement and enforce 
in-state as a treaty signatory party and/or as a USEPA delegatee? 
Clearly, the failure of these moderate Republicans to publicly 
acknowledge these significant issues engendering the influence of 
international (European) environmental law upon Michigan domestic 
environmental law was not due to mere oversight.620 
 
attractive to business development”). Such standards focus on the uncertainties 
surrounding possible environmental hazards rather than on known or knowable 
probable environmental risks and thereby reduce the scientific evidentiary threshold 
for the government to allege possible environmental harm and regulatory violations 
from direct causal evidence of harm to circumstantial weight-of-the-evidence, reverse 
the burden of proof (production and persuasion) from the government to show harm 
to economic actors to show no harm, and impose strict liability-based statutory 
penalties upon economic actors even in the absence of environmental harm as a 
deterrent “to ensure compliance.” See discussion infra.  
 619. See Lawrence A. Kogan, EU Regulation, Standardization and the 
Precautionary Principle: The Art of Crafting a Three-Dimensional Trade Strategy 
That Ignores Sound Science, NAT’L FOREIGN TRADE COUNCIL, INC. 57–61 (Aug. 
2003).  
 620. Indeed, it is highly unlikely these officials had been unaware that Jon W. 
Allen, who currently serves as an At-Large Member of the International Joint 
Commission (IJC)’s Great Lakes Water Quality Board (which advises Canada and the 
United States regarding their compliance with the GLWQA), had previously served 
during the Snyder administration as the former director of the OGL and former 
Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Great Lakes Commission (GLC). See 
International Joint Commission Great Lakes Water Quality Board, Members, at 
https://www.ijc.org/en/wqb/who/members; State of Michigan, Former Governors, 
Governor Names Jon Allen to Lead Michigan Office of Great Lakes (Oct. 2, 2012), at 
https://www.michigan.gov/formergovernors/0,4584,7-212-96477_90815_57657-
287370--,00.html. It also is highly unlikely these officials had been unaware that the 
OGL and GLC had been and remain significantly involved in the IJC. See Mary Ellen 
Geist, New Leadership for the Great Lakes in 2018 – But 2017 Brought “A Massive 
Loss of Expertise and Passion”, Great Lakes Now (Feb. 6, 2018), at 
https://www.greatlakesnow.org/2018/02/new-leadership-for-the-great-lakes-in-2018; 
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Arguably, the lack of concern expressed by many of Michigan’s 
Republican legislators regarding these issues was inconsistent with the 
subject matter that revised §§ 1307(6)(a)–(d) of recently enacted PA 
631 addresses. These newly revised provisions direct the MDEQ 
Director, in denying a permit application, to ensure that his/her 
decision “is based on specifically cited provisions of this Act or rules 
promulgated under [it],” “is based upon sufficient facts or data, which 
are recorded in the file,” “is the product of reliable scientific principles 
and methods,” “has applied the [scientific] principles and methods 
reliably to the facts,” and “[i]n the case of denial of an application for 
a permit under part 301 or 303” has provided “suggestions on changes 
to allow the permit to be approved,” which suggestions also arguably 
require the use of reliable scientific principles and methods.621 While 
such terminology had been replicated from other NREPA provisions, 
it remained inapplicable to NREPA Parts 301 and 303-related permit 
decisions until MCL § 324.1307’s 2019 revision.622 Nevertheless, as 
the result of these requirements not having been defined in NREPA, 
members of the regulated community had previously been left to look 
to state caselaw623 and even federal caselaw for guidance concerning 
how Michigan state courts would define those terms for evidentiary 
purposes.624  
 
see also Great Lakes Commission Annual Meeting (Oct. 2-3, 2018) (at Great Lakes 
Commission 2018 Semiannual Meeting Draft Meeting Minutes (March 6-7, 2018) at 
1, 3; Great Lakes Commission Board of Directors Conference Call Minutes (Feb. 15, 
2018), at 1; Great Lakes Commission Board of Directors In Person Meeting Minutes 
(June 5, 2018), at 1; Great Lakes Commission, Strategic Plan for the Great Lakes 
Commission 2017–2022 (adopted Jan. 2017), at 2, 8, 18). Furthermore, it is highly 
unlikely these officials had been unaware that the OGL, during the Snyder 
administration, had authored the “Michigan State of the Great Lakes” annual reports 
calling for internationally coordinated water resources management. See, e.g., 
Michigan Office of the Great Lakes, Department of Environmental Quality, Michigan 
State of the Great Lakes 2013, at Inside Cover, 4–7, 17, 21–22; Michigan Office of 
the Great Lakes, Department of Natural Resources, Michigan State of the Great Lakes 
2018 Report, at 1–3, 5.  
 621. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 324.1307(6)(a)–(d) (2019). 
 622. See § 324.35317(2)(a)–(d).  
 623. See, e.g., Dep’t of Envtl. Quality v. Morley, No. 323019, slip op. at 3–5 
(Mich. Ct. App. Dec. 15, 2015); Anglers of the Ausable, Inc. v. Dep’t of Envtl. 
Quality, No. 279301, slip op. at 18–19 (Mich. Ct. App. Mar. 31, 2009); Dep’t of Envtl. 
Quality v. Waterous Co., No. 272968, slip op. at 20–22 (Mich. Ct. App. Apr. 15, 
2008). 
 624. Because Michigan Rule of Evidence 702(2)–(3) (used to evaluate the 
admissibility of expert testimony, see MICH. R. EVID. 702) had since July 2003 served 
as an analogue of Federal Rule of Evidence 702(c)–(d) (see FED. R. EVID. 702(c)–(d)), 
the regulated community also could have consulted federal law to define such 
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Did these Republican officials intentionally fail to grasp the 
magnitude of this apparent inconsistency?625 Did they intentionally fail 
to recognize the long divergent views held by the United States and 
the European Union governments (at least, until the Obama 
administration) toward the role of science in assessing and managing 
public health and environmental risks?626 Or were these failures 
 
terminology. See Amendment of Rule 702 of the Michigan Rules of Evidence, ICLE 
(July 22, 2003), https://www.icle.org/contentfiles/milawnews/Rules/MRE/2001-
29_07-22-03_or.html [https://perma.cc/8U5H-V4B3] (“Staff Comment: The July 22, 
2003, amendment of MRE 702, effective January 1, 2004, conforms the Michigan 
rule to Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, as amended effective December 1, 
2000, except that the Michigan rule retains the words ‘the court determines that’ after 
the word ‘If’ at the outset of the rule. The new language requires trial judges to act as 
gatekeepers who must exclude unreliable expert testimony. See Daubert v Merrell 
Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc, 509 U.S. 579; 113 S. Ct. 2786; 125 L Ed 2d 469 (1993), 
and Kumho Tire Co, Ltd v Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137; 119 S. Ct. 1167; 143 L Ed 2d 
238 (1999). The retained words emphasize the centrality of the court’s gatekeeping 
role in excluding unproven expert theories and methodologies from jury 
consideration.”).  
 625. In other words, did they “sell out” the constitutionally protected private 
property rights of their constituents for personal pecuniary gain? 
 626. See Lawrence A. Kogan, The Precautionary Principle and WTO Law: 
Divergent Views Toward the Role of Science in Assessing and Managing Risk, SETON 
HALL J. OF DIPL. & INT’L REL. 77, 102–03 (2004) (“The prevailing view within Europe 
is to take a ‘better safe than sorry’ or precautionary approach to assessing and 
managing a growing number of possible but uncertain health and environmental 
hazards. According to this view, conventional scientific risk assessment should serve 
only a minimal function. There is a widespread belief that risk assessment, as an 
empirical process, reflects only the current state of limited human scientific 
knowledge—it cannot account for the uncertainties surrounding most human 
activities. As a result, it is argued that risk managers should focus instead on 
evaluating and addressing systemic hazards posed by products’ inherently dangerous 
characteristics categorized into risk profiles. Accordingly, where the possibility for 
significant irreversible harm is great, a lack of scientific certainty as to cause and 
effect, likelihood of occurrence or timing, or of actual evidence of harm, regulators 
should not be precluded from taking precautionary measures to prevent the harm from 
materializing in the first place. EU regulators argue that their aversion to risk is 
necessary to ensure a high level of health and environmental protection, even if it 
imposes a considerable legal, economic, and social burden on industry (foreign as 
well as domestic) and developing country governments. The prevailing U.S. 
regulatory view and practice, with certain limited exceptions, [was] to identify and 
evaluate health and environmental risks on a case-by-case basis, depending on their 
probability of occurrence and the likelihood that they may inflict serious actual harm. 
This is accomplished by means of an empirically driven and objective ‘science-based’ 
risk assessment that is performed with respect to a particular product or substance (not 
process). The risk assessment identifies the nature and significance of the particular 
risk, the magnitude and severity of known and/or uncertain potential harm, the degree 
and certainty of human exposure to such harm, and the vulnerability of the various 
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instead attributable to and motivated by political expediency and 
hypocrisy?  
B. Michigan’s Special Clean Water Act Domestic Status Protecting 
Wetlands  
The primary source of authority for NREPA’s sweeping 
wetlands (and consequently, inland streams, soil erosion and 
sedimentation control, and floodplain) provisions is the Michigan 
Legislature-passed Geomare-Anderson Wetlands Protection Act (PA 
203) of 1979.627 As former MCL § 281.702(1)(a) and former MCL § 
324.30302(1)(a) (NREPA, repealed by Act 98 of 2013) had previously 
stated the “[Michigan] legislature finds that: (a) [w]etland 
conservation is a matter of state concern since a wetland of 1 county 
may be affected by acts on a river, lake, stream, or wetland of other 
counties.”628 In fact, as early as 1973, the State of Michigan had 
already secured authority from the USEPA to administer the Federal 
Water Pollution Control Act Section 304(h)(2) (i.e., CWA) State 
Program Guidelines governing the National Pollution Discharge 
Elimination System point-source pollution permitting regime.629  
Michigan first obtained the legal authority to administer the 
federal CWA § 404(g) state-administered CWA § 404 wetland 
protection program (i.e., to regulate the discharge of dredged or fill 
material into “waters of the United States” within the state) on October 
16, 1984, when the state executed a Memorandum of Agreement with 
 
groups so exposed. Where there are profound uncertainties as to any of these factors, 
estimates and assumptions (safety factors) are employed that incorporate an 
appropriate degree of precaution. Additional margins of safety are also employed, if 
necessary, at the risk management stage through the selection of suitable frameworks. 
In most cases, health and environmental regulations are then subject to an economic 
cost/benefit analysis to determine whether the chosen approach maximizes net social, 
economic and environmental benefits.”).  
 627. See State and Federal Wetlands Regulations, EGLE, 
https://www.michigan.gov/deq/0,4561,7-135-3313_3687-10801--,00.html 
[https://perma.cc/S8AR-8NQR] (last visited Oct. 30, 2019) (noting that the Geomare-
Anderson Wetlands Protection Act (PA 203) of 1979 is now part of NREPA Part 303, 
formerly MICH. COMP. LAWS § 281.701 (1995)). 
 628. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 324.30302(1)(a) (1995) (repealed by Act 98 of 
2013).  
 629. See Memorandum from EPA on Agreement Between the Mich. Water 
Res. Comm’n and EPA (Dec. 9, 1978) (one file with the EPA). 
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the USEPA.630 The previously approved Michigan wetlands protection 
regulatory program incorporated seven state environmental laws.631 
These included inter alia the Goemaere-Anderson Wetland Protection 
Act plus the State Administrative Procedures Act and Freedom of 
Information Act, the Michigan Environmental Protection Act, and two 
federal Memorandums of Agreement—one with USEPA and one with 
the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (Corps).632 Michigan was actually 
the first state, and it remains only one of two states (New Jersey is the 
other state), authorized by USEPA to administer federal CWA § 404 
under CWA § 404(g).633 The CWA § 404 assumption program 
administered by USEPA vests the State of Michigan, rather than the 
Corps, with full state control over CWA § 404 dredge-and-fill 
permitting decisions.634 The Corps otherwise maintains jurisdiction 
and control over traditionally navigable waterways used to transport 
interstate or foreign commerce under § 10 of the Rivers and Harbors 
Act.635 “Where a state 404 Program is approved by the EPA, the Corps 
of Engineers suspends processing of 404 permits everywhere except 
Section 10 waters.”636  
 
 630. Michigan Department of Natural Resources Section 404 Permit Program 
Approval, Fed. Reg. 38,927, 38,947–38,948 (Oct. 2, 1984) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. 
pt. 233).  
 631. See id. at 38,948. 
 632. See id.  
 633. See ASSOC. OF STATE WETLAND MANAGERS, EXPANDING THE STATES’ 
ROLE IN IMPLEMENTING CWA § 404 ASSUMPTION 1 (2010). 
 634. See id. In Menomineee Indian Tribe of Wisconsin v. Environmental 
Protection Agency and United States Army Corps of Engineers, No. 19-1130 (7th Cir. 
2020), the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals recognized the sanctity of MDEQ’s 
decision to process and grant a third party’s revised CWA § 404 permit application to 
open and operate a mine in Michigan alongside the Menominee River in close 
proximity to Wisconsin’s northeast border, pursuant to Michigan’s assumption of 
CWA § 404 permitting (“waiver”) authority. In affirming the district court’s ruling, 
the Circuit Court held that the decision of the USEPA not to object to said revised 
permit application as set forth in an informational letter addressing the concerns of the 
Menomineee Indian Tribe of Wisconsin constituted a decision committed to the 
discretion of the agency within the meaning of § 701 of the federal Administrative 
Procedure Act (5 U.S.C. § 701), rather than an appealable final agency action. See 
Slip op. at 2–3, 7–14. In a concurring opinion, Circuit Judge Hamilton recommended 
that the Tribes could still petition the USEPA to reassume federal permitting authority 
over that portion of the river if and when the State of Michigan seeks to amend 
NREPA, as had occurred in 2013 when a state official petitioned the USEPA to review 
the State’s decision to amend NREPA via Act 98. See Slip op. at 18–19; see also infra 
note 733. 
 635. See id. at 12–13. 
 636. Id. at 2, 5–6 (describing how New Jersey became the second state to 
assume the CWA § 404 program in 1994).  
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C. Michigan’s Strict Wetland Regulations Entail Equally Stringent 
Inland Streams, Soil Erosion and Sedimentation Control, and 
Floodplain Regulations Consistent with Clean Water Act, Great 
Lakes Water Quality Agreement, and Western Lake Erie Basin 
Collaborative Agreement 
It bears repeating that the Michigan legislature had previously 
found that wetland conservation is a matter of state concern “since a 
wetland of 1 county may be affected by acts on a river, lake, stream, 
or wetland of other counties.”637 The Michigan legislature’s holistic 
view of strict wetlands regulation has resulted in the imposition of 
equally strict inland streams, soil erosion and sedimentation control, 
and floodplain regulations. This is clearly reflected in Michigan’s 
2016 IR, discussed above, which betrays the state’s implementation of 
these NREPA provisions consistent with the European precautionary 
principle and ecosystem-based management of Great Lake 
environmental stewardship. 
1. Wetlands—NREPA Part 303638 
The 2016 IR emphasized how Michigan had taken “direct 
legislative action to regulate and minimize wetland losses” to ensure 
that permits are required for all wetland alterations and to ensure that 
penalties are imposed for illegal wetland alterations.639 The 2016 IR 
also defined “regulated wetlands as those wetlands contiguous to the 
Great Lakes, . . . an inland lake, pond, river, or stream; and 
noncontiguous wetlands greater than five acres in size.”640 The 2016 
IR identified that “[t]he state also has the authority to regulate any 
noncontiguous wetlands that are determined to be essential to the 
preservation of the natural resources of the state once the landowner 
has been notified.”641 Furthermore, the 2016 IR stated that 
“Michigan’s regulatory program generally requires mitigation for all 
wetland impacts, although the MDEQ staff may waive this 
requirement for projects impacting less than one-third acre if no 
reasonably opportunity for mitigation exists.”642 
 
 637. § 324.30302(1)(a) (emphasis added).  
 638. See § 324.30301.  
 639. WATER QUALITY AND POLLUTION CONTROL IN MICHIGAN 2016 SECTIONS 
303(D), 305(B), AND 314 INTEGRATED REPORT, supra note 435, at 24–25. 
 640. Id. at 25. 
 641. Id. 
 642. Id. 
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2. Inland Lakes and Streams—NREPA Part 301643 
The 2016 IR noted how MDEQ’s Inland Lakes and Streams 
Program “is responsible for the protection of the natural resources and 
the public trust waters of the inland lakes and streams of the state,” 
including adjacent wetlands. In addition, it explained that said 
program oversees and regulates via permitting “activities including 
dredging, filling, constructing or placement of a structure on 
bottomlands [e.g., fishing platforms], constructing a marina, 
interfering with natural flow of water [e.g., installation of concrete 
retaining wall], and connecting a natural or artificially created 
waterway to an inland lake or stream”—e.g., constructed ditches via 
culverts.644 However, cantilevered fishing platforms, depending on 
where their footings are anchored, may or may not be deemed to be 
constructed on bottomlands. Part 301 also requires permits to be 
obtained prior to erecting cantilevered structures if they extend beyond 
the “bulkhead line.”645 The bulkhead line is defined as “a line that is 
established pursuant to this part beyond which dredging, filling, or 
construction of any kind is not allowed without a permit.”646 An 
exemption to this permitting obligation may, nevertheless, be secured 
by Federal Energy Regulatory Commission-licensed hydroelectric 
dam operators during the period of FERC-overseen temporary 
drawdowns of dam impoundments/reservoirs for purposes of 
conducting necessary dam repair work.647  
 
 643. § 324.30101. 
 644. Overview, EGLE, https://www.michigan.gov/egle/0,9429,7-135-
3313_3681_28734-84615--,00.html [https://perma.cc/VFM6-VBN4] (last visited 
Oct. 30, 2019); see also § 324.30102(1)(a) (prohibiting the dredging or filling of 
bottomland without a permit); § 324.30102(1)(b) (prohibiting the construction, 
enlargement, extension, removal or placement of a structure on bottomland); § 
324.30101(a) (defining the term “bottomland” as “the land area of an inland lake or 
stream that lies below the ordinary high water mark and that may or may not be 
covered by water”).  
 645. § 324.30101(b). 
 646. See id. (emphasis added). Arguably, MDEQ must establish a “bulkhead 
line” in accordance with the proper process and procedure as if a permit application 
has been filed, thereby providing for public notice and hearings and for local 
requirements. See §§ 324.30108, 324.30104(1), 324.30105 (establishing requirements 
for a permit and discussing public notice). 
 647. See § 324.30103(1)(n) (amended by 2013 Mich. Pub. Acts No. 98). This 
exemption is subject to certain conditions. For example, the FERC licensee must have 
“consulted [the] state during the drawdown plan development and [the] state’s 
concerns [must] have been addressed in the drawdown plan as FERC considers 
appropriate.” § 324.30103(1)(n)(i). In addition, the FERC licensee must have ensured 
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3. Floodplains—NREPA Part 31648 
NREPA Part 31 endeavors to keep development occurring 
within the 100-year floodplain reasonably safe from flooding and from 
increasing the potential for flood damage.649 It imposes a permitting 
obligation prior to undertaking any alteration (e.g., filling or grading) 
or any occupation of (e.g., storage in/on) the 100-year floodplain of a 
river, stream, or drain, no matter how temporarily (in terms of 
duration) the floodplain may remain occupied.650 The floodplain 
consists both of a floodway and a floodway fringe.651 Floodways are 
the channels of rivers or streams and those portions of the floodplain 
adjoining the channel “which are reasonably required to carry and 
discharge the 100-year flood.”652 They are the “high hazard areas of 
rapidly moving water during times of flood” that “carr[y] most of the 
flow during a flood event.”653 By comparison, floodway fringes are 
“area[s] of very slow moving water or ‘slack water.’”654 
4. Soil Erosion and Sedimentation Control—NREPA Part 91655 
Michigan’s 2015 Nonpoint Source Program indicated how 
NREPA’s soil erosion and sedimentation control permit program “is 
administered under the authority of [NREPA] Part 91,” which 
“provides for the control of erosion and prevention of off-site 
sedimentation from earth change activities.”656 It also noted how Part 
91 “is administered and enforced by state, county, and municipal 
agencies with oversight by the MDEQ.”657 Soil erosion and 
sedimentation can serve to impair the water quality of Michigan water 
bodies such that it may fail to meet state water quality standards or fail 
to fulfill its designated use(s). In the event a Michigan water body fails 
 
that “[a]dverse environmental impacts, including stream flow, aquatic resources, and 
timing, have been minimized to the extent practical.” § 324.30103(1)(n)(ii). 
 648. See §§ 324.3104, 324.3108. 
 649. See Floodplains, EGLE, https://www.michigan.gov/egle/0,9429,7-135-
3313_3684_3725-11255--,00.html [https://perma.cc/WGP3-GFSH] (last visited Oct. 
30, 2019). 
 650. See id.; see also § 324.3108(1) (explaining unlawful use of land). 
 651. See Floodplains, supra note 649. 
 652. Id. 
 653. Id. 
 654. Id. 
 655. See § 324.9101.  
 656. MICH. DEP’T OF ENVTL. QUALITY WATER RES. DIV., MICHIGAN’S 
NONPOINT SOURCE PROGRAM PLAN 83, 84 (2015) (emphasis added).  
 657. Id. at 84. 
 The Europeanization of the Great Lakes States 799 
to attain “one or more designated uses” or fails to meet state water 
quality standards, it shall be “placed on Michigan’s nonattainment list 
and reported to the USEPA” as CWA § 303(d) requires.658 Thus, Part 
91 requires “[a] landowner or designated agent who contracts for, 
allows, or engages in, an earth change” in the State of Michigan to 
secure a permit “before commencing an earth change which disturbs 
1 or more acres of land or which is within 500 feet of the water’s edge 
of a lake or stream, unless exempted in R323.1705.”659  
5. Nonpoint Source Pollution—Stormwater Discharges of 
Pollutants (Including Soil, Rocks, Gravel)—NREPA Part 
31660  
NREPA Part 31 governs the designated uses of Michigan’s 
surface waters, which “shall be protected for all of the following uses: 
agriculture, navigation, industrial water supply, fish consumption, 
warmwater fisheries, other aquatic life and wildlife, and partial body 
contact recreation.”661 “In addition, all waters of the state are 
designated for, and shall be protected for, total body contact recreation 
from May 1 to October 31.”662  
The objective of MDEQ’s nonpoint source program “is to 
protect high-quality waters and restore waters impaired by [NPS] 
pollution” by focusing on developing and implementing watershed 
management plans.663 Aside from nonpoint source pollutants such as 
nutrients (e.g., total phosphorous, nitrogen, etc.), the state’s NPS 
program also focuses on protecting state waters from excessive 
inundation of rock, sand, sediment, and dredged spoil,664 which the 
CWA includes within the definition of “pollutants.”665 According to 
the MDEQ, “nonpoint source (NPS) pollutants encompass a diverse 
range of substances varying from natural compounds, such as 
sediment, to commercially produced chemical pesticides.”666 
 
 658. Id. at 7. 
 659. MICH. ADMIN. CODE r. 323.17041(1) (1998).  
 660. See MICHIGAN’S NONPOINT SOURCE PROGRAM PLAN, supra note 656, at 
28. 
 661. Id. at 7.  
 662. Id.  
 663. MICH. DEP’T OF ENVTL. QUALITY WATER RES. DIV., NONPOINT SOURCE 
PROGRAM: MEASURES OF SUCCESS 1 (2018).  
 664. See id. at 7, 8, 10.  
 665. Navigation and Navigable Waters, 33 U.S.C § 1362 (2012).  
 666. MICHIGAN’S NONPOINT SOURCE PROGRAM PLAN, supra note 656, at 1. 
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Thus, Part 31 requires any person to obtain a “notice of 
coverage . . . before the startup of construction for any storm water 
discharge from a site of construction activity disturbing 5 acres or 
more.”667 A “construction activity” is defined as  
a man-made earth change or disturbance in the existing cover or topography 
of land for which a national permit is required pursuant to the provisions of 
40 C.F.R. §122.26(a) (2000) and which is any of the following: (i) Five 
acres or more in size . . . ; (ii) One acre or more in size and defined as a 
small construction activity . . . ; (iii) Less than 1 acre of total land area that 
is part of a larger common plan of development or sale if the larger common 
plan will ultimately disturb 1 acre or more. The term includes clearing, 
grading, and excavating activities.668  
Part 31 also requires a deemed authorized holder of a national 
wastewater discharge permit to secure a “certified storm water 
operator” for purposes of administering soil erosion control measures, 
to cause a “certified storm water operator” to inspect the small 
construction activities “once per week[] and within 24 hours after 
every precipitation event that results in a discharge from the site, and 
[to] ensure that any needed corrective actions are carried out.”669 Part 
31 nevertheless provides an exception to the notice of coverage filing 
requirement, but not to the certified stormwater operator and reporting 
obligations, for small construction activities—i.e., “1 to 5 acres of 
disturbed soil as defined in 40 C.F.R. §122.26(b)(15).”670 
6. The Interrelationship Between NREPA, CWA, GLWQA, and 
WBLECA 
The clearest explanation of the relationship between these 
NREPA provisions, CWA §§ 404, 303(d), 305(b), and 314, and the 
GLWQA and WBLECA is contained in the public comments MDEQ 
received during its development of the 2016 IR and in the MDEQ’s 
responses thereto.671  
For example, the Alliance for the Great Lakes/Michigan League 
of Conservation Voters had asked MDEQ why it had improperly 
avoided “making a listing decision on nutrients and algae impairment 
of western Lake Erie and Saginaw Bay” on the grounds that it lacked 
 
 667. MICH. ADMIN. CODE r. 323.2161(1)(b) (2006).  
 668. MICH. ADMIN. CODE r. 323.2102(k) (2005). 
 669. MICH. ADMIN. CODE r. 323.2190(2)(d)–(e) (2006). 
 670. MICH. ADMIN. CODE r. 323.2190(1) (2006). 
 671. See generally WATER QUALITY AND POLLUTION CONTROL IN MICHIGAN 
2016 SECTIONS 303(D), 305(B), AND 314 INTEGRATED REPORT, supra note 435. 
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“sufficient information to determine whether designated uses are 
supported due to algae and nutrient pollution.”672 “Michigan’s failure 
to make an impairment determination for these areas is improper since 
Michigan is required to evaluate and list all waters failing to meet any 
applicable water quality standard.”673  
MDEQ responded that it, along with its sister agencies (MDNR 
and MDARD),  
believe[d] the best approach for solving the issues in western Lake Erie is 
through the collaborative process established under Annex 4 of the Great 
Lakes Water Quality Agreement and the Western Basin of Lake Erie 
Collaborative Agreement, as they afford a holistic, multi-jurisdictional 
perspective that is outside the scope of a TMDL process.674  
MDEQ also responded that it recognized that “a TMDL or other 
approach allowed by USEPA to address impaired waters under the 
CWA will be required unless designated uses are restored first.”675  
Similarly, the Bay County Environmental Affairs and 
Community Development Director had commented that “as in all 
previous IR’s, the Saginaw Bay is listed as Eutrophic, having a high 
nutrient load, yet . . . there still is no TMDL proposed to control 
nutrient loading into the Saginaw River and Bay.”676 “The MDEQ 
needs to include Saginaw Bay and western Lake Erie on the § 303(d) 
list of waters that do not support their designated uses and require the 
development of Total Maximum Daily Loads.”677 
MDEQ responded that “a eutrophic classification doesn’t 
necessarily imply impairment nor require a TMDL.”678 MDEQ also 
stated that recent Water Resources Division monitoring of  
beaches along Michigan’s shoreline of Lake Erie, combined with extensive 
satellite imagery of cyanobacteria blooms in Lake Erie available from the 
NOAA supports the addition of an impairment determination based on algae 
bloom impacts to Michigan’s Lake Erie waters. Michigan is listing the 
Other Indigenous Aquatic Life and Wildlife designated use as Not 
Supporting (Category 5) for open and shoreline waters of the Michigan 
portion Lake Erie based on nuisance conditions related to nutrient 
expression.679  
 
 672. Id. at 106.  
 673. Id.  
 674. Id.  
 675. Id. 
 676. Id. at 109.  
 677. Id. 
 678. Id. 
 679. Id. at 109–10. 
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Nevertheless, MDEQ responded that it and its sister agencies believed 
that  
the best approach for solving the issues in western Lake Erie is through the 
collaborative process established under Annex 4 of the Great Lakes Water 
Quality Agreement and the Western Basin of Lake Erie Collaborative 
Agreement as they afford a holistic, multi-jurisdictional perspective that is 
outside the scope of a TMDL process.680  
MDEQ also similarly responded that it recognized that “a TMDL or 
other approach allowed by the USEPA to address impaired waters 
under the CWA will be required unless designated uses are restored 
first.”681 
7. NREPA Affords Landowners/Operators Little to No “Due 
Process of Law” in the Face of Unsubstantiated MDEQ 
Allegations  
In 2004, the Michigan Attorney General determined that “the 
exercise of any governmental authority will be subject to 
constitutional protections provided by the United States and Michigan 
Constitutions against arbitrary or unreasonable government action and 
the taking of property without just compensation.”682 The Michigan 
Attorney General issued this opinion approximately two years after 
the Michigan Court of Appeals issued its 2002 decision in Genesco, 
Inc. v. Michigan Department of Environmental Quality.683  
In Genesco, the court held that “the process due under the state 
and federal constitutions is flexible and satisfied as long as 
fundamental fairness is observed.”684 According to the court,  
 
 680. Id. at 110.  
 681. Id. It should be noted that while elements of MDEQ’s draft 2019 NPS 
Plan had identified how it would implement Michigan’s obligations under GLWQA 
Annex 4, it failed to identify how it would implement Michigan’s obligations under 
GLWQA Annex 2.c requiring the development of the Lake Huron Lakewide Action 
and Management Plan (LAMP). EGLE, NONPOINT SOURCE PROGRAM 319 APPROVED 
WATERSHED PLANS (2019). 
 682. See Mich. Dep’t of Att’y Gen., Opinion Letter on Regulation of Waters 
of the State (Sept. 23, 2004) (citing L.A. Darling Co. v. Water Res. Comm., 67 
N.W.2d 890, 897 (Mich. 1955)) (determining that an order of the Water Resources 
Commission failed to provide adequate due process under the Due Process Clauses of 
the United States and Michigan Constitutions, U.S. CONST. amend. XIV and MICH. 
CONST. art. II, § 16).  
 683. See generally Genesco, Inc. v. Mich. Dep’t of Envtl. Quality, 645 N.W.2d 
319 (Mich. Ct. App. 2002). 
 684. Id. at 326 (citing Dobrzenski v. Dobrzenski, 528 N.W.2d 827 (Mich. Ct. 
App. 1995)). 
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[f]undamental fairness is determined by “consideration of the private 
interest at stake, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through 
the procedures used, the probable value of additional or substitute 
procedures, and the state or government interest, including the function 
involved and the fiscal or administrative burdens imposed by substitute 
procedures.685  
In 2005, the Michigan Court of Appeals reaffirmed that under 
Michigan law “[t]he fundamental requisite of due process is the 
opportunity to be heard”686 and that “the concept of due process is 
flexible, ‘the essence of which is to ensure fundamental fairness.’”687 
The court held that “[p]rocedure in a particular case is constitutionally 
sufficient when there is notice of the nature of the proceedings and a 
meaningful opportunity to be heard by an impartial decision maker.”688 
In Genesco, the court determined, at the pre-enforcement review 
stage, that MDEQ’s issuance of a letter seeking additional information 
(i.e., a multifaceted work plan that inter alia would allow for remedial 
investigation) would enable the agency to determine the acceptability 
of Genesco’s plan to remediate a portion of White Lake in the city of 
Whitehall, Michigan, where it had long operated a tannery and owned 
the bottomlands.689 The court determined that MDEQ’s failure to 
approve or deny Genesco’s remediation plan qualified as a “response 
activity” not constituting a final agency decision subject to judicial 
review by the circuit court under NREPA Parts 17 and 201.690 
Consequently, the court held that the statute’s deferral of judicial 
review until after the MDEQ issued a final decision approving or 
denying Genesco’s remediation action plan did not deprive Genesco 
of due process of law.691 The court reasoned that the “private property 
interest at stake [was] small (the right to keep contaminated sediment 
at the bottom of White Lake), the risk of erroneous deprivation [was] 
correspondingly small, [and] substitute administrative procedures 
[were] available for Genesco to provide input to the MDEQ before 
approval of a remedial action plan.”692 In addition, the court reasoned 
 
 685. Id.   
 686. Dep’t of Envtl. Quality v. Conely, LC No. 338497, 2018 Mich. App. 
LEXIS 2261, at *5 (Mich. Ct. App. May 10, 2018) (citing Bullington v. Corbell, 809 
N.W.2d 657 (Mich. Ct. App. 2011)).  
 687. Id. (quoting Reed v. Reed, 693 N.W.2d 825 (Mich. Ct. App. 2011)). 
 688. Id.  
 689. See Genesco, Inc. v. Michigan Dep’t of Envtl. Quality, 645 N.W.2d 319, 
321, 326 (Mich. Ct. App. 2002).  
 690. Id. at 325–27. 
 691. Id. at 326. 
 692. Id. 
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that “judicial review [was available] after [MDEQ’s] response activity 
(albeit deferential and generally limited to the administrative record), 
and the interest of the government in promptly implementing a remedy 
for contaminated sites (the health, safety, and welfare of the public) 
[was] enormous.”693 
MDEQ’s monitoring and enforcement practices relating to other 
NREPA provisions, however, namely the strict liability regimes of 
NREPA Parts 31, 91, 301, and 303,694 arguably deny accused violators 
of their legal and equitable right to due process of law, which entails 
the right to receive notice and a hearing enabling their development of 
an adequate defense to NREPA violation allegations, to which they 
are constitutionally entitled.695 One prime example of this is MDEQ’s 
standard practice of presenting little, if any, of its own completed 
scientific evidence meeting federal floodplain and/or wetlands 
scientific standards and of then requiring the regulated community to 
retain costly third-party experts at their expense to perform the 
comprehensive scientific evaluations needed to refute and defend 
themselves in court (without the benefit of a prior administrative 
hearing) against MDEQ’s broad allegations of potential NREPA Part 
31 (floodplain) and 303 (wetlands) violations, which expert evidence 
it then ignores without reference to any “scientific” standard.696 This 
 
 693. Id. 
 694. See MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 324.3104, 324.3108, 324.9101, 
324.30101, 324.30301 (2019).  
 695. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332 (1976) (“Procedural due 
process imposes constraints on governmental decisions which deprive individuals of 
‘liberty’ or ‘property’ interests within the meaning of the Due Process clause of the 
Fifth or Fourteenth Amendment.”); Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 
339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950) (procedural due process requires defendants receive “notice 
reasonably calculated to under all the circumstances to apprise interested parties of 
the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their 
objections”); Morgan v. United States, 304 U.S. 1, 18 (1938) (“The right to a hearing 
embraces not only the right to present evidence but also a reasonable opportunity to 
know the claims of the opposing party and to meet them. The right to submit argument 
implies that opportunity; otherwise the right may be but a barren one.”). 
 696. In Michigan Department of Environmental Quality v. Boyce Hydro, LLC, 
MDEQ had not performed any scientific delineation of the established floodplain in 
Gladwin County, Michigan, into which the Tittabawassee River tailrace area of the 
Edenville Dam Site had allegedly fallen to support its 2010 allegations that Boyce had 
committed NREPA Part 31 floodplain violations on that portion of the site. MDEQ 
had relied, instead, upon what is essentially an administrative presumption of potential 
violation, and thus harm, based on the broad statutory language of Part 31, which 
imposes a permitting requirement on “[a]ny filling, any grading, any occupation 
within the 100-year floodplain of a river. . . . That’s literally what it says, ‘occupation,’ 
which is generally construction of some kind.” See Transcript of Deposition of Joy 
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would appear to be explained by, at least, one senior MDEQ official’s 
characterization of the terms “science” and “scientists” as postmodern 
colloquial terms.697 
 
Brooks (environmental engineer and floodplain manager) at 30:4-33:23, Mich. Dep’t 
of Envtl. Quality v. Boyce Hydro, LLC (Sept. 25, 2018) (No. 16-8538-CE). 
“Temporary fills, temporary obstructions [also] are regulated under Part 31. . . . There 
are no timelines in . . . the floodplain portion of Part 31.” Id. at 38:14-39:10. MDEQ 
also had relied upon an incomplete and then unpublished proposed FEMA floodplain 
map covering Gladwin County, Michigan, including the alleged floodplain violation 
area of the Edenville Dam site that Boyce itself had prepared under contract with 
Gladwin County. In fact, the Boyce-prepared FEMA Gladwin County floodplain map 
had only been preliminarily approved by FEMA during March 2015. Id. at 76:6-
82:10. Similarly, MDEQ had not performed a completed scientific wetland 
identification and delineation of the presence, size, and scope of the wetlands meeting 
the federal standards of the 1987 U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Wetland Delineation 
Manual to support its allegations that Boyce had committed NREPA Part 303 wetland 
violations on the eastern and western portions of the Edenville Dam Site. Rather, 
MDEQ had performed an ecological assessment describing the wetland functions 
presumed to have been lost. See Transcript of Deposition of Brian Rudolph, supra 
note 168, at 76:18-77:25. MDEQ had instead relied upon an administrative 
presumption of violation, and thus harm, based on the broad statutory language of Part 
303, which “presume[s] the need for protection. [T]herefore, we have a criteria for 
which permits have to be issued, and if you act outside of that by placing fill in a 
wetland, you’re in violation. . . . When you fill a wetland, regardless if it’s with dirt, 
regardless if it’s with granite, concrete, you place fill within a wetland, it is a regulated 
activity, it removes functions and values of the wetland, which is a negative impact.” 
See id. at 75:6-23. In fact, MDEQ uses the data from wetland data sheets not to 
document the presence or non-presence of a wetland but rather to “demonstrate[] the 
condition at each location from which it’s taken” “for the purpose of documenting the 
violation.” Id. at 82:13-22; 83:11-13. MDEQ, in effect, compelled Boyce to incur the 
cost of hiring its own wetlands experts/consultant(s) to evaluate and report the wetland 
status of the disputed areas, which expert analysis MDEQ then proceeded to ignore. 
Id.  
 697. See Transcript of Deposition of Brian Rudolph, supra note 168. 
Furthermore, MDEQ administratively presumes that any human disturbance of a 
portion of a site in question empowers MDEQ to bypass the 3-Parameter wetlands 
standard (soil, vegetation and hydrology) the 1987 U.S. Army Corps of Engineers 
Wetland Delineation Manual imposes in order to identify the presence or non-
presence of wetlands in the “disturbed” area. Rather than first perform onsite analyses, 
MDEQ instead administratively presumes there exists an “atypical situation” 
justifying its undertaking of an (off-site) reference site comparison of pristine 
wetlands to identify the pre-existence and extent of a wetland area in the “disturbed” 
portion of a site. It proceeds in this manner, even if the field representative can 
determine the presence of wetland soil, vegetation, and hydrology indicators showing 
the current presence of all 3 wetland parameters in that area of that site. Id. at 83:2-
6; 91:3-17; 92:15-93:14. This contravenes both the 1987 manual and its 2012 
northeast regional supplement, which authorize this “atypical situation” procedure 
only where none of the 3 parameters exhibits any definitive wetland indicators. Cf. 
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Wetlands Delineation Manual, Wetlands Research 
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Another prime example of this is MDEQ’s practice of seeking 
entry to private property based on tips or complaints (i.e., mere 
accusations) made anonymously by members of the public alleging 
that a potential NREPA violation has occurred on such property.698 
According to the Enforcement Unit Supervisor of MDEQ’s Water 
Resources Division, web-based anonymous tips or complaints also 
have served partially as the basis for applications the MDEQ 
enforcement unit has submitted to a magistrate to secure a civil 
administrative inspection warrant to enter private residential or 
business premises where the landowner or proprietor has refused to 
grant agency officials entry to their property.699 While there is no 
apparent requirement for MDEQ officials to undertake any minimal 
level of due diligence to substantiate the claims made in the 
anonymous tip or complaint or to disclose the sources supporting 
them, MDEQ investigators are likely to seek and secure publicly 
available materials, including web-based materials such as satellite 
imagery and photographs taken by members of the public, before 
seeking to secure such a warrant on putative probable cause 
grounds.700 
Since August 22, 2015, the official web-based platform or 
“online document management system”701 from which MDEQ 
officials have gathered anonymous tips and complaints has been the 
State’s MiWaters website.702 According to the District Supervisor for 
the MDEQ Water Resources Division of the Saginaw Bay District 
 
Program Technical Report Y-87-1 (Jan. 1987), at 73-74; U.S. Army Corps of 
Engineers, Regional Supplement to the Corps of Engineers Wetland Delineation 
Manual: Northcentral and Northeast Region (v.2.0) (Jan. 2012), at 114, 119, 128, 
137. In none of these three instances did MDEQ provide Boyce with notice and the 
opportunity to be heard at a science-based hearing to refute the allegations of NREPA 
violations. Instead, MDEQ directly proceeded to initiate an enforcement action 
relying instead upon Michigan court deference to executive agency interpretation of 
NREPA and MDEQ NREPA-implementing regulations. 
 698. See, e.g., Transcript of Deposition of Joy Brooks, supra note 696, at 14:8-
16:23.  
 699. See Transcript of Deposition of David Pingel at 89:5–8; 89:17; 89:25–
90:13, Mich. Dep’t of Envtl. Quality v. Boyce Hydro, LLC (June 29, 2018) (No. 16-
8538-CE), https://nebula.wsimg.com/edc5b77c05c4d2b585f92cc2d47e8271? 
AccessKeyId=7F494AADE6AF42D36823&disposition=0&alloworigin=1.  
 700. Id. at 90:14-91:3; 91:15-92:19; 93:16–25; 94:1–7; 95:4–8.  
 701. See Transcript of Deposition of Brian Rudolph, supra note 168, at 36:13–
21; 58:1–6. 
 702. See MiWaters – Water Resources Information and Forms, EGLE, 
https://miwaters.deq.state.mi.us/miwaters/external/home [https://perma.cc/ZC2W-
9BJS] (last visited Oct. 30, 2019).  
 The Europeanization of the Great Lakes States 807 
Office, any member of the public can submit via the MiWaters website 
pollution incidents (“tips”) or general complaints, by name or 
anonymously,703 regarding any potential “unauthorized activities in 
wetlands, lakes, or streams”704 (e.g., “incidents regarding dredge and 
fill or other construction activities within wetlands, lakes or streams 
or releases of substances to the aquatic environment”705 or “incidents 
regarding releases of substances to the aquatic environment”706). 
Presumably, this includes anonymous reporting to MDEQ of soil 
erosion and stormwater runoff about which a member of the public 
has become aware or has actually witnessed.707  
The general complaint form, for example, “requires minimal 
information regarding the incident or activity.”708 Thus, the amount of 
information provided in a given complaint varies widely.709 The first 
 
 703. See Transcript of Deposition of Brian Rudolph, supra note 168, at 37:19. 
 704. MiWaters – Water Resources Information and Forms, supra note 702. 
 705. See Complaint/Incident Description, Revision 1, Form Version 1.10, 
EGLE, https://miwaters.deq.state.mi.us/nform/app/?allowAnonymous=true#/ 
formversion/06eba8d6-01a2-4046-ad7a-34d304547bcc?FormTag=COMPLAINT, 
and https://miwaters.deq.state.mi.us/nform/app/?allowAnonymous=true#/ 
submissionwizard/ab32f68f-ae10-4573-9e78-24e5dffad8f1/0. (last visited Dec. 30, 
2019). 
 706. See Spill/Incident/Pollution, Revision 1, Form Version 2.5, EGLE, 
https://miwaters.deq.state.mi.us/nform/app/?allowAnonymous=true#/formversion/3
668646d-fe72-4a3a-935e 032b6eda83a6?FormTag=SPILL_INCIDENT 
_POLLUTION_REPORT_COMPLAINT, and 
https://miwaters.deq.state.mi.us/nform/app/?allowAnonymous=true#/ 
submissionwizard/3141f686-1dca-4394-9943-3ce4f64af90c/0 (last visited Dec. 30, 
2019). 
 707. See MiWaters – Water Resources Information and Forms, supra note 
702. The regulations of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers at the federal level similarly 
direct the Corps to encourage members of the public to report suspected violations 
without defining the phrase “suspected violation,” or the threshold of evidence 
required to establish a credible suspicion of violation. See 33 CFR § 326.3; see also 
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Sacramento District Website, Regulatory Enforcement 
– Reporting a Potential Unauthorized Activity, https://www.spk.usace.army.mil/ 
Missions/Regulatory/Enforcement/ (stating how “[t]he Corps heavily relies on the 
public to report unauthorized activities [and encouraging members of the public, i]f 
they suspect an unauthorized activity has occurred or is still underway . . . by 
completing the following form: Report Potential Unauthorized Activity Sheet[, 
which] form can be emailed to regulatory-info@usace.army.mil, faxed or mailed to 
[their] local district office or to the Sacramento District”) (emphasis added). The 
Corps Sacramento District Office, however, does not undertake a comparison of the 
regulatory phrase “suspected violation” and the phrase “potential unauthorized 
activities” contained in the title to the form to which it refers members of the public.  
 708. See id.  
 709. See Transcript of Deposition of Brian Rudolph, supra note 168, at 37:22–
38:3; 39:21, 40:15–19 (“I don’t think it’s a reasonable expectation to place on the 
808 Michigan State Law Review  2019 
section of the Complaint Form710 focuses on the description of the 
incident or activity.711 The next section focuses on the identity of the 
landowner and contractor who allegedly was responsible for the 
incident or activity.712 The third section focuses on the location of the 
waterbody and the property where the incident or activity is alleged to 
have occurred.713 The fourth section focuses on the identity or 
anonymity (“confidentiality”) of the complainant and the 
complainant’s contact information.714 The fifth section focuses on 
other information and related attachments the complainant provided, 
such as that relating to size and scope of the incident, the type of 
equipment used or observed, the apparent purpose of the activity, and 
any photographic or other evidence.715 The sixth and seventh sections 
of the Complaint Form focus, respectively, on reviewing and 
confirming all of the information previously submitted and on 
certifying the complaint as complete.716  
Once a public complaint has been submitted/transmitted to 
MDEQ, “it will become part of the public record.”717 MDEQ then 
reviews the complaint, and it is given an initial priority ranking of “no 
priority,” “low priority,” “moderate priority,” “high priority,” and 
“very high priority.” It is then assigned to a particular environmental 
quality analyst for investigation.718 The environmental quality analyst 
undertakes an investigation pursuant to MDEQ’s enforcement manual 
guidelines, which may entail an inspection of the property where the 
incident or activity had been reported to have occurred. Prior to an 
inspection, the environmental quality analyst will conduct research 
and gather resources such as aerial photographs, wetland maps, etc.719 
If an incident of alleged violation has been identified as a “priority” 
 
public to know what level of information they have to provide us. It’s our – the onus 
is on us to determine whether we’re going to respond and at what level we’re going 
to respond.”).  
 710. Complaint/Incident Description, Revision 1, Version 1.10, supra note 
705 (suggesting based on the general inoperability of the hyperlinks provided for each 
separate page of the MiWaters Complaint Form that readers proceed from page to 
page rather than seek to open individual hyperlinks).  
 711. Id. at “Complaint/Incident Description.” 
 712. Id. at “Owner and Contractor.”  
 713. Id. at “Location.” 
 714. Id. at “Contact.” 
 715. Id. at “Other Information/Attachments.” 
 716. Id. at “Review” and “Certify & Submit.”  
 717. Id. 
 718. See Transcript of Deposition of Brian Rudolph, supra note 168, at 41:2–
25. 
 719. See id. at 42:6–23. 
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that needs a site inspection, MDEQ will seek to perform a site 
inspection.720  
Where, however, the landowner refuses to grant MDEQ consent 
to enter the property upon being contacted, MDEQ is said to possess 
“delegated authority through the governor’s office to enter private 
property” pursuant to NREPA (Public Act 451) if it has a “reasonable 
suspicion that a violation has occurred.”721 In other words, MDEQ 
officials do not require a civil administrative warrant to enter private 
property for purposes of conducting an inspection if they possess a 
“reasonable suspicion” that a NREPA Part 31, 91, 301 or 303 violation 
has occurred.722 According to the District Supervisor for the MDEQ 
Water Resources Division of the Saginaw Bay District Office, a 
received complaint assigned a greater than “low priority” ranking will 
be considered to provide MDEQ with the basis to claim it possesses a 
“reasonable suspicion” that a statutory violation has occurred, thereby 
dispensing with the need for the agency to obtain a civil administrative 
warrant.723 In fact, the official testified that “a complaint is reasonable 
suspicion of a violation,” but due to lack of resources, MDEQ’s 
standing practice is to not inspect a site assigned a “low priority” or 
“no priority” ranking.724 Stated differently, once a member of the 
public has submitted a complaint—even anonymously—on the 
MiWaters website stating that a violation of state law (NREPA) has 
occurred or is occurring, MDEQ’s position is that it possesses a 
“reasonable suspicion” to assume that a violation has occurred, which 
enables it to enter private property without either the landowner’s 
consent or a civil administrative warrant.725  
NREPA Parts 31,726 91,727 301,728 and 303,729 however, did not 
previously, and do not currently, expressly provide MDEQ with such 
authority. Much to the contrary, from 1995 to March 28, 2019, MCL 
§ 324.30314(2) expressly conditioned MDEQ entry onto private 
premises “[u]pon reasonable cause” or “obtaining a search warrant” 
for purposes of conducting an inspection to evaluate whether a 
 
 720. Id. at 42:24–43:4.  
 721. Id. at 43:10–16; 45:19–23. 
 722. See id. at 44:16–25. 
 723. See id. at 44:2–4; 44:21–25.  
 724. Id. at 46:4–12; 46:20–21; 47:8–11. 
 725. See id. at 48:8–17; 49:20–23. 
 726. See MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 324.3104, 324.3108 (2019).  
 727. See § 324.9101.  
 728. See § 324.30101.  
 729. See § 324.30301.  
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NREPA Part 303 violation has/had occurred, as defined in MCL § 
324.30304.730 In fact, the Michigan Court of Appeals held, as recently 
as 2015 in Groninger v. Department of Environmental Quality, that 
under NREPA’s Wetlands Protection Act (NREPA Part 303), MCL § 
324.30314(2) provides that the MDEQ “may enter [private] premises 
[only] upon either reasonable cause or by obtaining a search 
warrant.”731  
Enacting section 2 of Michigan Public Act (PA) 98, effective 
July 2, 2013, was believed to have repealed NREPA Part 303, 
including MCL § 324.30314 and its “reasonable cause” standard.732 
This repeal, however, would not become effective until “160 days 
after the effective date, as published in the federal register, or an order 
by the administrator of the . . . environmental protection agency under 
40 CFR 233.53(c)(8)(vi) withdrawing approval of the state program 
under 33 USC 1344(g) and (h).”733 On December 13, 2016, at the close 
of the Obama administration, a USEPA Region 5 notice appeared in 
the federal register informing the public that USEPA had approved 
most of Michigan’s Clean Water Act Section 404 Permitting Program 
Revisions that had “resulted from the enactment of Michigan Public 
Act 98.”734 MCL § 324.30314 did not appear on either of the lists 
USEPA identified as containing provisions of PA 98 found to be 
consistent or inconsistent with the requirements of federal CWA 
 
 730. See § 324.30314(2). 
 731. 2015 WL 404753, at *2–*3 (Mich. Ct. App. 2015) (emphasis added). 
 732. See 2013 Mich. Pub. Acts No. 98. 
 733. 2013 Mich. Pub. Acts No. 34, at 15. In 2013, MDEQ Water Resources 
Division Chief, William Creal, had requested USEPA review of NREPA Act 98 
amendments/revisions to ensure they did not alter Michigan’s ability to administer the 
USEPA CWA § 404 Program. See Letter from William Creal, Chief, Michigan Dep’t 
of Env’t Quality Water Res. Dep’t, to Tinka Hyde, Director, EPA (July 5, 2013) (on 
file with the Michigan Department of Environmental Quality). In 2016, USEPA’s 
Chicago Regional Office wrote to MDEQ Water Resources Division Chief, Teresa 
Seidel informing her of USEPA’s completion of its review of Michigan’s NREPA 
Act 98 revisions. See Letter from Christopher Korleski, Director, EPA, to Teresa 
Seidel, Chief, Michigan Dep’t of Envt’l Quality Water Res. Div. (Dec. 19, 2016) (on 
file with the Michigan Department of Environmental Quality). The EPA letter to 
MDEQ WRD noted how USEPA had considered the comments former Michigan AG 
Schuette had provided in response to USEPA’s 2014 correspondence seeking the 
Michigan Attorney General’s interpretation of four NREPA Act 98 revisions. See 
Letter from Robert Reichel, First Assistant, Envtl., Nat. Res., and Agriculture Div., to 
Tinker Hyde, Director, EPA (May 27, 2015) (on file with the Michigan Department 
of Environmental Quality). 
 734. Receipt of Information Under the Toxic Substances Control Act, 81 Fed. 
Reg. 89, 930–33.  
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Section 404.735 USEPA, in other words, had not withdrawn approval 
of Michigan’s CWA 404 state program in 2016, and thus MCL § 
324.30314 had not effectively been repealed. Consequently, the 
reasonable cause requirement of MCL § 324.30314(2) had continued 
to apply. Therefore, contrary to the assertions of MDEQ-Water 
Resources Division Bay City Office Supervisor,736 it is arguably illegal 
for MDEQ officials to enter onto private land to conduct an inspection 
where there is only a “reasonable suspicion” that a NREPA Part 31, 
91, 301, or 303 violation has occurred.  
This conclusion was confirmed when MCL § 324.30314(2) was 
subsequently revised prior to the close of the Snyder administration 
during late 2018 via PA 631.737 These revisions were intended to 
clarify the conditions under which MDEQ “may enter on, upon, or 
through” private premises.738 Revised MCL § 324.30314(2)(a)–(c) 
authorizes MDEQ entry upon private premises on which a NREPA 
Part 303 violation or NREPA Part 303 permit information is located 
only when (1) a search warrant, an administrative warrant issued by 
the MDEQ Director, or the consent of the person who owns or controls 
the premises is obtained; (2) an imminent threat to the public health or 
environment is posed; or (3) upon reasonable cause if the wetland is 
a “water of the United States” as defined in CWA § 502(7).739  
Clearly, the “reasonable cause” and “reasonable suspicion” 
standards are substantively distinct standards under Michigan law. 
Michigan law, consistent with other states’ laws outside the sixth 
federal circuit, has long equated the “reasonable cause standard” for 
an arrest without a warrant with the “probable cause” standard for a 
warrantless arrest, to mean “as such trustworthy information as would 
warrant a person of reasonable caution to believe that a person was 
guilty of the commission of a crime.”740  
 
 735. See generally EPA, SUPPORTING DOCUMENT FOR EPA DECISION TO 
APPROVE/DENY REVISIONS TO MICHIGAN’S CWA SECTION 404 PROGRAM RESULTING 
FROM ENACTMENT OF MICHIGAN PUBLIC ACT 98 (2016) (confirming this conclusion 
with supporting USEPA documentation).  
 736. See Transcript of Deposition of Brian Rudolph, supra note 168, at 41:2–
25. 
 737. See MICH. COMP. LAWS § 324.30314(2)(a)–(c) (2019).  
 738. § 324.30314(2). 
 739. Id.  
 740. Mich. Dep’t of Attorney Gen., Opinion Letter (May 21, 1985) (citing 
People v. Ward, 226 Mich. 45, 50 (1924)) (“While the Legislature has not defined the 
term ‘reasonable cause’ in MCL 764.15a; MSA 28.874(1), it is noted that ‘probable 
cause’ for a warrantless arrest means any facts which would induce a fair-minded 
person of average intelligence to believe that the suspected person has committed a 
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There is only one NREPA provision authorizing MDNR (and 
likely, MDEQ) officials to enter upon private premises for inspection 
purposes based on a reasonable suspicion—MCL § 324.80166(2). It 
authorizes peace officers to stop and inspect a private vessel, even one 
that displays the required state safety decal, where the peace officer 
has a reasonable suspicion that the vessel or the vessel’s operator is in 
violation of marine law or is otherwise engaged in criminal activity.741 
Conservation officers appointed by the MDNR and trained and 
certified pursuant to the Michigan law enforcement officers training 
council act of 1965 are considered “peace officers” for such purposes, 
“and except as otherwise provided by law, are vested with the powers, 
privileges, prerogatives, and immunities conferred upon peace officers 
as provided in this act.”742 
Apparently, MDEQ has strayed from the statutory text and 
“unofficially” incorporated Principle 7 of the United Nations Global 
Compact within its NREPA enforcement practices. U.N. Global 
Compact Principle 7 strictly interprets and implements the 
precautionary approach contained in Principle 15 of the 1992 U.N. Rio 
Declaration as if it were the European continental civil law 
 
crime.”). It has also been held that “reasonable cause” for an arrest without a warrant 
is equated with “probable cause” and means such trustworthy information as would 
warrant a person of reasonable caution to believe that a person was guilty of the 
commission of a crime. See, e.g., People v. Lombardi, 18 A.D.2d 177, 180 (N.Y. App. 
Div. 1963); Greene v. Brown, 535 F. Supp. 1096, 1100 (E.D.N.Y. 1982). The terms 
“reasonable cause” and “probable cause” to make a warrantless arrest have been held 
to be synonymous. See, e.g., State v. Merrill, 274 N.W.2d 99, 108 (Minn. 1978); State 
v. Linkletter, 345 So.2d 452, 455 (La. 1977); State v. Klevgaard, 306 N.W.2d 185, 
190 (N.D. 1981); see also STATE OF MICHIGAN, MODEL POLICY – THE LAW 
ENFORCEMENT RESPONSE TO DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 15 (2009) (“Reasonable cause is 
defined in Michigan law as synonymous with probable cause. The probable cause 
standard applied to domestic violence crimes is no different from the standard applied 
to all other crimes. Probable cause means any facts and circumstances that would 
cause a fair-minded person of average intelligence to believe that the suspect has 
committed or is committing a crime.”); cf. People v. Bloyd, 331 N.W.2d 447, 445 
(1982) (holding that reasonable cause is something less than probable cause but 
substantially more than a reasonable suspicion). 
 741. See MICH. COMP. LAWS § 324.80166(2) (1994) (“(2) A peace officer shall 
not stop and inspect a vessel bearing the decal described in section 80166a or an 
equivalent decal issued by or on behalf of another state during the period the decal 
remains in effect unless that peace officer has a reasonable suspicion that the vessel 
or the vessel’s operator is in violation of a marine law or is otherwise engaged in 
criminal activity.”) (emphasis added).  
 742. See MICH. COMP. LAWS § 324.1501 (1995); see also § 324.1601 (“The 
department and conservation officers appointed by the department are peace officers 
vested with all the powers, privileges, prerogatives, and immunities conferred upon 
peace officers by the general laws of this state.”).  
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precautionary principle. Principle 7 also requires that “[w]hen there is 
reasonable suspicion of harm, decision-makers need to apply 
precaution and consider the degree of uncertainty that appears from 
scientific evaluation.”743 
The U.N. Global Compact represents itself as “a voluntary 
initiative based on CEO commitments to implement universal 
sustainability principles and to take steps to support U.N. goals.”744 
“The multi-year strategy of the U.N. Global Compact is to drive 
business awareness and action in support of achieving Sustainable 
Development Goals by 2030.”745 However, a company’s voluntary 
nonfinancial reporting of company sustainable 
development/environment-related initiatives can have U.S. legal 
financial reporting ramifications.746 
MDEQ’s “unofficial” incorporation of the European 
precautionary principle, a central tenet of European continental civil 
law and of international sustainable development law,747 within its 
enforcement of the permitting regimes of NREPA Parts 31, 91, 301 
and 303 is, therefore, tantamount to incorporating into Michigan 
environmental law enforcement a critical element or facet of Europe’s 
“preventive justice” system.748 A key distinction between the 
 
 743. The Ten Principles of the U.N. Global Compact, Principle Seven: 
Environment, U.N. GLOBAL COMPACT, https://www.unglobalcompact.org/what-is-
gc/mission/principles/principle-7 [https://perma.cc/399A-2TFS] (last visited Oct. 30, 
2019) (emphasis added).  
 744. About the U.N. Global Compact, U.N. GLOBAL COMPACT, 
https://www.unglobalcompact.org/about [https://perma.cc/D3SU-L3DS] (last visited 
Oct. 30, 2019). 
 745. Making Global Goals Local Business, U.N. GLOBAL COMPACT, 
https://www.unglobalcompact.org/sdgs [https://perma.cc/R2L4-A488] (last visited 
Oct. 30, 2019).  
 746. See Kogan, Exporting Precaution, supra note 90, at 75–81, 92–96.  
 747. See European Commission, Environment—Sustainable Development, at 
https://ec.europa.eu/environment/sustainable-development; Commission of the 
European Communities, Communication from the Commission, A Sustainable 
Europe for a Better World: A European Union Strategy for Sustainable Development 
(Commission’s Proposal to the Gothenburg European Council), COM(2001) 264 
final (5/15/01), at 6; Commission of the European Communities, Communication 
from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, Draft Declaration 
on Guiding Principles for Sustainable Development, COM(2005) 218 final (5/25/05), 
at 6.  
 748. Joselyn Stacey, Preventive Justice, the Precautionary Principle and the 
Rule of Law, in REGULATING PREVENTIVE JUSTICE: PRINCIPLE, POLICY AND PARADOX 
pt. I.2 (Tamara Tulich et al. eds., 2017) (“Sustainable development, an emerging and 
complex body of international law, has a significant preventive component. It captures 
the idea that the present generation has an obligation to future generations not to push 
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European continental civil law and the Anglo-American common law 
systems is their source of law. Civil law systems abide by codes and 
statutes “designed to cover all eventualities.”749 Civil law judges have 
a limited role of applying the law to the matter in dispute because 
“[p]ast judgments are no more than loose guides.”750 Civil law system 
judges thus tend to act more as investigators (i.e., fact finders). By 
contrast, the common law makes “extensive use of statutes” and 
regards “judicial cases . . . as the most important source of law.”751 
This vests common law judges, who act as independent arbiters, with 
“an active role in developing rules.”752 Common law courts also “abide 
by precedents set by higher courts examining the same issue” to ensure 
consistency.753 
A further critical distinction between the European continental 
civil law and Anglo-American common law systems is the civil law 
principle of “preventive justice.” It has been defined in the criminal 
context as  
[t]he system of measures taken by government with reference to the direct 
prevention of crime. It generally consists in obliging those persons whom 
there is probable ground to suspect of future behavior to give full assurance 
to the public that such offense as is apprehended shall not happen, by 
finding pledges or securities to keep the peace, or for their good behavior.754 
The principle of “preventive justice” also has been defined more 
generally as  
[t]he involvement of a state office or authority occur[ring] preventively, 
meaning as early as possible. Thus, important legal acts can be phrased 
unambiguously and to the best interest of the citizens. For this reason, 
 
the Earth’s ecological capabilities to their limits. . . . [T]he precautionary 
principle . . . posits that a lack of scientific certainty should not pose a barrier to state 
action in the face of serious or irreversible threats to the environment. Despite its 
largely preventive orientation, environmental law has, with one exception, remained 
distinct from the burgeoning field of preventive justice. The exception is the 
precautionary principle . . . .”).  
 749. S.B., What Is the Difference Between Common and Civil Law?, THE 
ECONOMIST (July 17, 2013), https://www.economist.com/the-economist-
explains/2013/07/16/what-is-the-difference-between-common-and-civil-law 
[https://perma.cc/22C8-L88X].  
 750. Id. 
 751. Id. 
 752. Id. 
 753. Id.  
 754. Preventative Justice, THE LAW DICTIONARY, https:// 
thelawdictionary.org/preventive-justice/ [https://perma.cc/V49K-77NL] (last visited 
Oct. 30, 2019). 
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subsequent legal disputes are avoided [and t]he courts competent for 
litigious disputes (‘litigious jurisdiction’) are relieved.755  
According to a 2008 European Parliament study, “[i]n contrast to the 
Anglo-American and Scandinavian legal systems, the state does not 
just become involved in deciding legal disputes ex post (‘contentious 
jurisdiction’) . . . . Instead, it provides for a preventive legal control 
through authentication by authentication authorities . . . for important 
transactions with a particular economic . . . significance for the public 
interest . . . .”756 
D. Michigan Wetland, Inland Lakes and Streams, Soil Erosion and 
Sedimentation Control, Nonpoint Source Pollution, and Fisheries 
Policies Support MDEQ/MDNR Dam Removal Projects to 
Improve Water Quality and Restore Habitat 
The dam removal/river restoration movement promoted by 
overzealous state and federal regulatory agencies and government-
funded environmental and wildlife nonprofit extremist groups is a 
national phenomenon that has persisted for decades.757 As discussed 
 
 755. Definition, PREVENTIVE JUSTICE EUR., http://www.prejus.eu/definition/ 
[https://perma.cc/5XDK-RQYQ] (last visited Oct. 30, 2019).  
 756. See Council of the Notariats of the E.U., Comparative Study on Authentic 
Instruments National Provisions of Private Law—Circulation, Mutual Recognition 
and Enforcement, Possible Legislative Initiative by the European Union UK, FR, DE, 
PL, RO, SW, in EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT’S COMMITTEE ON LEGAL AFFAIRS § 3.1 
(2008); see also § 1.4.1; §§ 2.1.5, 2.2.1; § 1; § 3.3 (“The core function of 
authenticating instruments is linked to the fundamental concept of public pre-
transaction control of the legality and the validity of transactions of particular 
significance.”); cf. Lawrence A. Kogan, Effort to Expand ‘Authentic Acts’ in Europe 
Imperils Economic Freedom (Wash. Legal Found. Vol. 24, Legal Backgrounder No. 
6, 2009), https://nebula.wsimg.com/ 
ad9f8d629e2219620966232a3ef1c013?AccessKeyId=39A2DC689E4CA87C906D
&disposition=0&alloworigin=1; Lawrence A. Kogan, The Creeping ‘Authenticity’ of 
Europe’s Intrusive Civil Law System, INST. FOR TRADE, STANDARDS AND 
SUSTAINABLE DEV. (2009), https://nebula.wsimg.com/ 
bcb1adacf17baedeeb2d200cafc85b20?AccessKeyId=39A2DC689E4CA87C906D&
disposition=0&alloworigin=1. 
 757. See, e.g., Jessie Thomas-Blate, Dam Removal in 2018 – Another 
Successful Year of Freeing Rivers, AM. RIVERS (Feb. 20, 2019), 
https://www.americanrivers.org/2019/02/dam-removal-in-2018-another-successful-
year-of-freeing-rivers/ [https://perma.cc/PY9N-ZLLW] (setting forth an annual list 
identifying how “82 dams and more than 1,230 miles of river were restored through 
dam removal in 2018”); see also AM. RIVERS, 86 DAMS REMOVED TO RESTORE RIVERS 
IN 2017 (2018); Jessie Thomas-Blate, Celebrating a Great Year for Dam Removal in 
2016, AM. RIVERS (Feb. 16, 2017), https://www.americanrivers.org/2017/02/ 
celebrating-great-year-dam-removal-2016/ [https://perma.cc/PN4C-LEWA] (setting 
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below, MDNR/MDEQ has participated in this movement for, at least, 
the past fifteen years. This has severely hampered Boyce Hydro Power 
LLC’s ability, since 2010, to operate its four Tittabawassee River 
dams profitably at their peak capacity, and it has placed Boyce’s status 
as a NREPA-compliant FERC licensee in potential jeopardy. 
The Michigan Department of Natural Resources (MDNR) 
Fisheries Division webpage entitled “Dams—Dam Management/Dam 
Removal Information” states that dams can have positive or negative 
impacts on natural resources and that when dams are beyond their 
design life a decision must be made to remove or rebuild a particular 
dam depending on specific criteria for each situation.758 As early as 
2004, MDNR/MDEQ released dam removal guidelines for owners,759 
which identified three driving forces behind dam removal decisions: 
(1) maintenance costs greater than benefits derived; (2) public safety 
and liability concerns: and (3) greater potential fisheries, water 
quality, and recreational use improvements resulting from removal.760 
These guidelines were subsequently rearticulated in 2005 as an 
unofficial “policy” of the MDNR Fisheries Division.761 Dam removal 
would be called for if the dam serves little or no purpose and it can be 
reasonably expected that the dam will likely cause significant damage 
to public health, safety, welfare, property, natural resources, or the 
public trust in natural resources.762  
Since then, the MDNR Fisheries Division has elevated this 
unofficial policy to a component of its official five-year plan for 
managing aquatic resources.763 For example, in its five-year strategic 
plan for 2013–2017, MDNR Fisheries Division recognized “the need 
for increased efforts in the short-term focused on . . . dam removal 
 
forth an annual list identifying how “[i]n 2016, 72 dams were removed across 21 
states”). 
 758. See MICH. DEP’T OF NAT. RES., Dam Management, 
https://www.michigan.gov/dnr/0,4570,7-350-79136_79236_80249---,00.html 
[https://perma.cc/NXX9-C8P2] (last visited Oct. 30, 2019).  
 759. See generally MICH. DEP’T OF NAT. RES., DAM REMOVAL GUIDELINES FOR 
OWNERS (2004). 
 760. See id. at 1; see also MICH. DEP’T OF NAT. RES., DAM REMOVAL IN 
MICHIGAN (2009).  
 761. See FISHERIES REPORT 10 – CHEBOYGAN RIVER ASSESSMENT, supra note 
365, at 32. 
 762. See id.; see also U.S. FISH AND WILDLIFE SERV., ENVIRONMENTAL 
ASSESSMENT FOR MAPLE RIVER DAM REMOVAL AND ROAD CROSSING IMPROVEMENTS 
– MAPLE RIVER, PELLSTON, MI 36 (2018).  
 763. See generally MICH. DEP’T OF NAT. RES. FISHERIES DIV., CHARTING THE 
COURSE: FISHERIES DIVISION’S FRAMEWORK FOR MANAGING AQUATIC RESOURCES – 
2013–2017 FISHERIES DIVISION STRATEGIC PLAN (2013). 
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protocols and considerations,” identified as a scorecard metric, 
“increase miles of free-flowing river/stream restored through dam 
removals,” and an “[e]xpand[ed] Dam Management Grant Program to 
assist communities and other dam owners with dam removal or 
repair.”764 During this period, for example, the Fisheries Division FY 
2013 Annual Report revealed that the agency had developed and 
implemented the Dam Management Grant Program, “which provided 
$2.35 million dollars in funding to remove three obsolete, high hazard 
dams” and “continued removal efforts on one dam.”765 The Fisheries 
Division FY 2014 Annual Report revealed that staff had helped to 
reconnect more than 424 miles of river habitat and to restore natural 
stream processes by developing and implementing the new Aquatic 
Habitat Grant Program, which provided $1 million inter alia for dam 
removals.766 In addition, the Fisheries Division provided technical 
assistance on eight dam removals.767  
The Fisheries Division FY 2015 “provided technical assistance 
on 12 dam removals,” including the Thompson Dam removal, “further 
developed and implemented the Dam Management Grant Program 
which provided $350,000 funding for the removal of three dams, two 
of which were high hazard dams,” and established the Habitat 
Improvement Account “to mitigate resource impacts from 
hydropower dam operations,” which funded the removal of Buhl Dam 
in Alcona County.768 During FY 2016, the Fisheries Division removed 
the Lyons Dam, which was “funded by $2.2 million in grants and 
funds from the DNR, U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service and the Village 
of Lyons.”769 During FY 2017, the Fisheries Division reported that 
“dam removal or other modifications ha[d] been completed on the 
Chippewa River (Millpond West Dam), Shiawassee River (Chesaning 
Dam), and the Cass River (Vassar and Frankenmuth Dams)” and that 
plans had been “developed for future removals including: Hamilton 
 
 764. Id. at 10, 25, 27. 
 765. MICH. DEP’T OF NAT. RES. FISHERIES DIV., MICHIGAN DEPARTMENT OF 
NATURAL RESOURCES FISHERIES DIVISION ANNUAL REPORT FISCAL YEAR 2013 8 
(2014).  
 766. MICH. DEP’T OF NAT. RES. FISHERIES DIV., MICHIGAN DEPARTMENT OF 
NATURAL RESOURCES FISHERIES DIVISION ANNUAL REPORT FISCAL YEAR 2014 8 
(2015). 
 767. Id. 
 768. MICH. DEP’T OF NAT. RES. FISHERIES DIV., MICHIGAN DEPARTMENT OF 
NATURAL RESOURCES FISHERIES DIVISION 2015 ANNUAL REPORT 2, 4 (2016). 
 769. MICH. DEP’T OF NAT. RES. FISHERIES DIV., MICHIGAN DEPARTMENT OF 
NATURAL RESOURCES FISHERIES DIVISION FISCAL YEAR 2016 ANNUAL REPORT 1 
(2017).  
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and Fabri dams on the Flint River; Shiatown and Corunna dams on the 
Shiawassee River; and Dow Dam on the Tittabawassee River.”770 In 
its 2018–2022 strategic plan, MDNR Fisheries Division stated that it 
would fulfill the agency’s first goal of ensuring healthy aquatic 
ecosystems and sustainable fisheries, inter alia “through 
administration of the Aquatic Habitat Grant Program and the Dam 
Management Grant Program.”771 
As these reports clearly show, since 2012 MDNR has provided 
funding through its Dam Management Grant Program of up to 
$350,000 per year “to conservation partners to manage dam removal, 
repair and major maintenance projects that will enhance aquatic 
resources and fishing opportunities . . . [and] public safety in 
Michigan.”772 The 2018 MDNR Dam Management Grant Program 
Handbook, for example, notes that funding will not be provided for 
routine maintenance activities and operational costs, design deficiency 
correction modifications for dams in fair or satisfactory conditions, or 
for repair/maintenance costs that are less than 50% of dam 
replacement cost.773 In addition, Michigan has provided grant funding 
for dam removal through its Aquatic Habitat Grant Program.774 The 
purpose of that program is “to improve desirable fish and other aquatic 
organism populations by protecting intact and rehabilitating degraded 
aquatic habitat.”775 In 2015, the Aquatic Habitat Grant Program 
dispensed approximately $66,000 to monitor, evaluate, and collect 
data following the removal of the Boardman and Sabin dams.776 In 
2017, the Aquatic Habitat Grant Program dispensed approximately 
 
 770. MICH. DEP’T OF NAT. RES. FISHERIES DIV., MICHIGAN DEPARTMENT OF 
NATURAL RESOURCES FISHERIES DIVISION FISCAL YEAR 2017 ANNUAL REPORT 2 
(2018). 
 771. MICH. DEP’T OF NAT. RES. FISHERIES DIV., CHARTING THE COURSE: 
FISHERIES DIVISION’S FRAMEWORK FOR MANAGING AQUATIC RESOURCES—2018–
2022 FISHERIES DIVISION STRATEGIC PLAN 9.  
 772. MICH. DEP’T OF NAT. RESOURCES, DAM MANAGEMENT GRANT PROGRAM, 
https://www.michigan.gov/dnr/0,4570,7-350-79134_81684_81685_81745---
,00.html [https://perma.cc/GN2Q-HKS6] (last visited Oct. 30, 2019) (emphasis 
added).  
 773. MICH. DEP’T OF NAT. RES. FISHERIES DIV., 2018 DAM MANAGEMENT 
GRANT PROGRAM HANDBOOK 3 (2018). 
 774. See Aquatic Habitat Grant Program, MICH. DEP’T OF NAT. RESOURCES, 
https://www.michigan.gov/dnr/0,4570,7-350-79134_81684_81685_81743---
,00.html [https://perma.cc/C229-DCR7] (last visited Oct. 30, 2019). 
 775. Id. 
 776. MICH. DEP’T OF NAT. RES., 2015 AHGP FUNDED PROJECTS 3 (2016).  
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$362,650 to remove 2,240 feet of the Manistique Dam’s center flume 
wall to improve aquatic habitat and recreational fishing.777 
The MDEQ/MDNR have apparently long looked unfavorably at 
dams, especially older earthen dams that generate hydroelectric 
power, that continue to require considerable and quite costly 
maintenance and upkeep.778 For example, the MDNR/MDEQ have 
found that the six dams registered with MDEQ in the Tittabawassee 
River watershed and listed as generating hydroelectric power, plus the 
remaining 137 dams on the Tittabawassee River, “have altered 
historical fish communities by blocking migration routes, elevating 
stream temperatures, and inundating high quality, steep-gradient 
habitats.”779 As in the case of the other Michigan rivers discussed 
above, MDNR/MDEQ would prefer to restore the Tittabawassee 
River to a run-of-the-river operation.780 In contrast to “conventional 
impoundment hydroelectric facilities,” a run-of-the-river operation is 
one that “harvest[s] the energy from flowing water to generate 
electricity in the absence of a large dam and reservoir.”781 Run-of-the-
river systems are classified primarily based upon their size and 
capacity.782  
The Tittabawassee River’s main stem is comprised of three 
segments.783 Its “middle segment begins at the upper end of the Secord 
Lake and extends south 36 miles to the Sanford Dam. This segment is 
a relatively large warmwater system that is greatly influenced by four 
hydropower dams: Secord, Smallwood, Wixom [Edenville], and 
 
 777. MICH. DEP’T OF NAT. RES., PROJECTS FUNDED BY THE 2017 AQUATIC 
HABITAT GRANT 3 (2017).  
 778. See MICH. DEP’T OF NAT. RES. FISHERIES DIV., TITTABAWASSEE RIVER 
ASSESSMENT, SPECIAL REPORT 52, at vix (2009); see also id. at xiii (referring to 
“human activities that have influenced the Tittabawassee River watershed” which 
encompasses all or part of thirteen counties: Arenac, Bay, Clare, Gladwin, Gratiot, 
Isabella, Mecosta, Midland, Montcalm, Ogemaw, Osceola, Roscommon, and 
Saginaw counties). 
 779. Id. at vix. 
 780. See Run-of-the-River Hydroelectricity, UNIV. OF CALGARY, 
https://energyeducation.ca/encyclopedia/Run-of-the-river_hydroelectricity 
[https://perma.cc/LQY4-PTAZ] (last visited Oct. 30, 2019).  
 781. Id. 
 782. See id. (including “‘Micro’ - <100 kW; ‘Mini’ - 100kW-1MW; and 
‘Small’ – 1-50 MW”). 
 783. See TITTABAWASSEE RIVER ASSESSMENT, SPECIAL REPORT 52, supra note 
778, at 4 (describing the Tittabawassee River as being comprised of three segments 
“based on differences in channel features and soil types, . . . surficial geology, and 
topography . . . within the watershed”).  
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Sanford,” all operated by Boyce Hydro Power LLC.784 The Tobacco 
River meets the Tittabawassee River within this segment just south of 
the Edenville Dam.785 According to MDEQ/MDNR, since the middle 
segment of the main stem of the Tittabawassee River “is almost 
completely impounded” by hydroelectric dams, these agencies have 
sought to require “run-of-the-river operations” and have frequently 
monitored dam operations to minimize their negative effects.786 
In their 2009 Tittabawassee River Assessment report, 
MDEQ/MDNR emphasized that “[w]alleye and northern muskellunge 
are currently stocked in Secord, Smallwood, Wixom [Edenville], and 
Sanford impoundments. Runs of potamodromous species are blocked 
by these impoundment dams as well as the Dow Dam. Thus, additional 
appropriate management actions are eliminated for the Tittabawassee 
River system, and sport fishing opportunities are lost.”787 In addition, 
their report highlighted how these dams also “disrupt natural flooding 
cycles and redistribution of sediment and nutrients” and how their 
impoundments/reservoirs “trap sediments and nutrients often creating 
anoxic conditions in the deeper, colder bottom waters.”788 
MDNR/MDEQ thus look askance at hydroelectric generating dams as 
other than sources of clean renewable energy despite their “black-
start” capabilities.789  
Each of these four earthen hydroelectric power dams were built 
in 1924 and have been operated by Boyce Hydropower LLC, a Federal 
 
 784. See id. at 4, 31; see also id. at xiii (“The mouth segment extends 35 miles 
from the Sanford Dam to the confluence with the Saginaw River. This segment is a 
large warmwater system with relatively low gradient.”); cf. id. (noting the middle 
segment is unlike the river’s headwaters segment, which “begin[s] as coldwater 
streams and quickly transition into coolwater”). 
 785. Id. at 32. 
 786. See id. at xv. 
 787. See id.  
 788. Id. at 15. 
 789. See Reclamation’s Hydropower Resources: Hearing Before the Comm. 
on Nat. Res., 110th Cong. (2008) (statement of Robert W. Johnson, Comm’r, Bureau 
of Reclamation, U.S. Dep’t of the Interior) (“A black start unit is one that can start its 
own power without support from the grid in the event of a major system collapse or a 
system-wide blackout.”); Linday Morris, Black Stat: Preparedness for Any Situtation, 
POWER ENG’G (July 1, 2011), https://www.power-eng.com/2011/07/01/black-start-
preparedness-for-any-situation/#gref [https://perma.cc/A3PN-HSB4] (“Hydroelectric 
generators, since they can be started without an external power source, have 
traditionally been relied upon to restart the electric power system in the event of a 
blackout.”). 
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Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) licensee, since 2006.790 
Boyce had been in litigation with the MDEQ since June 9, 2016, over 
violations alleged to have occurred at the Edenville Dam site,791 until 
the suit was finally settled via entry of a court-approved consent 
judgement on December 5, 2019.792 The three northernmost dams are 
located in Gladwin County, Michigan, while the fourth, the 
southernmost dam, is located in Midland County, Michigan. Secord 
Dam,793 the northernmost dam, is located at Secord Lake, 
approximately forty-two miles upstream from Midland, Michigan.794 
Smallwood Dam is located approximately eight miles downstream 
from Secord Dam and approximately thirty-four miles upstream from 
 
 790. TITTABAWASSEE RIVER ASSESSMENT, SPECIAL REPORT 52, supra note 
778, at 31. 
 791. See Summons and Complaint, Mich. Dep’t of Envtl. Quality v. Boyce 
Hydro, LLC, Case No. 2016-8538-CE (Gladwin Cty. Cir. Ct. 55th Jud. Cir.), 
https://nebula.wsimg.com/4e47311969570b030c83f5625719cfab?AccessKeyId=7F4
94AADE6AF42D36823&disposition=0&alloworigin=1 (“1. This is an action to 
obtain both declaratory and injunctive relief, and a judgment imposing civil fines and 
awarding damages. The defendants have violated Parts 31, 91, 301, and 303 of the 
Natural Resources and Environmental Protection Act (NREPA), MCL 324.101 et 
seq., and its associated administrative rule, on several occasions over the course of 
many years.”). 
 792. See Consent Judgment, Mich. Dep’t of Envtl. Quality v. Boyce Hydro, 
LLC, Case No. 2016-8538-CE (Gladwin Cty. Cir. Ct. 55th Jud. Cir.) (entered Dec. 5, 
2019), https://nebula.wsimg.com/2a7b86e9a297e552a66e7fef1ce803e0? 
AccessKeyId=7F494AADE6AF42D36823&disposition=0&alloworigin=1.  
 793. See TITTABAWASSEE RIVER ASSESSMENT, SPECIAL REPORT 52, supra note 
778, at 31–32 (“Secord Dam, the uppermost of the large hydroelectric dams, is located 
north of the Village of Wooden Shoe in Gladwin County, T 19N, R1E, Sec 15, just 
below the confluences of the East, West, and Middle branches of the Tittabawassee 
River. Secord Dam has three sections that span a total of 2,085 ft. The dam has a dam 
height of 55 ft, hydraulic head of 46 ft, and impounds 895 acres and creates 69 miles 
of shoreline at normal pool height (750.8 ft National Geodetic Vertical Datum 
(NGVD)). There is a reinforced multiple arch spillway with an ogee crest and two 
Taintor gates. The powerhouse is equipped with one Francis vertical-axis turbine 
generator with an installed capacity of 1.2 MW (FERC 1998b). There is a 47-ft long 
intake leading to the powerhouse. During winter drawdown, December 15 and 
January 15, the level may not fall below 747.8 ft NGVD.”). 
 794. See Dam Information, GLADWIN CTY., http://gladwincounty-
mi.gov/dam-information/ [https://perma.cc/SW2C-YLDL] (last visited Oct. 30, 
2019).  
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Midland.795 Edenville Dam,796 which is the largest of the four earthen 
dams, is located approximately thirteen miles downstream from the 
Smallwood Dam and approximately twenty-one miles upstream from 
Midland. The Edenville Dam “consists of two sections, one across the 
Tobacco River and one across the Tittabawassee River, each with a 
concrete spillway and earthen embankments extending from either 
side of the spillways to natural ground.”797 Sanford Dam, the 
southernmost dam, is located approximately ten miles downstream of 
Edenville Dam in Midland County, Michigan, and approximately 
 
 795. See TITTABAWASSEE RIVER ASSESSMENT, SPECIAL REPORT 52, supra note 
778, at 31–32 (“Smallwood Dam, the second hydroelectric dam in the series on the 
main stem, is located 10 miles downstream of Secord Dam in the Village of Wooden 
Shoe in Gladwin County, T 18N, R 1E, Sec 15. Smallwood Dam has a height of 36 ft 
and hydraulic head of 28 ft. It impounds 402 acres, creating a 25-mile shoreline at 
normal pool elevation (704.8 ft) NGVD. The dam has a reinforced concrete hollow 
gravity spillway dam about 52 ft long and 50 ft wide at the base. There are two steel 
Taintor gates on top of the right-side earth embankment, about 100 ft long by a 
maximum of 40 ft high. There is a 25 ft long intake leading to the powerhouse. The 
powerhouse has a single turbine with an installed capacity of 1.2 MW (FERC 1998c). 
Except during winter drawdown, December 15 and January 15, the level may not fall 
below 701.8 ft NGVD. There currently is no official public access site on Smallwood 
Lake impoundment.”); see also Dam Information, supra note 794.  
 796. See Dam Information – Edenville Dam, GLADWIN CTY., 
http://gladwincounty-mi.gov/dam-information/ [https://perma.cc/HL9L-ET5L] (last 
visited Oct. 30, 2019). Activities alleged to have been undertaken at the Edenville 
Dam had been the subject of the legal dispute between the State of Michigan and 
Boyce Hydropower LLC. See id. 
 797. See id.; see also TITTABAWASSEE RIVER ASSESSMENT, SPECIAL REPORT 
52, supra note 778, at 32 (“Edenville Dam, the third in series of hydroelectric dams, 
is located 13 miles down from Smallwood Dam in the village of Edenville in Gladwin 
County, T 17N, R1W, Sec 35. The dam width consists of three sections totaling about 
6,600 ft. Edenville Dam has a height of 54.5 ft, hydraulic head of 44 ft, and impounds 
the most water with 2,600 acres, creating 49 miles of shoreline at full pool, in Wixom 
Lake impoundment. There is a 50 ft long intake and the powerhouse has an installed 
capacity of 4.8 MW. The project creates a 0.4-mile bypassed reach on the Tobacco 
River that extends from the dam to the point where the Tobacco River meets the 
Tittabawassee River. The Tobacco River arm bypass has a minimum flow of 40 CFS 
winter and 66 CFS summer (FERC 2000). The Tobacco River arm is essentially on 
the west and the Tittabawassee River arm is on the east side of the impoundment 
(FERC 1998d). Normal pool elevation is 675.8 ft NGVD. During winter drawdown, 
December 15 and January 15, the level may not fall below 672.8 ft NGVD. Railed 
barrier free fishing piers are supposed to be located near the tailwater area of the 
Tittabawassee River outlet and an improved and railed shoreline pier is to be provided 
at the Tobacco River outlet.”). 
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thirty-five miles upstream from the mouth segment of the 
Tittabawassee River.798 
Given the MDNR/MDEQ’s institutional attitude that 
hydroelectric power-generating dams are harmful to water quality, 
wetlands, and fish and that the Tittabawassee River should be returned 
to its run-of-the-river natural state, it is not surprising that Boyce 
Hydropower LLC had been targeted, administratively harassed,799 and, 
ultimately, subject to a multi-year lawsuit by these state agencies and 
their overzealous enforcement officials for alleged noncompliance 
with NREPA Parts 31, 91, 301, and 303. Indeed, at least one MDNR 
official, a senior fisheries biologist working in the habitat management 
unit to oversee stream and habitat restoration work, testified at a 
recently convened deposition that his primary responsibility is 
monitoring the compliance of hydro projects with their federal FERC 
licensing obligations,800 focusing on the impact of the hydro project 
upon the environment.801Although his job description does not state he 
is the official liaison from MDNR to the FERC with respect to all 
FERC-licensed hydro projects located in the State of Michigan, he 
effectively serves in that capacity.802  
 
 798. See TITTABAWASSEE RIVER ASSESSMENT, SPECIAL REPORT 52, supra note 
778, at xiii, 32 (“The last in the series of hydroelectric dams, Sanford Dam is located 
10 miles downstream of Edenville dam in the Village of Sanford in Midland County, 
T15N, 1W, Sec 24. It has a dam height of 36 ft and hydraulic head of 26 ft. It impounds 
1,528 acres above it, in Sanford Lake impoundment. The dam has a controlled crest 
length of 1,579 ft, and a spill width of 139 ft. Sanford Dam was licensed under FERC 
in 1987, but amended to be included for relicensing with the above three dams in 2028 
(FERC 1998e, and FERC 2004). The minimum flow requirement for downstream 
release is 210 ft3/s. except during walleye spawning season when the minimum flow 
requirement is 650 ft3/s. This flow requirement is not as beneficial as run of the river, 
but it does provide for an increase in the amount of available downstream aquatic 
habitat than would be available under peaking operations. This FERC order again 
called for plans for development of public access to the reservoir and downstream, 
short- and long-term needs for recreational facilities, and associated construction 
plans.”). 
 799. See, e.g., Transcript of Deposition of Kyle Morris Kruger, at 83:7-85:4, 
Mich. Dep’t of Envtl. Quality v. Boyce Hydro, LLC (Sept. 27, 2018) (No. 16-8538-
CE), https://nebula.wsimg.com/4747a3833fef4b450006555df4d073c1?AccessKeyId 
=7F494AADE6AF42D36823&disposition=0&alloworigin=1 (discussing an incident 
whereby this MDNR official had acted aggressively toward and had made a vulgar 
statement to two key Boyce employees out of frustration that Boyce Hydro Power 
LLC, the former FERC licensee of the Edenville Dam Project, had not developed 
recreational facilities at that site to MDNR’s liking). 
 800. Id. at 5:13–20; 6:1–9.  
 801. Id. at 6:13–15. 
 802. Id. at 7:1–10; 106:10–107:1. 
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This official testified that where a dam license was entered into 
years ago and does not reflect current environmental rules (as in the 
case of Boyce),803 MDNR “figures out ways that the operation of the 
facility will minimize the impacts to the environment, and in some 
cases, [helps to] change [it] over from a peaking project to a run of 
river project.”804 According to said official, peak operating 
hydroelectric FERC-licensed dams “cause more harm than traditional 
or run of river operations as to riverine tail race, and also there’s more 
erosion along the impoundment shorelines due to the fluctuating water 
levels in the pond.”805 
At least one MDNR official has admitted that he engaged in both 
the indirect enforcement of NREPA Parts 31, 301 and 303806 and the 
unofficial monitoring of FERC hydroelectric dam license compliance 
(as in the case of Boyce) by intentionally submitting comments and 
requests to the FERC that the agency well recognized could be 
accepted as new conditions imposed on the licensee upon issuance or 
renewal807 or could otherwise result in FERC administrative 
enforcement actions. “[I]f there is a project [MDNR] feel[s] is causing 
impacts in a negative manner and there’s a pathway in the license in 
order to achieve mitigation, [MDNR] . . . would file comments and 
requests” with the FERC.808 And if MDNR concluded that the licensee 
was not complying with the license, the agency “would file comments 
with FERC saying we don’t believe that the obligations of the license 
are being met and something needs to be done, and then FERC would 
direct the licensee to do something.”809 This MDNR official also 
testified that he had been dealing with the Boyce Edenville Dam Site 
for approximately twenty years, since the renewal of the license,810 
regarding mostly recreational development and access issues 
governed by the FERC license.811 Furthermore, where a FERC license 
 
 803. See FERC, PROJECT NO. 10808, ORDER ISSUING ORIGINAL LICENSE TO 
WOLVERINE POWER CORPORATION (Oct. 16, 1998) (discussing the “Edenville 
Hydroelectric Project” and addresses issues common to all four projects—i.e., the 
Sanford Hydroelectric Project No. 2785, the Smallwood Hydroelectric Project No. 
10810, and the Secord Hydroelectric Project No. 10809).  
 804. Transcript of Deposition of Kyle Morris Kruger, supra note 799, at 24:9-
21.  
 805. Id. at 120:9–15. 
 806. Id. at 109:15–112:16. 
 807. See id. at 24:22–25:7; 26:6–27:4. 
 808. Id. at 27:22–25. 
 809. Id. at 27:25–28:5. 
 810. See id. at 34:1–5; 35:18. 
 811. See id. at 35:7–13; 35:21–36:4. 
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provides that the licensee’s recreational plan must be developed in 
consultation with the MDNR, this official testified that the MDNR 
then submits comments to the FERC and thereby indirectly utilizes the 
agency consultation process to persuade the FERC to effectively 
amend the license or reshape an already-issued or renewed license to 
MDNR’s liking.812 This MDNR official testified, moreover, that from 
2015 through 2018 (a period of approximately four years), he had filed 
no fewer than twenty-seven comment and request letters to the FERC 
via the FERC e-library, alleging Boyce’s noncompliance with its 
FERC licenses and NREPA Parts 31, 301 and 303,813 even where 
MDEQ, and not MDNR, had enforcement responsibility/jurisdiction 
over the issue (e.g., sedimentation and soil erosion control).814 
Ultimately, these letters contributed to FERC’s revocation of the 
Edenville Dam license.815  
The irony of the Boyce litigation, however, is that MDEQ’s 
allegations of NREPA violations at the Edenville Dam site appeared 
to have centered around the unpermitted movement of dirt (i.e., sand, 
soil, sediment, rocks, and gravel) on the property servicing and 
immediately adjacent to the former FERC Project Boundary of the 
Edenville Dam site, posing only the possibility (not probability) of soil 
erosion occurring and sending sedimentation runoff (discharge) into 
the dirt-bottomed Tittabawassee and Tobacco Rivers. The 
Tittabawassee River, including its Tobacco River tributary (which “is 
not on Michigan’s [CWA §] 303(d) [impaired waters] list”),816 
however, is known to accumulate sedimentation naturally as it 
apparently overflows its banks on an ongoing basis to a far greater 
extent than the possible soil erosion generated by operations at such 
dam sites. As the 2009 MDEQ/MDNR report that reviewed the Dow 
Chemical Midland facility spill and cleanup relates, the 
“Tittabawassee River is a ‘flashy’ river that often overflows its 
 
 812. See id. at 40:18–41:12; 41:22–42:5. 
 813. See id. at 79:7–93:12. 
 814. See id. at 97:14–98:13; 102:2–4; 103:22–105:5. This MDNR official also 
testified that he submitted the letters to FERC under these circumstances because he 
felt he had a “moral obligation to make the observations and request assistance.” Id. 
at 107:25–108:4.  
 815. See Boyce Hydro Power, LLC, 159 F.E.R.C. ¶ 62,292 (2017), at 1, 23, 
24, 42–43, 48–52; see also Boyce Hydro Power, LLC, 161 FERC ¶ 62,119, 1, 3–4, 6 
(2017).  
 816. See State of Michigan, Tobacco River Restoration Project, MDEQ-Water 
Bureau (2002).  
826 Michigan State Law Review  2019 
banks.”817 Given the natural proclivities of the Tittabawassee River, 
the Dow Chemical facility incident resulted in the “deposition of 
contaminated material onto the floodplain and in the redistribution of 
contaminated sediments.”818 Indeed, MDNR’s own description of 
Tittabawassee River belies the legal fiction that has been created by 
NREPA’s effective adoption of an administrative presumption of 
harm requiring strict liability impositions for alleged inland stream, 
floodplain, wetland, and soil erosion violations, which, as this Article 
has clearly revealed, dovetails nicely with the GWLQA’s analogous 
strict liability-based precautionary principle and ecosystem-based 
legal and philosophical underpinnings.  
The 1987 GLWQA had identified Saginaw River and Saginaw 
Bay, Michigan, as an Area of Concern (AOC) on Lake Huron due to 
contaminated sediments, fish consumption advisories, degraded 
fisheries, and loss of significant recreational values.819 The following 
sources of pollution were identified: industrial waste discharges; 
municipal, industrial, and stormwater discharges; combined sewer 
overflows; and agricultural and urban runoff. Contaminants included 
dioxins, furans, PCBs, chloride, metals, acids, and excessive nutrients, 
such as nitrogen and phosphorus.820 USEPA addressed the source of 
much of these contaminants by engaging in a massive cleanup of the 
Tittabawassee River, Saginaw River, and Saginaw Bay, which began 
in 2012 as far north as a three-mile stretch next to the Dow Chemical 
Company’s Midland, Michigan, Plant.821 This cleanup continues to the 
current day, with USEPA having released a 2018 plan proposing 
cleanup options for Segments 6 and 7 of the Tittabawassee River 
downstream from the Dow Chemical Midland Plant, which involves 
remediation of several “sediment management areas (SMAs) and bank 
management areas (BMAs).”822 The MDNR/MDEQ Tittabawassee 
 
 817. TITTABAWASSEE RIVER ASSESSMENT, SPECIAL REPORT 52, supra note 
778, at 37. 
 818. Id. 
 819. See Great Lakes AOCs – About Saginaw River and Bay AOC, EPA, 
https://www.epa.gov/great-lakes-aocs/about-saginaw-river-and-bay-aoc [https:// 
perma.cc/N5KD-NBWC] (last updated Oct. 3, 2018).  
 820. See id. 
 821. See Superfund Site: Tittabawassee River, Saginaw River & Bay Midland, 
MI Cleanup Activities, EPA, https://cumulis.epa.gov/supercpad/SiteProfiles/ 
index.cfm?fuseaction=second.Cleanup&id=0503250#bkground [https://perma.cc/ 
D6F3-W44F] (last visited Oct. 30, 2019).  
 822. Id.; see also TITTABAWASSEE AND SAGINAW RIVER & FLOODPLAIN 
PROJECT TEAM, TITTABAWASSEE RIVER SEGMENTS 6 AND 7 (OU1) RESPONSE 
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River Assessment identified that the higher than normal dioxin levels 
had arisen from the operations of the Dow Chemical Midland Plant 
and had been found in Tittabawassee River sediment, floodplain soils, 
fish, and wild game animals located beginning at Midland and 
downstream from the Boyce Hydropower LLC-operated hydroelectric 
dams.823  
While such evidence against Dow should have removed the 
Boyce hydroelectric dam facilities from MDEQ’s consideration as a 
major point source or a nonpoint source contributor to the 
Tittabawassee River’s impairment (and thus Saginaw Bay’s and Lake 
Huron’s impairment), this has not been Boyce’s experience. Indeed, it 
must be recalled that Annex 2.c of the GLWQA had required the 
development of the Lake Huron Lakewide Action and Management 
Plan (LAMP).824 Additionally, the Lake Huron LAMP has taken the 
position that hydropower dams “threaten the diversity of native fishes 
by restricting or eliminating connectivity between lake and critical 
spawning, nursery, and overwintering habitat” and “interrupt the 
natural flow of water, nutrients, and sediment to Lake Huron, alter 
temperature regimes (e.g., thermal heating), and increase the 
transformation and exposure of toxic pollutants (e.g., mercury).”825 It 
also must be recalled that the 2017 Lake Huron LAMP recommended 
“[f]ederal, regional and multi-jurisdictional initiatives that examine 
opportunities for dam decommissioning and removal,” included dam 
removal among its lakewide actions for the five-year period spanning 
2017–2021, and that GLRI funding has been used since at least 2012 
and will continue to be used to remove dams across the State of 
Michigan and the Great Lakes Region.826 
Therefore, it is no surprise that MDEQ’s 2015 and Draft 2019 
Nonpoint Source Program plans identified how “[w]ater quality 
impairments caused by dams” are among “[t]he primary NPS 
pollutants and causes of impairment addressed by the NPS 
Program.”827 MDEQ’s 2015 and Draft 2019 NPS Plan further state that 
 
PROPOSAL 1–2 (2018); EPA, EPA PROPOSES CLEANUP PLAN FOR TITTABAWASSEE 
RIVER: SEGMENTS 6 & 7, at 1 (2018). 
 823. See TITTABAWASSEE RIVER ASSESSMENT, SPECIAL REPORT 52, supra note 
778, at 36–37. 
 824. See supra Section III.F.3. 
 825. See id.  
 826. Id. 
 827. MICH. DEP’T OF ENV’T GREAT LAKES AND ENERGY WATER RES. DIV., 
NONPOINT SOURCE PROGRAM PLAN 7 (Dec. 3, 2015); MICH. DEP’T OF ENV’T GREAT 
LAKES AND ENERGY WATER RES. DIV., NONPOINT SOURCE PROGRAM DRAFT 10 (June 
14, 2019).  
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“NPS threats and causes of impairments that are relatively minor on a 
statewide basis may be locally important within individual watersheds 
and best addressed through implementation of a [watershed 
management plan] WMP.”828 The 2015 and draft 2019 NPS Plan cite 
as a priority example “[a]lterations to natural stream morphology 
caused by dams and dam failures.”829 
The 2015 and Draft 2019 NPS Plans, in addition, state that the 
“NPS Program will work to address the causes of hydrologic alteration 
of water bodies and watersheds. The National Water Quality 
Inventory: 2000 Report to Congress lists hydrologic modification as a 
source of water quality impairment in 20 percent of rivers and streams 
nationally, and 18 percent of lakes, ponds, and reservoirs.”830 
“Hydrologic modification can be caused by a number of activities, 
including dams . . . . Altering the hydrology of a water body or 
watershed can increase soil erosion and sediment loads resulting in 
impaired aquatic life.”831 
More specifically, MDEQ’s 2015 and Draft 2019 NPS Plans 
state that “[a]nthropogenic flow obstructions,” such as dams, “change 
the natural morphology of the stream by changing stream dimensions, 
flow velocities and sinuosity.” For example, dams “impound water 
and do not allow for the natural movement of sediment through the 
watershed. In addition, soil erosion can be unnaturally high below 
dams and undersized culverts.” Significantly, MDEQ’s draft NPS 
Plan emphasizes that the “NPS Program will look for opportunities to 
remov[e] unnatural flow obstructions to reduce soil erosion and 
restore natural stream functions. The NPS Program will consider the 
use of program funds for portions of dam removal projects that will 
contribute toward improvements in water quality.”832 The 2015 and 
Draft 2019 NPS Plans state that to improve climate change 
 
 828. MICH. DEP’T OF ENV’T GREAT LAKES AND ENERGY WATER RES. DIV., 
NONPOINT SOURCE PROGRAM PLAN 27 (Dec. 3, 2015); MICH. DEP’T OF ENV’T GREAT 
LAKES AND ENERGY WATER RES. DIV., NONPOINT SOURCE PROGRAM DRAFT 28 (June 
14, 2019). 
 829. Id. 
 830. MICH. DEP’T OF ENV’T GREAT LAKES AND ENERGY WATER RES. DIV., 
NONPOINT SOURCE PROGRAM PLAN 29 (Dec. 3, 2015); MICH. DEP’T OF ENV’T GREAT 
LAKES AND ENERGY WATER RES. DIV., NONPOINT SOURCE PROGRAM DRAFT 30 (June 
14, 2019).  
 831. Id. 
 832. MICH. DEP’T OF ENV’T GREAT LAKES AND ENERGY WATER RES. DIV., 
NONPOINT SOURCE PROGRAM PLAN 30 (Dec. 3, 2015) (emphasis added); MICH. DEP’T 
OF ENV’T GREAT LAKES AND ENERGY WATER RES. DIV., NONPOINT SOURCE PROGRAM 
DRAFT 30–31 (June 14, 2019) (emphasis added). 
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performance, it would promote removal of dams that no longer serve 
their purpose “to reduce the surface area of impounded river water 
warmed by solar radiation in the summer.”833 Moreover, the Draft 
2019 NPS Plan cites the “removal of three major dams on the 
Boardman River mainstream” as “the largest dam removal project in 
Michigan’s history, and the largest wetlands restoration in the Great 
Lakes Basin.”834  
In sum, MDNR/MDEQ’s strict enforcement of NREPA Parts 
303, 301, 91, and 31, which also encompasses the agencies’ dam 
removal policy, resulted in their excessive monitoring of Boyce Hydro 
Power LLC’s operation of its four Tittabawassee River FERC-
licensed hydroelectric dams. The burdens such monitoring had 
imposed on Boyce significantly contributed to its loss of the Edenville 
Dam FERC license and ultimately led Boyce to seek the sale of all 
four Tittabawassee River hydroelectric dam facilities and the lands 
servicing them to Michigan lakeside residents.835 These policies and 
practices amount to nothing less than foreign regulatory acculturation 
by overzealous regulators and government-funded environmental and 
wildlife extremist groups which seek to ensure their climate change-
 
 833. Id. at 48. 
 834. MICH. DEP’T OF ENV’T GREAT LAKES AND ENERGY WATER RES. DIV., 
NONPOINT SOURCE PROGRAM DRAFT 78 (June 14, 2019) (discussing the “Boardman 
River Downstream from the Confluence of the North Branch and the South Branch”).  
 835. See Chris Ehrmann, Wixom Lake to Become a Lake Again After Tentative 
$9M Deal, MLIVE (Apr. 26, 2019), https://www.mlive.com/news/saginaw-bay-
city/2019/04/wixom-lake-to-become-a-lake-again-after-tentative-9m-deal.html 
[https://perma.cc/5C2V-3DH9]; David Lyden, Wixom Lake Levels Expected to Return 
to Normal as Task Force Agrees to Buy Dams, 9&10 NEWS (Apr. 25, 2019), 
https://www.9and10news.com/2019/04/25/wixom-lake-levels-expected-to-return-to-
normal-as-task-force-agrees-to-buy-dams/ [https://perma.cc/69ZY-MA6X]; Tereasa 
Nims, Wixom Water: Tentative Deal Reached on Purchase of Four Dams, MIDLAND 
DAILY NEWS (Apr. 24, 2019), https://www.ourmidland.com/news/article/Tentative-
nbsp-deal-reached-on-purchase-of-four-13792418.php [https://perma.cc/Y2TT-
EBKS]; see also A Sustainable Future for the Four Lakes, FOUR LAKES TASK FORCE, 
http://www.four-lakes-taskforce-mi.com/ [https://perma.cc/A8FK-RQB6] (last 
visited Oct. 30, 2019); FLTF Files for Preliminary Permit to Obtain Hydroelectric 
Power License for Edenville Dam, FOUR LAKES TASK FORCE (June 24, 2019), 
http://www.four-lakes-taskforce-mi.com/updates.html [https://perma.cc/UM7Q-
W79T].  
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free utopian society materializes,836 no matter the economic cost and 
their inability to quantify the putative benefits promised.837  
CONCLUSION 
This Article has demonstrated that the wetlands, floodplains, 
inland waterway, and soil erosion and sedimentation control 
provisions of Parts 31, 91, 301, and 303 of NREPA, Michigan’s 
primary environmental statute, and their corresponding regulations, as 
well as MDEQ NREPA monitoring and enforcement practices (which 
include MDNR FERC license compliance monitoring practices and 
dam removal policies), have effectively been “Europeanized” and 
internationalized at the expense of the constitutionally protected 
private property rights of Michigan-based hydroelectric dam 
owner/operators, farmers, and other landowners. This result has been 
obtained, in part, because of the state’s implementation of various 
federal, interstate, and international environmental agreements and 
initiatives entered into with Canada and the Great Lakes States to 
which Michigan has directly (and indirectly through USEPA) become 
a signatory party or an intended third-party beneficiary. These legal 
and political instruments embody European and international legal 
norms and standards, such as sustainable development, the 
 
 836. See Lawrence Kogan, A Second Look at EPA Findings, FORBES (Mar. 5, 
2015), https://www.forbes.com/sites/realspin/2015/03/05/a-second-look-at-epa-
findings/#4bd154d32c8d [https://perma.cc/DQ86-ZEXM]; Kogan, Revitalizing the 
Information Quality Act, supra note 287, at 13–14; Lawrence Kogan, Climate Change 
Chicanery and the Federal Agency-Academic Complex, DAILY CALLER (Sept. 26, 
2014), https://dailycaller.com/2014/09/26/climate-change-chicanery-and-the-federal-
agency-academic-complex/ [https://perma.cc/MBU8-PDD3]; Lawrence A. Kogan & 
Richard D. Otis, Keeping Junk Science at Bay on Global Warming, WASH. TIMES 
(May 29, 2014), https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2014/may/29/kogan-otis-
keeping-junk-science-at-bay/ [https://perma.cc/BFJ3-QUUR].  
 837. See WATER QUALITY AND POLLUTION CONTROL IN MICHIGAN 2016 
SECTIONS 303(D), 305(B), AND 314 INTEGRATED REPORT, supra note 435, at 31 (“The 
benefits associated with implementation of these programs are numerous, although it 
is not possible to accurately quantify the benefits in strictly monetary terms.”); id. at 
109 (“If (Table of Contents) 2.26 Cost/Benefit Assessment is to remain in the 
document the contribution of local funding, support and operations should be included 
and expanded to reflect the real local costs of water treatment, wastewater treatment, 
on-going maintenance of water protection systems, and the value of local stewardship 
as reported (at minimum) in DEQ grant records.”); see also id. (“We appreciate that 
2.26 is far from complete, as stated in the second sentence. The numbers used in this 
section only help provide a brief description of the scale of activities in which the 
MDEQ is involved and are not meant to address the significant efforts and costs 
realized by local governmental entities as well.”). 
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precautionary principle, ecosystem-based management, marine spatial 
planning, and weight-of-the-evidence.838 In addition, Michigan has 
been compelled to implement at the state level complimentary USEPA 
and USFWS-driven federal environmental and wildlife regulations 
(i.e., Clean Water Act, Endangered Species Act, Coastal Zone 
Management Act, etc.) revised during the former Obama 
administration specifically to incorporate such European and 
international norms and standards.839 Michigan’s strict enforcement of 
NREPA also is attributable, in part, to Michigan’s exclusive status as 
only one of two U.S. states USEPA has authorized to enact and 
enforce CWA § 404 wetlands protections that are more stringent than 
those at the federal level.840  
Michigan’s and Washington’s political classes, however, have 
long relied upon the density and complexity of these Canada–U.S. 
environmental agreements and initiatives and their relationship to U.S. 
federal and Michigan state environmental laws as a pretense for not 
disclosing to the state electorate how the European and international 
legal norms and standards they incorporate have incrementally over 
time been imbibed into state law in the putative “public interest.” The 
failure of these “captured”841 elites to transparently inform the ordinary 
people (“We the People”) regarding how these foreign legal norms and 
standards have been designed and implemented to curtail the exercise 
of their constitutionally protected private property rights is nothing 
short of an abdication of their federal and state oaths of office and a 
violation of the legal and fiduciary responsibilities they owe to the 
public they are sworn to serve.842  
 
 838. See supra Parts I–V. 
 839. See, e.g., Kogan, Revised U.S. Deep Seabed Mining Policy, supra note 
96 (and sources cited therein). 
 840. See supra Part VI. 
 841. See Lawrence A. Kogan, Commercial High Technology Innovations 
Face Uncertain Future Amid Emerging “BRICS” Compulsory Licensing and IT 
Interoperability Frameworks, 13 SAN DIEGO INT’L L. J. 201, 213–216 (2011) 
(discussing the concept of industry and interest group regulatory capture related to 
clean energy projects). 
 842. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 3 (“The Senators and Representatives before 
mentioned . . . shall be bound by Oath or Affirmation, to support the 
Constitution . . . .”); see also Oath of Office, U.S. SENATE, https://www.senate.gov/ 
artandhistory/history/common/briefing/Oath_Office.htm [https://perma.cc/XBS2-
6HHK] (“I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support and defend the 
Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic; that I will 
bear true faith and allegiance to the same; that I take this obligation freely, without 
any mental reservation or purpose of evasion; and that I will well and faithfully 
discharge the duties of the office on which I am about to enter: So help me God.”) 
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These federal and state government servants must be held 
publicly accountable. Public accountability can be achieved most 
swiftly by voting out of and recalling from office (preferably, during 
the next election cycle) the Europhiliacs and New Green Deal 
supporters hiding in plain sight within Michigan’s and Washington’s 
legislative and executive branches. Alternatively (or additionally), 
concerned Michigan citizens and residents can demand that their state 
and federal representatives undertake more lasting reforms resulting 
in (1) the revision of NREPA and accompanying regulations and 
modification of MDEQ/MDNR/EGLE monitoring and enforcement 
practices to ensure they are and remain consistent with constitutional 
due process and the rule of law; (2) the narrow reinterpretation or 
surrender of Michigan’s special CWA § 404 status with USEPA, 
recognizing that Congress had never intended to regulate isolated 
nontidal inland wetlands;843 and (3) the amendment of or the State of 
Michigan’s withdrawal from the Great Lakes Water Quality 
Agreement, the Great Lakes–St. Lawrence River Basin Agreement, 
the interstate Great Lakes–St. Lawrence River Basin Water Resources 
Compact, the Great Lakes Restoration Initiative, and the Great Lakes 
Regional Collaboration, within which the European and international 
legal norms and standards discussed herein are ensconced. Finally, 
concerned Michigan citizens and residents can call for the White 
House and Congress to immediately suspend all U.S. funding to the 
Great Lakes Legacy Act, Great Lakes Regional Collaboration, Great 
Lakes Restoration Initiative, Great Lakes Commission, Great Lakes 
Water Quality Agreement, and all Clean Water Act (CWA) §§ 319 
and 404 federal–state funding susceptible to nontransparent 
allocation/diversion/transfer thereto. And they can insist on this 
moratorium remaining in place until it can be demonstrated that such 
agreements, initiatives, and funding mechanisms have been purged of 
their postmodern European and international law taint. 
  
 
(last visited Oct. 30, 2019); see MICH. CONST. art. XI, § 1 (“I do solemnly swear (or 
affirm) that I will support the Constitution of the United States and the constitution of 
this state, and that I will faithfully discharge the duties of the office of . . . according 
to the best of my ability.”).  
 843. See Kogan, Harmonizing ‘Converted Wetland’ Under the Clean Water 
Act and Food Security Act, supra note 34. 
